FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-020
Wednesday
30 January 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-020 CONTENTS *30 January 1991*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Bessmertnykh, Egyptian, Dutch Ministers View Gulf *[TASS]* 1
Ignatenko on Summit Postponement, Other Issues *[TASS]* 1
  Views 'Serious Decisions' on Gulf *[AFP]* 1
Petrovskiy on Soviet Perception of Changing UN *[TASS]* 2
Petrovskiy, SFRY Envoy Discuss Gulf Crisis *[TASS]* 2
Dzasokhov Addresses Moscow Forum on UN Role *[TASS]* 3
Lukyanov Holds Talks With UN Officials *[Moscow TV]* 3
Yanayev Meets UN Official in Moscow *[TASS]* 3
Poles Define Terms for FRG Aid Transit to USSR *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 3
  Poland Said Profiting From Transit *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Jan]* 4
NATO 'Stay Behind' Activities in GDR Eyed *[PRAVDA 11 Jan]* 4
Batenin Views Future European Security Strategy *[Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG 9 Jan]* 4

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

IZVESTIYA Reports Moscow Summit Postponement *[30 Jan]* 6
Bessmertnykh Interviewed on Summit Postponement *[Moscow TV]* 6
Commentaries Follow Decision on Summit's Delay 7
  Should Not Be 'Overdramatized' *[Moscow International]* 7
  Reasons for Delay Analyzed *[PRAVDA 30 Jan]* 8
  Potential for Dialogue Left Open *[TASS]* 9
TASS Carries Joint U.S. Statement on Gulf 9
Bessmertnykh-Baker Talks End 29 Jan *[TASS]* 10
U.S. Protests Over Gulf Recalls Vietnam Fears *[PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 10

China

Chinese Experience May Help USSR Reforms *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 11

Northeast Asia

Reports Continue on Maslyukov's Visit to ROK 12
  Interviewed on Relations *[Moscow International]* 12
  'Promising' Prospects Foreseen *[Moscow TV]* 12
Japan's Nakayama Interviewed on Relations *[Moscow TV]* 13
Commentary Views Nakayama's Visit *[Moscow International]* 14
Pavlov Previews Gorbachev Visit to Japan *[TASS]* 15
Japan-North Korea Discuss Normalizing Relations *[Moscow International]* 16

Southeast Asia & Pacific

TASS Reports Joint Vietnamese Economic Talks 16
PRAVDA Notes Vietnamese Group's Visit to Paper *[25 Jan]* 16
Commentary on Lao Official's Visit to China *[Moscow International]* 17
Beijing-Phnom Penh May Establish Governmental Ties *[Moscow International]* 17
Yazov Greets Lao Counterpart on Army Anniversary *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Jan]* 18
Cambodian Parties Urged To Show Self-Restraint *[Moscow International]* 18

Near East & South Asia

- Petrovskiy Discusses Gulf With Maghreb Envoys *[TASS]* 18
- Mideast Diplomats Interviewed on Gulf Conflict *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 22 Jan]* 19
- Defense Officials View Iraqi Chemical Threat 20
  - Regional Dangers Eyed *[IZVESTIYA 29 Jan]* 20
  - Medical Consequences Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Jan]* 21
  - Allied Forces Characterized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 26 Jan]* 22
- Gremitskikh Reports Baghdad Embassy Reductions *[TASS]* 23
- Further Assessments on Persian Gulf War Issued 23
  - Global Consqequences Assessed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Jan]* 23
  - Opposing Views Compared *[Gerasimov in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 4]* 23
- Soviet Peace Committee Appeals to Saddam *[IZVESTIYA 11 Jan]* 24

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

- 'Vremya' Carries Gorbachev Law Enforcement Decree *[Moscow TV]* 25
  - Further on Decree *[Moscow TV]* 25
- Ministers Cited on Joint Patrols, Prices *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 30 Jan]* 25
- Interior Minisrty Official on Joint Patrols *[TASS]* 27
- Constitutional Committee To Review Order *[Radio Rossii]* 27
- Decree for Joint Militia-Army Patrols Discussed 27
  - Shatalin, Others Discuss Plan *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 27
  - Concern Expressed at Decree *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 27
- Justice Minister Affirms Primacy of Union Law *[TASS]* 28
- End of Gorbachev 'Silence' on Baltics Welcomed *[IZVESTIYA 26 Jan]* 28
- Gubenko Ponders Causes of Baltic 'Tragedy' *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 29
- Central Committee Department Discusses Referendum *[PRAVDA 25 Jan]* 30
- Veterans Backs Referendum on Preserving USSR *[Moscow Radio]* 31
- 'Absolute' Sovereignty Said 'Incorrect' *[PRAVDA 23 Jan]* 31
- Centrist Bloc's Composition, Aims Described *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Jan]* 32
- Measures Against Drug-Trafficking Examined *[TASS]* 33
- Dzasokhov Addresses Zil Plant Workers *[Moscow TV]* 34
- Cabinet of Ministers Discusses Coal Industry *[PRAVDA 30 Jan]* 34
- AES Shutdown, Generating Capacity Data Cited *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* 35
- KGB on Problems of Opening Krasnoyarsk *[TRUD 25 Jan]* 35
- 1960's Operations in Latin America Detailed 36
  - Part I *[TRUD 9 Jan]* 36
  - Part II *[TRUD 10 Jan]* 38
- Yelena Bonner Condemns Gorbachev Policies *[Prague TV]* 42
- Youth Daily Says Press Law 'Intact' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Jan]* 43
- Anchorman Bemoans Fate of 'Vzglyad' Program *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 43
- New Feature Launced on Party Organizations' Work *[PRAVDA 28 Jan]* 44
- Pakistani Embassy Denies Visa Delays *[IZVESTIYA 19 Jan]* 45
- Finland Denies Political Asylum for Hijacker *[TASS]* 45
- Government Extends Early Retirement Rights *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 45

Economic

- Speculation on Prices Increases Challenged *[IZVESTIYA 30 Jan]* 46
- Deputy Minister on Impact of AES Closings *[EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN No 52]* 46
- Appeals Made to Gorbachev To Save Oil Industry *[IZVESTIYA 26 Jan]* 48
- Shatalin Calls for Return to '500 Days' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 16 Jan]* 48
- Gosbank Official Discusses Ruble Exchange *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* 51
- Gosbank Aide on Issues Raised by 'Ekho' Deal *[IZVESTIYA 25 Jan]* 53
- Omsk To Produce AN-74 Planes for Civilian Use *[Moscow International]* 54

Military

Decree Issued on Joint Army-Militia Patrols *[PRAVDA 30 Jan]* ... 55
  Deputy Interior Minister on Decree *[TASS]* ... 55
Draft Provisions for Military Control Commission *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Jan]* ... 55
Belorussian MD Officer Discusses Troop Cutbacks *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Jan]* ... 57
Defense Budget Structure Review Urged *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Jan]* ... 58

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Addresses Supreme Council 29 Jan *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 60
Landsbergis Interviewed on Gorbachev Meeting *[Paris LE FIGARO 24 Jan]* ... 61
Landsbergis Cited on Postponed U.S.-Soviet Summit *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 62
Landsbergis Receives Bulgarian Deputies *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 63
Paper Criticizes Landsbergis Statement on Army *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Jan]* ... 63
Lithuania Adopts Statement on Diplomatic Treaties *[TASS]* ... 63
Supreme Council Delegation Departs for Moscow *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 63
TASS Charges Lithuanian Press 'Disinformation' ... 64
TASS Issues Rebuttal of Disinfomation Accusation *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 17 Jan]* ... 65
Lithuanian Referendum Preparation Reported *[IZVESTIYA 29 Jan]* ... 65
Navigational Malfunction Cited in Bombing *[TASS]* ... 65
Fires at Mazeikiai Oil Refinery Cause Concern *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 66
Latvian Salvation Committee Suspends Power Quest *[TASS]* ... 66
Latvian, Estonian Leaders Meet Germany's Genscher *[TASS]* ... 66
  Jurkans Reaches 'Understanding' *[TASS]* ... 66
Gorbunovs on Supreme Soviet Deputies Meeting *[TASS]* ... 67
Latvian People's Front Discusses Nishanov Visit *[Riga Radio]* ... 67
Gorbunovs Discusses Referendum, Army Relations *[Riga Radio]* ... 68
  Further on Gorbunovs Remarks *[Riga Radio]* ... 68
Gorbunovs Invited to Federation Council Session *[Riga Radio]* ... 68
Latvian Official on Independence, Gorbachev Talks *[Bratislava VEREJNOST 25 Jan]* ... 69
Split in Estonian Communist Party 'Completed' *[TASS]* ... 69
'Autonomous' Party Declared *[IZVESTIYA 28 Jan]* ... 70
Stockholm Paper Interviews Estonia's Savisaar *[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 27 Jan]* ... 70
Savisaar Says Army in Estonia 'Being Observed' *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 71
Estonia's Ruutel on Upcoming Swiss Economic Quorom *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 71
Estonia's Ruutel To Visit U.S. 'Soon' *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 71
'Lysenko's Hitmen' 'Inciting Tension' in Tallinn *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 71
Estonian Radio Director Protests 'Jamming' Claim *[Moscow Radio]* ... 71
  Claim Called 'Crude Falsification' *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 72
Centrist Bloc Blames Baltic Leaders for Events *[TASS]* ... 72
Baltic Leaders' 'Pilgrimage' to West Criticized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Jan]* ... 73

RSFSR

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Bodies To Meet 29 Jan *[Moscow Radio]* ... 73
  Federation Treaty Debated *[TASS]* ... 73
Stankevich, Police Chief Cited on Joint Patrols *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 29 Jan]* ... 73
RSFSR Deputies Criticize Joint Patrol Order *[Moscow TV]* ... 74
RSFSR Council of Ministers View Monetary Reform *[PRAVDA 24 Jan]* ... 76
Resolution on Bank Note Exchange Published *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Jan]* ... 77
Party Leadership Lauds Reception of Citizens *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 26 Jan]* ... 77
Popov on Strengthening Executive Power in Moscow *[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 17 Jan]* ... 78
  Text of Restructuring Draft *[VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 17 Jan]* ... 80
Deputy Groups Issue Statement on Lithuania *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Jan]* ... 82
Colonel Defends Yeltsin in Baltic Issue *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 4]* ... 82
Yeltsin, Union Heads View Income Indexation *[Moscow Radio]* ... 83
Sakhalin Seeks Suspension of Free Economic Zone *[Moscow International]* ... 83

Cooperation Talks With Hokkaido Open in Tokyo *[TASS]* 83
Afghan Envoy to USSR Meets With Yeltsin *[Kabul BAKHTAR]* 84
RSFSR State Pension Law Issued *[cross-reference]* 84

Western Republics

Moldovan Communist Party Holds Conference *[TASS]* 84
  Party Statutes Approved *[PRAVDA 28 Jan]* 85
Ukrainian Draftees Transferred Despite 'Promise' *[Kiev International]* 85
Ukrainian Politburo Discusses Draft Union Treaty *[PRAVDA 26 Jan]* 85
Kravchuk Lauds Crimean Referendum on Autonomy *[TASS]* 85
New Concept Determined for Ukraine Constitution *[TASS]* 86
Protest Issued Over Fire in Dnepropetrovsk *[Kiev International]* 86
Ukraine, Poland Conclude Economic Trade Agreement *[TASS]* 86
Ukrainian Student Hunger Striker's Case Closed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Jan]* 86
Ukrainian Law on Prices, Price Formation *[cross-reference]* 86

Caucasus

Georgia To Establish Army, Abolish Joint Patrols *[AFP]* 87
Police Withdrawal From South Ossetia Proposed *[TASS]* 87
Situation in S. Ossetian Capital 'Contradictory' *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 Jan]* 87
Georgian Railroad Protest Ends; Trains Operating *[Moscow Radio]* 87
Local Administration Bodies Created in Georgia *[TASS]* 88
Armenians Attack Vehicles, Town in Azerbaijan *[Baku Radio]* 88
Azerbaijan Communist Party Plenum Opens 28 Jan *[Baku Radio]* 88
Azerbaijan Officials Examine Refugee Situation *[Baku Radio]* 89
Armenian Leader Briefs Legislature on Lithuania *[Yerevan Radio]* 89
Armenian Official Rules Out Price Increases *[Yerevan International]* 90
Armenian Government Appoints Representatives *[Yerevan Radio]* 90
  Further on Appointments *[Yerevan Radio]* 91

Central Asia

Kazakhstan's Abdildin Views Union Treaty *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Jan]* 91
Alma-Ata Workers' Movement To Help Communists *[Moscow Radio]* 92

Bessmertnykh, Egyptian, Dutch Ministers View Gulf

LD2901223591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2145 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Washington, 30 Jan (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh has had meetings here with Egyptian Foreign Minister A.I. 'Abd-al-Majid and H. van den Broek, the foreign minister of the Netherlands, who are in the United States on working visits.

The situation in the Persian Gulf was the focal point of A.A. Bessmertnykh's conversation with A.I. 'Abd al-Majid. It was noted by both sides that S. Husayn, having clearly miscalculated the world community's reaction to the seizure of Kuwait, by all appearances continues to appraise the situation wrongly. Nevertheless, A.A. Bessmertnykh pointed out, even under conditions of the military operations that have begun, one cannot give up the search for political ways of influencing Iraq with the aim of prompting it to implement the UN Security Council resolutions.

The Soviet and Egyptian ministers were united in the view that after the elimination of the crisis in the Persian Gulf priority attention must be paid to unblocking the Arab-Israeli conflict and to satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

A mutual desire was voiced for the further development and improvement of Soviet-Egyptian relations in various fields.

A.A. Bessmertnykh and H. van den Broek exchanged views on the situation in the Persian Gulf. Also discussed during the conversation were events in the Soviet Union and, specifically, in the Baltic republics and the perception of them in the West. The importance of conducting a dialogue and displaying restraint was stressed by both sides, however.

Ignatenko on Summit Postponement, Other Issues

LD2901171791 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—A Soviet-American summit meeting, originally scheduled for February 11-13, has been postponed to a later period in the first half of the current year because of the Gulf war which requires U.S. President George Bush, as commander-in-chief, to be present in Washington, Vitaliy Ignatenko, assistant to the president of the USSR and head of the presidential press service, told a briefing here today.

Besides, he said, some more time is needed for work on a strategic arms reduction treaty.

Speaking of the current visit to Washington by Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Ignatenko said the Soviet minister explained to the U.S. leadership the Soviet Union's concern that in the Gulf war, actions of the anti-Iraq coalition forces may exceed the powers stipulated by the United Nations Security Council resolutions and unjustified casualties among the civilian population could be inflicted.

Ignatenko said he believes that the talks in Washington have enabled the U.S. side to "come to feel clearly the Soviet Union's stand", including that on the situation in the Baltic republics.

In answer to a question whether new initiatives can be expected from Moscow to settle the Gulf crisis, Ignatenko said that these are now discussed both inside the Soviet leadership and in Mikhail Gorbachev's correspondence with the leaders of a number of West European countries and with President Bush. "They involve a wide spectrum of problems but chief among them is how to end the conflict and avoid further bloodshed," Ignatenko said.

Commenting on a report by the POSTFACTUM news agency that during the Japanese foreign minister's recent visit to Moscow the Soviet side promised to cede four islands of the Kuril chain for 200 billion dollars, Ignatenko stated that "there was nothing of the kind during the visit and no secret documents on that score were signed".

The leader of the presidential press service said the current situation in the Baltic republics is a matter of the president's concern. Gorbachev maintains permanent personal contact with the main figures in Latvia and Estonia. He came to terms with some of them that, quite possibly, the most odious anti-constitutional laws that were adopted there can be abrogated.

"As far as Lithuania is concerned, the process is evolving very slowly there. However, we believe that it will also develop in a positive vein", Ignatenko said.

He described as sheer disinformation a statement by USSR People's Deputy Viktor Alksnis during an interview with the newspaper ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, in which the president was accused of initiating the setting up of national salvation committees in the Baltic republics.

Informing journalists of Gorbachev's work schedule, Ignatenko said that on Thursday the president will attend a plenary meeting of the Soviet [Communist Party] Central Committee and on Friday he will preside over a Federation Council meeting.

Views 'Serious Decisions' on Gulf

AU2901153291 Paris AFP in English 1506 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 29 (AFP)—Kremlin spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko on Tuesday said "very serious decisions" were about to be taken on the Gulf war, adding that Moscow had prepared some "specific proposals" to try to stabilize the situation. "We are on the eve of very serious decisions," Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's spokesman told a news conference here.

Warning that "any war develops its own logic which sometimes goes beyond the objectives set", Mr. Ignatenko cautioned against a widening of the conflict, saying Moscow attached great importance to U.S. President George Bush's statement that he did not wish to destabilize Iraq and respected the Iraqi people.

Mr. Ignatenko restated Moscow's backing for United Nations' resolutions which call for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, but he stressed that the Security Council resolutions did not call for the destruction of Iraq's military and economic potential. "The multi-national force must not allow unjustified victims among the civilian population," the spokesman said.

Mr. Gorbachev has exchanged letters with a number of states, including Mr. Bush, offering "specific proposals" aimed at "stabilizing the situation" in the Middle East, his spokesman said. "All our initiatives at present concern just one thing, that the war does not boil over into a monstruous conflict," Mr. Ignatenko said.

Mr. Ignatenko also spoke of "interesting proposals" by India on ending the conflict and noted that Moscow was keeping in close touch with leaders in Western Europe in an attempt to find a way out of the crisis.

"Our current task is to think of what will happen after the war," Mr. Ignatenko also said, pointing to the need to scale down tensions in the Middle East once the current conflict was over.

Petrovskiy on Soviet Perception of Changing UN

LD2901234391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Vladimir Petrov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan —It is impossible without the United Nations—a unique mechanism of the harmonization of the positions and actions of the members of the world community—to ensure the continuity and stability of the achievements of civilization and the irreversibility of the processes of renewal and development which are taking place in the world today. This was stated by Vladimir Petrovskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affais, in a report entitled "The Soviet Union's View on a Changing United Nations" at an international meeting of nongovernmental organizations, "The United Nations on the Eve of the 21st Century," which opened today.

He noted, however, that these changes should not mean that the United Nations must tackle all problems for all states. The Soviet Union has opened up its society for cooperation and interaction with the whole world. At the same time, the country's internal problems must be tackled by the Soviet people alone and no one else. Especially as they are being tackled in the channel of generally accepted undersandings and on the basis of international law and our Constitution.

Concerning the UN role in the changing world, Vladimir Petrovskiy said that only the collective efforts of all the UN memberstates can ensure the transition from a world structure based on a balance of forces to a stable system of peace, at the basis of which lies a balance of interests. This is also important, bearing in mind that at the present time global stability is inseparably linked with the stability of each member of the world community, and a severance of the progressive nature of the movement may be fraught with destabilization, threatened by an intensification of extremely negative trends toward regional hegemonism, separatism, and an uncontrolled spread of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons.

Dwelling on internal aspects of the development of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovskiy noted that the Union republics that have declared their sovereignty have their own specific interests, the implementation of which demands many-sided cooperation within the framework of international forums. This undoubtedly requires qualitatively new approaches to the coordination of a joint policy in the United Nations on the part of the members of the USSR corresponding to the processes of the renewal of the Soviet federation.

There is no doubt, he stressed in conclusion, that the United Nations is on the brink of major changes. It would be no exaggeration to say that an endorsement of a new world structure today would be impossible without the key role of the United Nations.

Petrovskiy, SFRY Envoy Discuss Gulf Crisis

LD2901221391 Moscow TASS in English 2159 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—Matters connected with the Gulf crisis were discussed by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy and Milos Veres, the ambassador of Yugoslavia in Moscow, during a meeting which was held on Tuesday at the ambassador's request.

Veres informed Petrovskiy of efforts being made by Yugoslavia as chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement towards settling the crisis by political means and towards cessation of hostilities.

The Soviet side emphasised that, considering the danger of further escalation of the conflict, it is important that politico-diplomatic actions should be given a boost, on the part of the Non-Aligned Movement as well, to secure that requirements of the United Nations Security Council resolutions for the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait are complied with.

Dzasokhov Addresses Moscow Forum on UN Role

LD2901212191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1043 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Ivanov and Vladimir Petrov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—Aleksandr Dzasokhov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs, has stressed the "unique" role of the United Nations in solving military, political and regional conflicts. He spoke here today at the opening of the international information meeting "United Nations on the Eve of the 21st Century" in which high-ranking UN officials, Soviet diplomats and the prominent public figures are taking part.

Speaking on the situation in the Persian Gulf region, he stressed the need to increase efforts to achieve a ceasefire and full compliance with the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions.

Touching upon the question of the renewal of Soviet Federation Aleksandr Dzasokhov has noted that the USSR is facing considerable difficulties here. At the same time he stressed that the information about the intensification of interethnic conflicts in the USSR should not been seen as "something capable of hampering good and productive relations" between the USSR and other countries. Adding that interethnic relations are the USSR's internal problem, he declared the USSR's adherence to just solutions for these "exclusively by way of political settlement."

Having mentioned the CSCE conference on human dimension the third stage of which will take place in Moscow in 1991, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, on behalf of the Soviet legislature, has assured the participants in the meeting that the USSR fully realizes its responsibility as the conference host.

He reported that a special commission will be formed very soon under the aegis of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev which will include the competent representatives of state and public organizations. "We will do all we can to make this major international event a success" stressed Aleksandr Dzasokhov.

Lukyanov Holds Talks With UN Officials

LD2901210891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrade Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, today received Therese Paquet-Sevigny, UN undersecretary general for public information; Margaret Anstee, general director of the UN office in Vienna, head of the social development center; Goran Ohlin, assistant to the UN secretary general for economic and social questions; and other members of the UN secretariat taking part in the information meeting "United Nations at the Threshold of the 21st Century."

A friendly conversation took place about the UN's growing role at the present stage as a universal mechanism of global interaction of the world community in the interests of maintaining international peace and security. The guests were informed about the USSR Supreme Soviet's work on the law, preparations for a new Union treaty, and other questions on the life of our country.

Yanayev Meets UN Official in Moscow

LD2801142491 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 28 TASS—Soviet Vice-President Gennadiy Yanayev today received U.N. Under-Secretary-General Therese Paquiet-Sevigny who came to the Soviet Union in connection with the information meeting "United Nations on the Threshold of the 21st Century".

Duration the meeting, the sides praised cooperation between the U.N. and Soviet Government and public organisations on difficult problems facing the international community.

During the meeting, the sides praised cooperation between the U.N. and Soviet Government and public organisations on difficult problems facing the international community.

Yanayev pointed to the U.N.'s growing role as an efficient instrument of maintaining peace, security and international cooperation in the social, economic, humanitarian and legal spheres.

Poles Define Terms for FRG Aid Transit to USSR

PM2901103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Strange Demands"]

[Text] Berlin, 25 Jan—A major "aid convoy" sent from the FRG to the Soviet Union—150 heavy military trucks and 50 ordinary freight vehicles of the Western Group of Forces loaded with food, medical apparatus, and medicines—has been forced to sit in Cottbus for a fifth day.

The valuable freight was collected by Bundeswehr servicemen within the framework of a broad campaign mounted in the FRG to give the USSR humanitarian assistance and was sent by them as a gift to the Moscow Patriarchate. The reason for the convoy's holdup is the categorical refusal of the Polish border customs service to allow the trucks to cross Polish territory in transit.

In this the Polish officials' arguments are of a challenging and almost a provocative nature. They are demanding that the trucks bear Red Cross markings and be inscribed "Charitable Activity for the Russian Church" and that insurance contracts for all the vehicles be concluded with the Polish side and a corresponding sum be paid for this. But even this turns out to be too little. They are demanding that the 250 Soviet servicemen accompanying the convoy be dressed in civilian clothes.

An appeal from representatives of the Orthodox Church to Polish legislators, asking them to assist in resolving this question, has proved unsuccessful.

Poland Said Profiting From Transit

PM2301161591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

["Rejoinder" by V. Stepanov: "They Decided to Make a Bit of Money..."]

[Text] This incident occurred recently on the Polish-German border: The press has reported that Polish border guards detained and sent back to Germany a train on which approximately 200 Soviet servicemen were traveling home from the Western Group of Forces. It is not hard to guess why the barrier came down in front of that train. Not so long ago Polish officials openly promised to hinder the Soviet troop withdrawal from the territory of united Germany unless they were allocated a considerable sum in hard currency for each unit of transport passing over Polish soil. Thus, for example, they would like to get more than $200 for the passage of just one truck. And if you consider the scale of the transfer of troops from Germany to the Soviet Union over the next four years, you can imagine what abundant golden rain the Polish political meteorologists predict for themselves.

Ensuring the transit of units of the Western Group of Forces represents a good opportunity to make a bit of money, POLSKA ZBROJNA, the country's central military newspaper, wrote frankly last fall. The Soviet side could be presented with a big tab for transit services rendered. In this case no arguments of the Soviet command aimed at reducing the payments must be accepted, the newspaper, an organ of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland, pointed out.

Well, the ability to make money has been valued highly on the banks of the Vistula from time immemorial. People throughout the world know what perfection has been achieved by individual representatives—not always the best ones—of the Polish people in the art of making a profit out of anything. It is sad that in the pursuit of profit certain contemporary international businessmen sometimes totally forget about moral considerations. Incidentally, what morality can there be when it is a question of money! Of the big money that can so easily be made out of the Soviet Army's problems.

True, it has to be thought that not all reserves have yet been exhausted here. It is a question now only of paying for passage "back." But it is also possible to present a bill for Soviet units to travel "out." Almost 50 years ago, you know, their route also lay across Polish lands. Incidentally, about land. Here too it is probably possible to make a considerable additional income. A long-term income, practically eternal! For not all the Soviet servicemen will leave Poland. Many, very many, will be unable to leave together with the Northern Group of Forces when the time for withdrawal comes. They died liberating Poland from the Hitlerites. They will remain there forever. They number 600,000. Maybe they too should be presented with bills for the land they occupy?

NATO 'Stay Behind' Activities in GDR Eyed

PM1101152591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov: "More about 'Gladio'"]

[Text] Berlin, 10 Jan—New information has come to light on the activity of the covert organization "Gladio," which existed within NATO.

The newspaper NORDKURIER has reported that during the cold war years personnel of "Gladio's" German department were stationed on GDR territory. The newspaper learned this from a Federal Intelligence Service staffer. The German underground organization used the name "The Stay Behind Organization" (SBO).

The SBO agents were not set the task of conducting any direct subversive actions. They were mainly occupied with intelligence work and with gathering "valuable information." For example, two agents were stationed permanently in Frankfurt an der Oder. They observed Soviet troop movements across the GDR-Polish border. On certain occasions the SBO helped people of importance to it to illegally cross the GDR border.

Batenin Views Future European Security Strategy

AU1601193691 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 9 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Major General Geli Batenin, military expert of the CPSU Central Committee: "Now Europe's Military Division Must Be Abolished, Too"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

Consolidation Must Take Place Gradually

The changes that have happened in Europe were codified in international law in November 1990, when the "Paris Charter" and the "Joint Declaration of the 22 States" were signed in the French capital. (In this declaration members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact gave solemn assurances that they do not consider each other as opponents anymore—the editors) Now basic conclusions have to be drawn from this; a change is necessary.

Here there are some potential options. The first one: The blocs remain in existence, their strategies and military forces undergo a transformation; the goal is the dominance of a nonoffensive defense. The second variety: Via certain organizations or through mutual accessions, the blocs merge into a unified bloc of the European states (with the participation of the United States and Canada).

The third one: The blocs are liquidated after the military-political functions are passed on to the all-European parliament. The military infrastructure of the blocs is not abolished but is used as the basis for a cooperative system.

One also can put the above-mentioned options in chronological order. Then these would be stages of Europe's military-political consolidation. In any case, neither the first nor the second option can be considered as an ideal construction for all-European security—in contrast to the cooperative system, which would best correspond to the democratization of the relations of the participating states.

Sooner or later, however, stages one and two have to be gone through. But they still have a serious defect, namely that they do not eliminate the basic situation—the search for a potential opponent. In the first option, this search would take place on the continent, in the second case outside Europe. This "search" lies in the nature of any bloc structure, as does the trend toward "excessive defense"—because every bloc is based on the egocentric goal of "better security" for the participants.

Options of the two-bloc and mono-bloc construction of security for Europe are conservative in their nature, because they always contain the element of political and military-strategic division into groups of states. In the first construction this dividing line will run through Europe and, as a result of Germany's unification and the weakness of the Warsaw Pact, it may shift toward the East. In the second case, the line will be located outside Europe, which, however, may give rise to absolutely justified security fears on the part of the remaining part of the world community. In other words, the preservation of the blocs (or one bloc) in Europe preserves principles of the cold war, namely those of deterrence and the "balance of fear."

In our view, the idea of a cooperative system of security, which FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher has repeatedly mentioned, has good prospects for the future. What is the basis of this similarity of views? In particular the fact that cooperative security makes it possible to avoid the egocentric models of blocs. It makes it possible to create basically new, civilized, democratic mechanisms for controlling the military-strategic situation in Europe—and this on the basis of the balance of interests of all participants—mechanisms, which (in contrast to the blocs) leave every country with a completely free choice of means and ways for its own contribution to common security.

History Gives Europe One Decade

In this way, the collectively worked out European strategy of security will be implemented according to the following principle: Each participant is guaranteed the same security regardless of its military-political status and its rank. This means, like the share of every other participant, its share in security does not depend on the volume of its military contribution to common security. Each participant may make a contribution through political, economic, ecological, or humanitarian activities.

History gives Europe about one decade for creating the prototype of such a security system. During this period the democratic structures of economic and political power in the USSR and in the other East European countries must be stabilized. Essential geostrategic restructurings in the Third World, such as the elimination of explosive regional hotbeds of conflict, are indispensable. Much will also be determined by the end result of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

United States & Canada

IZVESTIYA Reports Moscow Summit Postponement

PM2901151991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by V. Nadein: "Summit Meeting Will Take Place Later"]

[Text] Washington—The Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow, initially scheduled for February, will take place later, in the first half of 1991. This became known from a joint statement by the USSR and U.S. presidents read out here immediately after President G. Bush's meeting with USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh.

The statement gives two reasons for rescheduling the meeting. The first and main one is the need for the U.S. President to stay in Washington because of the war. The second, subordinate, reason is that work on the treaty on strategic offensive arms has not yet been completed and there is a likelihood that all the problems would not be successfully overcome before 11 February, when it was planned to begin the meeting in Moscow.

The agreement to hold it was reached in December last year, when USSR Foreign Minister E. Shevardnadze was J. Baker's guest in Houston, in the homeland of the secretary of state.

Although G. Bush's intention to refrain from visiting Moscow for the time being has already been under discussion for a long time in the U.S. mass media, as a result of which the deferment of the Moscow meeting was not a political sensation, a whole series of signs attest to the White House's unchanged line aimed at preserving and improving relations with the Kremlin.

Among these signs, observers include primarily the fact—a sensitive one for us—of the absence of mention of the events in the Baltic among the reasons for the deferment. You form the impression that the White House assesses realistically the unrivaled complexity of Soviet domestic political problems, which have no obvious solution. "It is clear that President Gorbachev is struggling against a number of difficulties, but that is nothing new, since similar problems have also faced him in the past," the U.S. secretary of state said, answering a question from one journalist.

At the same time, at both meetings—in the State Department and the White House—U.S. concern was voiced at the use of force in Lithuania and Latvia. But the White House has shown no intention of reacting positively to the appeal of representatives of the Baltic republics that their state independence be recognized and that the problem be passed on to the United Nations. Nor did the U.S. Administration react to a number of signals from B.N. Yeltsin regarding the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between the United States and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The statement which A. Bessmertnykh made on arrival in Washington regarding the need to observe precisely the framework of the UN Security Council resolution aimed exclusively at the liberation of Kuwait has generated profuse commentary in the U.S. press. The Soviet position has often been interpreted as a sudden departure from mutual accords.

At the journalists' request the Soviet minister specified a number of points. It is not a case of the Soviet stance differing from the U.S. Stance. It is a case "of the danger which is created by the very logic of war and a military conflict" which no one can predict or control. The USSR believes that "one must constantly bear in mind the existence of this threat and do everything to avoid it."

If you compare this position with President Bush's recent statements about how the allies are not setting themselves the aim of destroying the state of Iraq and have no hostile feelings for the Iraqi people, then either there is no difference between the positions of the USSR and the United States or else this difference is not so substantial right now, observers believe.

A. Bessmertnykh's concluding talks with Secretary of State J. Baker are scheduled for Tuesday. It is proposed that the sides will concentrate on eliminating differences over the text of the agreement on strategic offensive arms reduction, which has been under discussion for eight years now and has never been so close to completion as now.

Bessmertnykh Interviewed on Summit Postponement

LD2901205591 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Interview with USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh by correpsondent B. Kalyagin in Washington, D.C. on 29 January; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] It is understandable that a certain effect from the tragic events in the Persian Gulf was felt also in the course of the talks USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh held in Washington. Our correspondent B. Kalyagin reports:

[Kalyagin] Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bessmertnykh was received in the Oval Office of the White House by U.S. President George Bush. The Soviet minister handed the leader of the U.S. Administration a message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A detailed conversation took place. Also taking part were U.S. Vice President Quayle and Secretary of State Baker. After the conversation, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and James Baker went out to the journalists who had assembled outside the White House. The ministers said that the presidents of the two countries, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush, had reached an accord that the Soviet-U.S. summit—initially scheduled for February—would take place later, in the course of the first half of 1991.

The USSR foreign minister granted an interview to Soviet television.

[Begin recording] [Bessmertnykh] Because the U.S. President is busy with the events in the Persian Gulf—as the commander in chief he cannot leave the U.S. capital while the conflict continues—and also because of the fact that the Strategic Offensive Armaments Treaty is not yet ready, even though it must be said that probably over 98 percent of the treaty has been agreed—the sides have come to a unanimous mutual conclusion that the summit meeting can be postponed.

[Kalyagin] Has the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics exerted any influence on the decision to postpone the meeting?

[Bessmertnykh] The question of the Soviet Baltic republics was discussed between the two sides prior to my arrival in Washington, and during the meetings here it was touched upon by the U.S. side. We, so to speak, reacted to this in the appropriate way. The postponement of the summit meeting—its being put off until some later time—was brought about primarily by the two circumstances I mentioned.

[Kalyagin] Speaking of the remaining differences in preparing the Strategic Offensive Armaments Treaty, is the U.S. side not trying to make use of the complicated internal situation in the Soviet Union in order to get us to make unilateral concessions.

[Bessmertnykh] As you know, I did not get such an impression. I was in touch with them on this issue earlier, and Baker and I discussed this today, and this question was touched on with President Bush, too. You know the problems which remain—there are two, three problems—are of a very technical nature. They are very complicated. That is why it takes some time to complete them. I think that even here, in Washington, we will ensure a certain advance in resolving these problems. Moreover, it is a 500-page treaty, and even if we succeed, now, in solving all the main problems, even the technical work, right up to simply agreeing the wording of this treaty will take more time than we have left. So, today in his conversation with me, the President stated outright that the United States is interested in concluding this treaty on limiting strategic offensive armaments. We agreed that both sides would attempt to complete this treaty sometime in February.

[Kalyagin] How, as a whole, do you assess the present talks with the U.S. President, and with the secretary of state?

[Bessmertnykh] Well, frankly speaking, this was not my first meeting with the American leaders, but it was my first meeting in my new capacity. The talks were very intensive, very complicated on a number of aspects, but, at the same time, the level of mutual understanding and trust that has arisen between the Soviet Union and the United States has made it possible to discuss virtually everything in such a frank and businesslike form. We spoke about questions of security. We spoke about problems concerning the Persian Gulf, including prospects for the development of the situation there, not only around the Persian Gulf, but in the Near East as a whole. We spoke about questions of disarmament. I think that as a whole this was a stage of no small importance in the development of contacts between the two countries. [end recording]

Commentaries Follow Decision on Summit's Delay

Should Not Be 'Overdramatized'

LD2901151691 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] As you may have heard in the news, the Moscow Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, originally scheduled for 11-30 February [dates as heard], has been put off. It will take place later, in the second half of this year. After a meeting between the Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, and the U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, and President George Bush, it was announced that the summit was delayed for two reasons: the war in the Gulf and the unpreparedness to the treaty to cut strategic offensive arms by one-third.

Yuriy Solton of our staff elaborates:

Many expected that decision, and I do not think it should be overdramatized. The decision was mutual, and I amm certain that it does not indicate a cooling in Soviet-U.S. relations. The spirit of cooperation and trust crucial to bilateral relations and world security has remained. The Soviet Union and the United States have common interests in a number of key fields of international life, something one could not dream of just two or three years ago. For instance, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh has confirmed that the Soviet Union, like the United States, wants the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution on the ousting of Iraq from Kuwait, although it fears that the scale of the war may expand. In Washington, it has been agreed to finalize a strategic arms treaty at an early date. In February, after a new round of consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States hope to have the treaty ready for signature.

Of course, the emergence of a new type of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States after several decades of confrontation is no easy matter. In some cases, they have to deal with situations which, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh said, require action in cold blood. This is particularly true of domestic problems. For instance, the hasty and shallow response from the West on the events in the Baltic area has caused harm to the consolidation of democratic forces in the Soviet Union and efforts to build a new world order. I believe that the Bush administration has displayed enough restraint. True, both Congress and the President have voiced serous concern about the outbreak of violence in Lithuania and Latvia; however, the U.S. secretary of state, Baker, has confirmed that that was not the reason for putting off the summit. Mr. Baker said that the U.S. officials were aware that President Gorbachev had to deal with many problems and that he was doing his best to cope with them.

Judging from the results of the talks in Washington, the leaders of the two countries are going to preserve and build up from the positive potential of Soviet-U.S. relations. President Bush told the Soviet foreign minister that fostering those relations was very important. He said that a new climate of trust made possible an unprecedented level of political cooperation by the two countries in the international scene. The Moscow summit has been put off, but the policy of mutual understanding and partnership between the Soviet Union and the United States has continued.

Reasons for Delay Analyzed

PM2901185791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by political observer Tomas Kolesnichenko: "My Opinion": "Concerning the Visit"]

[Text] The main news from Washington—the postponement of the Soviet-U.S. summit which was scheduled for 11-13 February—did not come as a sensation. It had been predicted by most observers. Something else caused the sensation, namely the reasons which were given for this in the joint statement to journalists, let me emphasize—the joint statement, by the U.S. secretary of state and the USSR foreign minister.

Many Muscovites who are currently "intercepting" broadcasts by the U.S. CNN-TV network directly from the air waves were able to witness this for themselves.

The first reason, Baker said, is the war in the Persian Gulf. In this situation President Bush cannot leave the United States.

The second reason is the necessity to finalize, or rather to polish the treaty on substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms which is to be signed by the presidents of the USSR and the United States. This is not a very weighty argument, since both sides have said that it is not a question of fundamental differences, but rather of a "technical" linkup.

A "third reason" remained hanging in the air, or rather it reverberated in the air in front of a battery of microphones held up by journalists: "What about Lithuania, what about the 'Baltic factor'?" To all these questions Baker replied imperturbably: "The statement speaks for itself. It contains all there is to say. There are no other reasons."

There is a deep meaning in these words, in my opinion. Above all this means that President Bush did not succumb to the temptation to give way to a noisy press campaign, to pressure from certain senators, and from a certain section of public opinion, to put it bluntly. A single mention of the "Baltic factor" would have been sufficient to earn Bush, riding the populist wave, a number of points. But as Kipling wrote way back—"work out what the dinner will cost before you invite the guests." And Bush did. There is no "third reason." "Growing concern" about the situation in the Baltic republics, which he expressed in conversation with our foreign minister means in diplomatic language that the U.S. President did not overstep the line beyond which he could be accused of interference in the internal affairs of other states.

How long can Bush maintain this stance? Usually both the U.S. Senate and the President give priority to their domestic interests ("narrow mercenary" interests, as we were fond of calling them). The situation in the world at present is such that it is becoming difficult to separate them from international interests, however. It is highly indicative that Bush himself recently described the Soviet Union as "a most important factor in the international community." Essentially, the question at present is this: Will the two great powers succeed in maintaining and developing the new level of their relations, or will a sharp decline set in, a return to "cold war" times. The latter, generally speaking, is fraught with a worldwide catastrophe in view of the fact what is happening in the Persian Gulf. If the USSR and the United States were on opposite sides of the barricades in that region now, the specter of a third world war could become reality. Fortunately, this is not the case.

It would be naive to assume that all the interests of Moscow and Washington coincide, however. It would be even more naive to believe that the USSR, going through a complex transitional period in its development, has "farmed out" the Near and Middle East to the "only remaining superpower"—America. If anyone had any doubts about this, they should have been dispersed by the very first words uttered by A. Bessmertnykh on U.S. soil.

Yes, we favor the implementation of the Security Council decisions—forcing the aggressor to withdraw from Kuwait. We are against the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, however, and we are concerned at the mounting casualties among the civilian population. It is possible to add that the future of Iraq and the region as a whole, including how long U.S. forces remain there, is by no means a matter of indifference to us. Let me note that literally the next day President Bush publicly replied to our minister, as it were: "The United States," he said, "is merely implementing the Security Council resolution. It has no other intentions." These words are only to be welcomed.

Not once since 1960 has a Soviet-U.S. summit been postponed (the reason at that time was Powers' flight on the U-2 aircraft). Personally, the present postponement does not worry me much. "Official sources" have hinted that it may take place as early as March or April this year. Something else is worrying however. The centrifugal forces, which are prepared to push Moscow and

Washigton far apart again, are mounting. No matter how paradoxical this may sound, but such forces exist in our country, too. All those who are rocking the ship of state, abusing the constitution, and using methods impermissible in a civilized society, to achieve their aims—they all can also claim to have contributed to the complications in Soviet-U.S. relations.

This can be countered only with common sense. On both sides, that is.

Potential for Dialogue Left Open

LD2901191591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1650 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Commentary by TASS international service observer Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—So, the Soviet-American summit in February will not take place. Although Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh himself said that this does not give rise to "any disappointment," in my view the news from Washington still has a somewhat bitter taste of failure.

First and foremost, the very fact of the postponement of the meeting between the top leaders of the USSR and the United States is essentially the first setback so far in the gradual process of rapprochement between the two countries, the foundations of which were laid by the meeting between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva in 1985. Although voices can be heard saying that by slowing down the progress of their rapprochement the superpowers are merely imparting a necessary realism to their relations (at the end of the day, the long-term interests of the USSR and the United States cannot coincide 100 percent), others maintain that putting the brakes on in this way is not very timely.

The necessity for George Bush to be present in Washington during the war in the Persian Gulf was officially the main reason for the postponement of his visit to Moscow. Does it mean that if the war is not over by, let us say, December, then there will not be any summit in 1991? On the whole this argument looks rather strange, as the dramatic turn in the war in the Middle East—which is threatening to grow out of a conventional war into a nuclear or biological one—seems to make further consultations between the two countries' leaders more urgent. I would like to recall that not so long ago it was the crisis in the Persian Gulf which urged the two presidents to postpone all their business and to go to the meeting in Helsinki. Why has such a change come about today?

Another official reason is that the treaty on strategic offensive weapons is not quite ready for signing. It is plausible, but, I think, this was known before Aleksandr Bessmertnykh went to Washington for the first time with the rank of minister. Experience shows that the signing of a treaty needs not just precise wording and coordination of technical details, but also the appropriate climate of bilateral relations. I doubt if the postponement of the meeting would help to improve it.

Finally, the reason which has not been mentioned aloud: The internal instability in the USSR which many in the West connect with the "growth of conservative mood" in the country. Even before Aleksandr Bessmertnykh's visit to the United States, many U.S. newspapers were demanding "good behavior" from Moscow, first of all in the Baltics. It is clear that George Bush could not completely ignore public opinion in the United States which is changing not in the USSR's favor. But it is reassuring that this topic, which has been discussed by the foreign ministers for more than five hours, was not mentioned as an impediment to the summit. It is also comforting that George Bush has shown understanding of Mikhail Gorbachev's problems, and did not rush with condemnation of USSR internal policy, as was expected from him by many people. This leaves all the possibilities of the dialogue between the USSR and United States open, without exception.

TASS Carries Joint U.S. Statement on Gulf

LD3001042291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0234 GMT 30 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksey Berezhkov]

[Text] Washington, 30 Jan (TASS)—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, adopted a Soviet-American statement on the Persian Gulf in the course of the last round of talks on Tuesday. The text of the statement follows:

In the course of the talks which took place in Washington on 26-29 January, A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and J. Baker, U.S. secretary of state, paid considerable attention to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

The ministers confirmed the adherence of their countries to the resolutions of the UN Security Council adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. They expressed regret in connection with the fact that the numerous efforts by the UN Organization, other international organizations, individual countries, and representatives were rejected by Iraq. The military actions sanctioned by the United Nations were provoked by the refusal of the Iraqi leadership to satisfy the clear and lawful demands of the international community on the need to withdraw from Kuwait.

Secretary of State J. Baker stressed that the United States and its partners in the coalition are trying to attain the liberation of Kuwait, and not the destruction of Iraq. He underlined that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people and is not threatening the territorial integrity of Iraq. He confirmed that the United States is doing everything that it can to avoid casualties among the civilian population and is not interested in broadening the conflict. A.A. Besmertnykh took into consideration the American position and expressed agreement with the fact that the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait should remain the aim of the international community. Both sides consider that everything possible should be done to avoid further escalation of the war and the widening of its scope.

The ministers continue to believe that an end to military action is possible if Iraq will make an unambiguous pledge to leave Kuwait. They also think that such an undertaking should immediately be backed up with specific steps leading to the complete fulfillment of the UN Security Council resolution.

The Iraqi leadership should display respect for the will of the international community. It can thereby put an end to the violence and the bloodshed.

The ministers are in agreement that the establishment of firm stability and peace on the basis of effective security structures in the region after the conflict ends will be the priority task of their governments. It will be important to assist in lessening the danger of war and not allowing errors to occur, especially taking into account the fact that the gathering arms race in this unstable region may only intensify the threat of violence and terrorism. Moreover, the elimination of the causes of the instability and the sources of conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one, will be of special importance. Both ministers were thereby agreed on the fact that the elimination of the sources of conflicts and the instability in the region is impossible without a genuine peace process promoting a just peace, security, and a genuine reconciliation between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. The ministers therefore believe that overcoming the crisis in the Persian Gulf will considerably facilitate and allow the activation of joint efforts on the part of the USSR and the United States, undertaken in contact with other parties in the region for the purpose of promoting peace between the Arabs and Israel and regional stability.

Both ministers are convinced that the Soviet Union and the United States are in a position, as has been demonstrated in other regional conflicts, to make a substantial contribution to achieving an all-embracing settlement in the Near East.

Bessmertnykh-Baker Talks End 29 Jan

LD3001054991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0429 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Washington, 30 Jan (TASS)—On 29 January, talks between A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and J. Baker, U.S. secretary of state, ended here. They were largely devoted to disarmament and regional problems. Summing up the results of the Washington round in a conversation with journalists, A.A. Bessmertnykh stated that the meetings in the White House and at the State Department had allowed the basis of mutual understanding to be expanded and the prospects for future Soviet-American cooperation to be outlined.

On Tuesday, A.A. Bessmertnykh and J. Baker discussed in detail the remaining technical issues in the treaty on a reduction in strategic offensive weapons. It was arranged that next week in Geneva, at the same time as the continuation of the talks by the delegations, contact will take place on the level of deputy ministers engaged in the problems of disarmament in order to complete the work on the treaty.

A.A. Bessmertnykh and J. Baker had an exchange of opinions on the practical aspects of destroying chemical weapons in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement of 1 June 1990.

The need was confirmed by both sides to resolve the issues of numbers ensuing from the treaty on a reduction in conventional weapons in Europe.

A wide range of regional problems were examined by the ministers, among them Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia. The main emphasis, naturally, was laid on the situation in the Persian Gulf and the Near East as a whole. The outcome of the discussion was a joint statement—the first Soviet-American document of this kind in the last 15 years. [passage omitted]

Late on Tuesday evening, A.A. Bessmertnykh left for home.

U.S. Protests Over Gulf Recalls Vietnam Fears

PM2901114991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by V. Linnik under the general heading: "Persian Gulf: The Consequences of War Are Unpredictable"]

[Text] Whatever people are saying now in Washington and however high the polls show support for the president, it is clear that Americans are experiencing serious doubts whether the war under way in the Persian Gulf is right or not.

Once something has been started, you have to see it through and not hamper your president—that, succinctly, is how the views shared by probably most U.S. residents today can be summed up. This does not however totally preclude the opposite sentiments which are increasingly manifesting themselves. They boil down to the idea that this war is not for America but for the interest of the oil monopolies, that it cannot be won in the full sense of the word, and that the region's problems cannot be resolved by military means all the same.

Antiwar demonstrators and patriots brandishing U.S. flags are once again taking up their stand on different sides of the same streets and squares in large and small settlements throughout the vast country. Discussions often end not only with verbal skirmishes—people resort to more weighty arguments. Voices heard from time to time saying that perhaps antiwar demonstrations should be banned altogether for the period of military operations encounter the following outwardly appealing counterargument: America is fighting precisely in order for everyone to be able to freely speak for or against government policy. At any rate, today's sentiments in the country inevitably call to mind the split during the period of the Vietnam war. At present, television is only recording these sentiments and informing Americans of them in performance of its professional duty.

There will be no repeat of Vietnam, President Bush has reiterated on several occasions over the last few days. He is referring not only to the last protracted bloody war in Southeast Asia. He is also referring to the split in U.S. society which took a long time after to heal in the country. Everything is being done today to prevent this. But will the efforts be successful?

China

Chinese Experience May Help USSR Reforms

PM3001105591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 5

[Report by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov "Opinion": "Around the 'Golden Mean'"]

[Text] How are we to find the optimum combination of centralization and decentralization, of market relations and a regulating role for the state? How are we to draw a reasonable demarcation line between the powers of the government and the powers of local authorities? In my opinion, it would be useful to refer to foreign experience—and China's experience in particular—in our search for the answers to these questions, which are prompting stormy discussions in our country.

This year the Chinese found that the New Year coincided with an important landmark in their country's development. I happened to be in Beijing in the last few days of December, when the seventh plenum of the CPC Central Committee, 13th convocation, was in progress, and visited Shanghai immediately after its results had been published. The meetings I had in these cities showed that China attached the same kind of significance to this pre-New Year event—i.e. seeing it as a turning point—as it had to the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee, 11th convocation, which announced the policy of reforms and openness at the end of 1978.

Implement the second strategic objective of modernization: That is how Chinese Communists formulate the task facing the nation in the 90's. I should remind you that the policy of reforms and openness has set the country three objectives. At the beginning of the 80's, China's GNP amounted to just $250 per capita. The task in the first decade of the reforms was to double this to $500. That objective was reached two years ahead of schedule. The next objective is to double GNP again and take it up to $1,000 by the year 2000. Then, Beijing believes, the country will bid farewell to poverty. In order to overcome the country's backwardness, the third and most difficult stage has to be got through: to further quadruple GNP by the year 2050 so as to reach $4,000 per capita of the country's 1.5 billion population. That would take China to the level of an average developed country.

Three strategic objectives were mapped out at the end of the 70's. What is the fundamental novelty of the decisions adopted by the seventh plenum, which makes it a landmark event in the life of the country? I think that it lies in a new approach to the problems of decentralization, which are highly current for our perestroyka also.

The difficulties encountered by China in the first decade of its reforms are similar to our own in many respects. Broadening the rights of labor collectives and local authorities encouraged initiative and enterprise but also had negative consequences. The national economic balance was upset and the rational use of scarce resources disrupted. Processing sectors surged ahead, while base sectors fell behind. Shortages of raw materials, fuel, energy, and transport worsened. Prices spiraled and cheap commodities disappeared from sale. Group and regional selfishness appeared.

Life has not improved to the same extent everywhere during the reform years. The country has been polarized. The special economic zones are the main areas to have benefited from the policy of openness, followed by the 160 million people living along China's coastline. But the 40 million peasants living in remote areas of China form the poorest section of the population, and some 200 million people are still illiterate.

The different levels of prosperity also give rise to different interests. The flourishing maritime provinces are inclined to see tougher state regulation of the economy as an encroachment on their independence. On the other hand, backward, remote areas are in favor of centralized financial and material resources, realizing that they will never be able to escape from poverty without help from the capital.

The keenest debates at the plenum were about the limits of the powers enjoyed by the center and local authorities and about the size of contributions to the state budget and local budgets. Compromise won the day. Instead of the "get rich" slogan put forward in the 80's, the slogan for the 90's will be "equalization." Those who have surged ahead will have to share the experience of their success with those who have fallen behind. Share their experience but not their wealth. Because "equalization" does not signify a return to leveling. At the same time, contributions to the state budget are going to be increased so that the center has more substantial resources at its disposal to resolve national tasks.

In my view, the experience of the 80's, generalized by the seventh plenum of the CPC Central Committee, deserves to be studied closely. China has become convinced that it is wrong to reduce the essence of its reforms to the simplified dilemma: "Either the plan or a market system; either independence for enterprises or state regulation." The task of the 90's is to create a "socialist, planned, commodity economy," or, in other words, to combine market relations with an economic strategy that has been well thought out by the state, an example of which could be postwar Japan. In other words, decentralization is necessary, but within reasonable limits. I think this conclusion could be instructive for us as well.

Northeast Asia

Reports Continue on Maslyukov's Visit to ROK

Interviewed on Relations

SK2501075191 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Interview with Yuriy Maslyukov by station reporter Mikhail (Krekov); place and date not given; from the "Focus on Asia" Program—recorded; Maslyukov's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into Korean]

[Text] As has already been reported, a visit to Seoul by a Soviet Government delegation headed by Yuriy Maslyukov has ended. During the visit, intergovernmental talks between the Soviet Union and the ROK were held. The talks discussed the issue on economic, scientific, technological cooperation between the two countries.

Station reporter Mikhail (Krekov) met Yuriy Maslyukov, head of the delegation, who had returned from the visit.

[Maslyukov] Our visit to the ROK this time was made according to an agreement reached at the talks between the presidents of the Soviet Union and the ROK. In the talks we sought to subdivide the fields of cooperation between the two countries, sounded out the actual conditions of ROK business circles, and discussed the terms of ROK loans to be provided to the Soviet Union. The talks also discussed ways to strengthen economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between our two countries.

I think that the talks were successful and that we successfully performed the basic task assigned to our delegation.

Western mass media have aroused various repercussions of my answer to a reporter's question: Have Soviet offensive weapons been supplied to the DPRK? Let me say again that any country has the right to defend its country by purchasing necessary means of defense. We have not supplied offensive weapons to the DPRK and there is no plan to supply them in the future, too.

'Promising' Prospects Foreseen

LD2401183291 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita networks in Russian 1530 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Commentary by special correspondent V. Lyubovtsev; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] As we have already reported, this year the USSR will received $1 billion from Seoul. This is one-third of the total sum which South Korea is sending to the USSR in the form of economic aid and loans. As the Korean side has stated, this money will be used to encourage the development of economic relations and to help the Soviet president to implement the perestroyka program. Here is a commentary from our special correspondent:

[V. Lyubovtsev] [passage omitted] Reciprocal trade exchange which started virtually from zero has already reached almost $1,000 million. New promising plans and joint enterprises were discussed at the talks with the Soviet governmental delegation in seoul.

President No Tae-u received in his official residence, the Blue House, Maslyukov, the head of our delegation, deputy prime minister of the USSR. The president stated in particular that the Republic of Korea was interested in the accelerated development of mutually advantageous links with the USSR, particularly trade and economic links.

The head of the Soviet delegation handed No Tae-u a personal message from President Gorbachev which also expresses satisfaction at the constant expansion of cooperation between our countries. No Tae-u asked to have conveyed to the Soviet leader best wishes for the success of perestroyka and the reforms taking place in our country.

During its trip around South Korea, the members of the Soviet delegation looked around a number of industrial enterprises. [passage omitted]

After the conclusion of the talks, final documents were signed in Seoul—a joint statement, an agreement on the granting to the USSR of long-term credits—financial, trade, and investment credits to a total of $3 billion—and an agreement on fisheries.

Here is what Yuriy Dmitriyevich Maslyukov said about the importance of these documents when he spoke at a news conference.

[Begin Maslyukov recording] We have found out, as we should, about the industry and potential of the Republic of Korea in the sphere of the production not only of consumer goods but also of excellent equipment, and we have seen great possibilities for joint production and the reciprocal complementing of our economies by the two sides. [end recording]

Japan's Nakayama Interviewed on Relations

LD2901220291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1620 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Interview with Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama by political observer Valentin Zorin; place and date not given; from the "Undiplomatic Conversations" program—recorded; Nakayama remarks in Japanese with superimposed translation into Russian]

[Excerpts] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. I want to introduce to you our interlocutor for today, Mr. Taro Nakayama, Japan's foreign minister. [passage omitted] Taro Nakayama became the foreign minister of Japan in August 1989 and took command of that country's diplomatic service. This last fact prompts me to one question, Nakayama-san, which I hope will not seem insulting to you. It stems from the traditional European idea of Oriental diplomacy—not a correct idea, maybe, but it does exist. So I would like to ask you whether one can talk frankly and undiplomatically to a Japanese diplomat?

[Nakayama] Japan and the USSR are neighbors and, from the geographical viewpoint, cannot alter their locations. A number of political problems between our countries have remained unresolved throughout the 45 postwar years. I believe that both countries must use the visit to Japan by USSR President Gorbachev to create a breakthrough in the resolution of these problems.

[Zorin] Well, I understand your reply as confirming that one may conduct an undiplomatic conversation and, since you have already mentioned President Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Japan, I want to say that during the days of your stay in the Soviet Union, in Moscow, you met with President Gorbachev and had talks with your counterpart, Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. I wonder, did these meetings give you any new ideas or hopes for good prospects for improving Soviet-Japanese relations, or do you think that everything remains as it was?

[Nakayama] We had two meetings with USSR Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. These conversations were very substantive. The conversation with Mr. Gorbachev lasted one hour 50 minutes. I believe that a path toward overcoming the problems that have existed between our countries for a long time consists of mutual strivings and efforts aimed at resolving them. Each of our states has a history of its own. The people of each country have their own viewpoint on existing problems. We must strive for mutual understanding. This will make it possible to overcome the differences that exist. This will promote peace not only between Japan and the USSR but also in the Asian-Pacific region and the world as a whole.

[Zorin] This is very interesting, especially as it is known that the territorial problem, the problem of four islands, is a serious factor which has hampered until now an improvement of relations between our countries. I know that for quite a long time you have adhered to a tough stance on this issue. I would like to ask you now, minister, do you see a possibility of some compromise approaches to solving this problem, to solving it gradually, or do you regard your current position as the only acceptable one for you?

[Nakayama] I believe that both countries' political leaders must study historical facts thoroughly and come to a mutual understanding on this basis. This will open a way toward solving the problem. State relations between Japan and Russia were first established in 1855. A Russian ship arrived at the Japanese port of (Simoda) that year, and a Russian-Japanese treaty was signed which initiated diplomatic relations. The issue of borders was discussed then, too. As a result, the Russian Government of the time acknowledged that the four islands in question belonged to Japan. So, Japan started governing the islands and, one should say, they became part of Japan not as a result of aggression, far from it.

If we turn to postwar historical facts, we will see that these islands were illegally occupied by Soviet troops. I think this fact can hardly be denied. Therefore, the Japanese Government cannot neglect the territorial issue while solving other problems of Japanese-Soviet relations. Until now both sides have refused to make any concessions despite these real facts.

I believe that if we conduct talks on this issue in all sincerity, a significant development can be achieved in Japanese-Soviet relations in general. President Gorabchev's visit to Japan may assist in reaching a breakthrough with a view to forming friendly relations between our countries which are entering the 21st century. Political will is required for that. I understand that this is an extremely complex problem, and it is precisely for this reason that I am speaking about political will.

[Zorin] Well, I know that there are different viewpoints on that issue. You refer to history. I am a historian both by education and through work experience, and I know—let us put it this way, frankly—that historians can, if need be, find arguments in favor of different viewpoints. So I will not express here the arguments from the sphere of history. But the fact that you have touched on history obliges me to continue the conversation on that subject and to ask you a question that I have been working on for a very long time now but to which I have not found an answer.

The relations between our countries are, in general, a kind of historical phenomenon. I do not know of any other instances where two direct neighbors have lived, not for decades and not even for just one century, but for many centuries, with their backs to one another, if one may put it that way. For a whole succession of centuries there were no relations. The 20th century is a history of enmity, wars, and, at best, profound suspicion and mistrust. This is a very heavy burden. So a kind of historical inertia has taken shape.

I want to ask you: What do you think? First—briefly, if possible—what are the reasons for this situation? Most important, is it realistic to pose the task for oneself and for the present generation of politicians, including yourself, the task of overcoming this inertia that is many centuries old?

[Nakayama] I must say frankly that the active development of Japanese-Soviet relations can be ensured only by the resolution of the territorial problem. The development of economic relations will also depend on that. We intend to make use of President Gorbachev's visit to ensure progress in resolving the territorial problem. To that end various talks and consultations are necessary.

[Zorin] Minister, you did not fully answer my question because, let us say, there have after all been periods when there were no territorial problems between Japan and Russia, yet there were no relations. There have been periods when it was rather Russia that had territorial claims against Japan, and the position was also difficult. Do you really believe that it is sufficient to resolve the problem of the four islands in order to overcome this inertia of many centuries' standing? Maybe the problem is more complicated? That is why I would like to know your opinion.

[Nakayama] I believe that the human beings inhabiting the world are now on the eve of historic changes. President Gorbachev proposed the idea of a Europe under one roof, thus opening a new page in that part of the world. Thus, in Europe, an end has been put to the East-West confrontation, but in Asia there are still quite a few hotbeds of tension and conflicts. A number of problems that arose after World War II remain unresolved. One of these problems exists between our countries. I consider that all these questions must be tackled in a spirit of new thinking.

[Zorin] Your reply prompts my next question. Things have taken shape in such a way that the policy of new thinking which you mentioned has in the last few years borne very great and very real fruit in the West, as regards the Soviet Union's relations with the United States, relations with Europe, and considerably less fruit in the Asian-Pacific region. What is the cause of the imbalance? Why has this policy produced so much in one direction, but as regards the Asian-Pacific region—I mean not only Japan but wider—it has so far produced less?

[Nakayama] If you compare Europe and Asia, then in Europe all the countries are in equal conditions and are located on one continent. In postwar Europe until recently there were two systems of ensuring security, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The one military organization was effectively led by the USSR and the other by the United States. In contrast to this, the Asian-Pacific region is a region of ocean and seas. Geographically it is radically different from Europe. [passage omitted] In such conditions in this region there are hotbeds of tension. Among these can be listed the confrontation of South and North Korea, the Kampuchean question, the territorial problem between our countries, and others. Taking into consideration this specific trait of the Asian-Pacific region it should be noted that in contrast to Europe here there are quite a few bilateral agreements on ensuring security. In addition, in this region there are many developing countries which need aid. The Japanese Government allocates to the development of economic cooperation with other countries up to $10 billion, 70 percent of which goes on providing economic aid to developing countries. We are pinning our hopes on the future economic development of the countries of Asia and the Pacific. But, at the same time, we must not forget the specific nature of this region which is also preparing to enter the 21st century.

[Zorin] Nevertheless despite what you call the specific nature, do you consider that this is a favorable ground—I am referring to Asia—for the new thinking to bear positive fruit in this region, too?

[Nakayama] Yes, I think so.

[Zorin] Now I want to ask you a question about economic relations between our countries. Tell me frankly, Nakayama-san, do you not believe that the present, shall we say, not very good state of economic relations between our countries, the lack of use of the opportunities which exist will inflict economic damage not only on the Soviet Union—that is indisputable—but also on Japan, especially if you bear in mind not only today but also the long-term factor?

[Nakayama] I want to point out that since the war Japan and the USSR have carried out a whole series of economic projects. Now, if one is speaking about external trade via the Japanese private sector, the volume of trade between the two countries amounts to $6 billion. I do not know whether the expression, Western countries, is suitable. I am more accustomed to the expression, the free world. But, in any case, until recent times in the USSR's trade with those countries the first place was held by Finland, the second by Germany, and the third by Japan. So we can say that in the sphere of trade Japan was ahead of such countries as the United States and Great Britain. We believe that, economically, we are certainly not bested by those countries.

[Zorin] In that case I want to ask an undiplomatic question. Are you as foreign minister satisfied with today's state of Soviet-Japanese relations? [pause] I mean, economic relations.

[Nakayama] I believe that the point is not whether I am satisfied with the state of Japanese-Soviet economic relations. It is necessary to say that the impetus toward the further development of economic ties between our countries is provided by the solution of the political problems. [passage omitted]

Commentary Views Nakayama's Visit

OW3001104891 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Dmitriyev commentary]

[Text] Foreign Minister Nakayama's visit to the Soviet Union was one of the most memorable events in recent years in connection with the realization of Soviet President Gorbachev's visit to Japan, the first in history, awaited for so many years.

It is particularly important that President Gorbachev's schedule for a visit to Japan was confirmed in a Moscow meeting attended by Foreign Minister Nakayama. This is because there are those who questioned the feasibility of his visit on the scheduled dates. This question was raised after the Soviet Union asked Foreign Minister Nakayama to postpone his scheduled visit to the Soviet Union in the wake of former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's resignation. Fortunately, the postponement was not for long, and the Soviet-Japanese dialogue returned to its original normal track promptly. This proved that both countries are serious about the Soviet-Japanese summit and holding high hopes about the summit.

In his meeting with President Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Nakayama said that the Japanese legislature, the general public, and economic circles welcome President Gorbachev's visit. His visit is eagerly awaited. There are now historical changes taking place in the world, all of which will take longer than a year.

When such are the given conditions, we say that it is unnatural that two neighboring foreign countries, Japan and the Soviet Union, have not yet had contacts at the highest levels.

Regarding bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Japan, there is a feeling that while elsewhere the cold war between the East and the West has ended and everything is moving in a forward-looking direction, Soviet-Japanese relations are not catching up with trends of the time.

The first reason for this is the absence of a basic element like a peace treaty as a legal foundation. What is becoming a barrier to the conclusion of the peace treaty is the difference of views between the two countries regarding the territories question. It appears that the problem could not have been overcome even during the latest visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Nakayama.

At a meeting with Nakayama, President Gorbachev noted that this problem needs to be approached by both the Soviet Union and Japan from the viewpoint of equilibrium of their interests.

Regarding the Soviet position, opinion surveys have shown that most Soviet citizens regard all the Kurile Islands, including the southern part, as part of the Soviet Union. In the Russian Republic, which administers the Kurile Islands, such feeling is particularly strong. This has an especially important meaning under present conditions, when the Soviet Union's domestic situation is still unstable.

In other words, any Soviet leadership concessions to Japan will cause opinion splits which are totally undesirable. If Japan really wants the Soviet Union's perestroyka to succeed, they should take this situation into account.

Once the market economy is established and a sound democratic social structure is installed with perestroyka's success, it will be far easier to solve all problems, including international issues.

If Japan uses its power, particularly its economic power, to support Soviet perestroyka, this will benefit not only the Japanese themselves but also the world community.

But the Japanese Government, for instance, is taking the position of not separating economics from politics; this poses a problem.

Regarding various developments in the Soviet Union, there are some Japanese who hasten to conclude that these are setbacks for perestroyka.

Simply put, Soviet-Japanese relations have encountered domestic, bilateral, and international problems. Sometimes these problems are intertwined in rather complicated manners.

In order to untangle these knots, it may be necessary for these two countries, instead of being bound only by their interests, to realize and appreciate their responsibilities as members of the present world.

Pavlov Previews Gorbachev Visit to Japan

LD2901123891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1110 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—Valentin Pavlov, USSR prime minister, has sent a greetings telegram to the participants in the 13th joint meeting of the Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees for economic cooperation, which opens in Tokyo tomorrow.

It is noted in the greetings that the meeting is taking place during a period of active preparation for the Soviet-Japanese summit meeting. "We hope that the visit to Japan by USSR President Gorbachev will give a new dynamism to the development of multilateral and broad contacts and links between our countries, including those in the sphere of economic relations. The constructive dialogue between the USSR and Japan, and the broadening of our bilateral trade, will undoubtedly serve as a factor in the stability of the Asian-Pacific region," the telegram states.

Pavlov has noted that over the 25 years which have passed since the first Soviet-Japanese economic meeting, a considerable amount of experience in business cooperation has been accumulated.

The prime minister expressed a wish that the work of the conference participants be successful and productive.

Japan-North Korea Discuss Normalizing Relations

SK3001041691 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Commentary by station commentator Igor Lebedev from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] The representatives of the DPRK and Japan will start talks on 30 January in Pyongyang to normalize bilateral relations. Our station commentator Igor Lebedev writes on this:

These will be official Korean-Japanese talks to normalize relations. I would like to recall the fact that the diplomats of the two countries had meetings in advance in Pyongyang and Beijing. The two sides expressed their opinions at these meetings, and there were significant differences in views. The most complicated issue is how much money Japan must give the DPRK as compensation. Also, Japan has said that the DPRK must allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct on-site inspections at its nuclear facilities to examine whether its research pursues peaceful goals. There are other issues, too. One of them is the status of Korean residents in Japan. It is clear that these issues may not be resolved immediately. It is important that dialogue was held in Pyongyang and Beijing to normalize bilateral relations, however. This is in accordance with the spirit of positive changes that are taking place on the Korean peninsula and in its vicinity. There are many examples of (?these changes). One of them is the premier-level talks between the DPRK and the ROK now being held to ease military and political tension on the peninsula. Also, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and the Soviet Union has improved the situation in this region. Against this background, Seoul's efforts to improve its relations with Beijing stand out. A Korean Trade Promotion Corporation office will officially open in the Chinese capital this week. The contact in Beijing between the United States and the DPRK and the imminent opening of the DPRK's embassy in Thailand are also some of these changes. In a word, these positive political changes in this region have led Pyongyang and Tokyo to negotiate diplomatic relations.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

TASS Reports Joint Vietnamese Economic Talks

LD2501114591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0320 GMT 25 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Denisovich]

[Text] Hanoi, 25 Jan (TASS)—The consultations of the Soviet and Vietnamese economic delegations are taking place in Hanoi in an amicable and businesslike though tense atmosphere due to restricted time limits. They have met here to discuss draft intergovernment agreements on a new mechanism for economic relations between the two countries, a draft document on the volume of trade and economic cooperation for 1991, and also credit and finance relations, which arise from a decision to carry out mutual transactions at world prices and in freely convertible currency, which was adopted earlier.

In the course of the visit the head of the Soviet delegation Boris Volodin, deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, met with Phan Van Khai, chairman of the SRV State Planning Commission, on Thursday. The sides informed each other about the plans and budgets of the USSR and the SRV for the current year. Touching on Vietnamese-Soviet relations, they stated with satisfaction that the imbalance in mutual trade exchange has been significantly reduced lately. Thus, if in 1986-1990 Soviet deliveries to Vietnam were three times as much as reciprocal shipments, then starting with the current year the sides have got an opportunity to closely approach a balanced trade exchange.

An exchange of opinions was also held on ways toward a settlement of the question of Vietnam's debt to the Soviet Union. Experts from both sides also began discussing a document on this. Among other things, an agreement was reached that the Vietnamese side would begin to partially pay off its debts during the current five-year period and then volumes of deliveries of commodities from the SRV would exceed Soviet exports. The attainment of the planned capacity of economic projects built in Vietnam with Soviet assistance would enable this to be achieved.

At the same time, B. Volodin and Pham Van Khai noted that the grave economic situation in both countries requires a search for ways to settle all issues which would have a detrimental affect on the economic development of each of them. In other words, one must find the formula of a decision which would be accepted by the legislators of both states, convinced that the programs of inter-relations between the USSR and the SRV for 1991 and the subsequent period would be realized on the basis of mutual benefit and effectiveness.

PRAVDA Notes Vietnamese Group's Visit to Paper

PM2901161791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 4

["Own Information" report under the general heading: "Meetings at the Editorial Office"]

[Text] Yesterday the PRAVDA editorial office was visited by a group of Vietnam Communist Party [VCP] Central Committee workers, headed by Pham Huy Van, head of the VCP Central Committee Ideology and Culture Department center for the study of public opinion.

The visitors asked about PRAVDA's work in the new conditions and its role in the solution of the perestroyka tasks. In turn, the Vietnamese comrades gave an account of the work experience of their country's party press and talked about the preparations for the next VCP congress.

Commentary on Lao Official's Visit to China

BK1901134991 Moscow in Lao to Laos 1330 GMT 18 Jan 91

[Aleksey Nikolayev commentary]

[Text] It has been announced in Beijing that a delegation of the Lao Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] led by Nouhak Phoumsavan, chairman of the assembly, will pay a visit to the PRC beginning 20 January. This visit to China by the Lao SPA delegation will probably help speed up the expansion of Lao-Chinese cooperation. It is apparent that Lao-Chinese relations in all fields have now been promoted. Not long before, the situation in connection with the Lao-Chinese relations was absolutely contrary to that of today. The diplomatic relations between Laos and China at the ambassadorial level have just been restored since the dry season of 1988. Many years ago, the relations between the two countries were at a considerably low level. The conflicts over the Cambodia issue had separated Beijing and Vientiane to be in an opposition direction. They had caused tension in all issues between the two countries. These had thus brought about negative results to the common atmosphere in the region.

Being well aware of the aforesaid unusual situation, in the middle of the eighties, Laos and China began talks with a view to normalizing their relations. The withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia has taken an significant role in the said process. As is known, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops from Cambodia was completed in late September 1989, and later, in early October of the same year, Kaysone Phomvihan—the Lao leader—paid a visit to Beijing. His talks in Beijing reflected the normalization of relations between Laos and China. The restoration of cooperation and good-neighborliness has also served as the objective requirements for the interior changes, or as called the modification movements, in the two countries.

In Laos, it is generally accepted that the lessons on the modification and reconstruction of the economic and social work in China can be usefully applied in Laos. This is why most of the progress in the bilateral relations between Laos and China is particularly in the economic and trade field. An example of this is that China has taken the lead in the overall volume of the foreign investments in the economic field in Laos. Nevertheless, there still remain problems between the two countries. But, in actual practice, Laos and China have already proven that all problems can be settled. For example, in settling the problem of common border, the two sides signed an agreement on a clear defining of the borderline. This has effectively created a favorable condition for the two sides to quickly increase the volume of trade exchanges and the exchanges in other fields.

A new strength to promote the Lao-Chinese relations was the visit to Vientiane by Li Peng, premier of China, in December last year. Observers have attached importance to the remarks of the Chinese leader on China's efforts to improve its relations not only with Laos, but also with Vietnam. It is certain that the development of this trend will bring about a good result to the international and regional relations.

Beijing-Phnom Penh May Establish Governmental Ties

BK2401041591 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Text] The People's Revolutionary Party, the ruling party in Cambodia, will strive to improve relations with China. According to a broadcast by Phnom Penh radio, this was expressed at the plenum of the party Central Committee held at the end of last week. Here are comments by our observer, Comrade Kiril Mikhaylov.

As everyone knows, there are no relations between Phnom Penh and Beijing either at governmental or party levels. This has been the situation over the past 12 years. Beijing has always been on the side of the toppled Pol Pot regime, providing it political support and weapons. The Phnom Penh authorities, on the other hand, have relied on Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Since then, many changes have taken place. People have come to realize that the Cambodian conflict cannot be solved through military means. Vietnamese troops have left Cambodia; the Soviet Union, the United States, and China have spoken of the need to stop providing weapons to warring Cambodian parties. The United Nations has worked out a plan aimed at solving the conflict peacefully. None of these things have taken place in flash; each step of the peace process is the result of political negotiations, rapprochement of each party's stance, and mutual concessions.

Lately, progress has been made because all parties, which earlier were on opposing sides, have sat down and talked. Consultative meetings have been held between the Chinese and Vietnamese sides, and the possibility of organizing inter-related meetings has emerged—on the one hand between representatives from China and the West and Comrade Hun Sen, and on the other between Soviet representatives and Samdech Sihanouk. Soviet diplomats have already talked to representatives of the opposing Cambodian side. These talks are, generally speaking, necessary and useful. Paris and Washington have already held direct talks with the government of Comrade Hun Sen. There have also been reports on the establishment of contacts between Chinese diplomats and Phnom Penh representatives.

The appeal from the Cambodian capital, aimed at improving relations with China, should be assessed from a realistic viewpoint. The leaders of the State of Cambodia and the Chinese leadership hold different views on the way to solve the Cambodian conflict. This could become an obstacle on the path proposed by the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party. On the other hand, it is also clear that the Cambodian conflict should be solved through political means and that Cambodia should become a neutral and nonaligned state. This is recognized by both Beijing and Phnom Penh. In other words, there is already common ground for cooperation for peace in Cambodia. This was the conclusion of our observer, Comrade Kiril Mikhaylov.

Yazov Greets Lao Counterpart on Army Anniversary

PM2301134791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Greetings message from Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister, to Army General Khamtai Siphandon, Lao defense minister, on Lao People's Army 42d Anniversary]

[Text] To Comrade Army General Khamtai Siphandon, Lao People's Democratic Republic defense minister

On behalf of the USSR Armed Forces and on my own behalf, I greet you and all Lao servicemen on the occasion of the 42d anniversary of the Lao People's Army.

We highly value the friendly relations between our armed forces, which reliably serve the cause of peace and progress.

I wish you and all Lao People's Army servicemen new successes in ensuring the peaceful creative labor of your people.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister.

Cambodian Parties Urged To Show Self-Restraint

BK2901095391 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Commentary by station observer Kiril Mikhaylov]

[Text] Phnom Penh will launch no military campaign during this year's dry season, said the foreign minister of the State of Cambodia [SOC], Comrade Hor Namhong. Our observer, Comrade Kiril Mikhaylov, has the following comments:

In my opinion, the above-mentioned statement by the Cambodian minister is aimed at wooing those who consider the Phnom Penh administration the only main brake on a peaceful settlement of the Cambodian problem. Comrade Hun Sen's government, which has in general accepted the peace plan of the United Nations, is still cautious about the consequences of the prospect of ceasing the function of the existing authority in the leadup to general elections in the country. The attitude expressed by Phnom Penh government is at the drop of a hat interpreted as unwillingness to end the conflict and as ambition to monopolize power. But, this is absolutely contrary to reality. Phnom Penh has for a long time advocated free elections with the participation of the opposition groups and has no intention whatsoever for monopoly of power. As clear evidence, Phnom Penh is for the time being refusing to launch a large-scale military campaign. The SOC only fears that if the current government is no longer in power, the Khmer Rouge would definitely use this opportunity to wrest back power in the country by military force. Indeed, Pol Pot's unrestrained power is already well-known—unlawful activities, bloodshed, and genocide.

The current activities carried out by the Khmer Rouge are certainly aimed at arousing Phnom Penh's suspicion. The military campaign launched by them since the beginning of this dry season, in the views of observers, has been especially active. The armaments given by foreign countries to the gang for years and at present secretly stockpiled in the jungle are sufficient for keeping the war going for another two o- three years, military experts estimate. The polpotist group continues to create obstacles to the repatriation of Cambodian refugees. This is aimed at using those people for its political goal in likely elections in the future.

Now, the Khmer Rouge's endorsement of the UN peace plan for Cambodia has brought about general euphoria, but people are still wary of the group's pretending to remain deaf and blind to the international community's resolution which they think does not serve their interest, such as the necessity for a long-discussed cease-fire which is required as a prerequisite of a settlement. The participants to the Paris meeting on Cambodia at the end of last month stressed again that all the concerned parties should effectively exercise self-restraint on launching military activities, because this would certainly lead to achieving a national reconciliation at the international conference on Cambodia which will soon be held in Paris.

The protracted 12-year war in Cambodia has shown that the conflict can never be resolved via military means. It is unwise to think that the United Nations' involvement in the settlement has given the upper hand to any party in the conflict. In the current situation, if all the parties consent to discontinue military campaign, this would absolutely help eliminate mutual distrust and become an important prologue to the progress in the process of settling the Cambodian problem, Comrade Kiril Mikhaylov concludes.

Near East & South Asia

Petrovskiy Discusses Gulf With Maghreb Envoys

LD2901175191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1642 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—Meetings have been held at the USSR Foreign Ministry between Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, and the ambassadors of the states of the African Maghreb Union [AMU]: from Algeria—M. Yala; from Tunisia—S. Abdallah; from Libya—S. Salih; from Mauritania—A.

Kamara; and the Moroccan charge d'affairs—S. Majdi; as well as A.S. Gonsalves, Indian ambassador to the USSR.

Expressing serious concern at the situation in the Persian Gulf, the representatives of the AMU member countries briefed him about the position and the joint steps by this organization which are directed particularly at making effective use of the powers of the Security Council with the object of ending the armed conflict. The Soviet side stressed the particular importance for the destinies of the peoples of this region and the international situation as a whole of vigorously striving to localize the crisis and of taking into account the possible consequences of combat operations which should not go beyond the framework of the objective set out in UN Resolution 678. This the only way to prevent considerable sacrifices and destruction and great complications at the end of the war.

At a meeting between V.F. Petrovskiy and A.S. Gonsalves, Indian ambassador to the USSR, which took place as a continuation of hte conversation with Indian Foreign Minister V.Ch. Chukla in Moscow, the ambassador briefed him about the steps being taken by India, including those in the Nonaligned Movement, to overcome the crisis. The Soviet side stressed the urgent need to prevent an escalation of the conflict both horizontally and vertically and it gave a high appraisal of India's efforts aimed at seeking mutually acceptable political solutions to the conflict.

The central theme running through all the meetings was the idea of the urgent need for the strict fulfillment of the resolutions of the UN Security Council which are well known.

Mideast Diplomats Interviewed on Gulf Conflict

91UF0381A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report on interviews with Jordanian, Israeli, and Kuwaiti diplomats by Major R. Mustafin; place and date not given: "While the Battles are Raging"]

[Text] We decided to interview diplomats from the states located in the region of the combat actions and ask them three questions:

How do you regard the situation that has developed in the Persian Gulf region in connection with the beginning of combat operations?

Is there any possibility of stopping the war now and what is necessary in order to do this?

How is the position of the Soviet Union in this conflict perceived in your country?

These questions are answered by:

Ahmad MUBAYYIDIN, adviser of the Jordanian embassy in Moscow:

"From the very beginning the Jordanian government has very attentively followed the development of the situation in the region. We think the war will do a great deal of harm to the entire world and above all the peoples of the Near Eastern region. The very fact that the war began is an extremely negative phenomenon for professional diplomats and in the activity of all international organizations, including the activity of the United Nations and the Security Council. Therefore at the present time it is necessary to exert all efforts to bring about an immediate cease-fire and find a way out of the situation so as to solve all the problems as a whole.

"There is a way out of the war. To do this it is necessary to immediately call a meeting of the Security Council at which it would be possible to really discuss the situation that has developed, taking into account the interests of all parties and not any one particular position. This discussion should be conducted on the basis of norms of international law, the UN Charter, and the resolutions of this organization.

"We take a favorable view of the USSR position and have a great deal of respect for the policy adopted by the Soviet Union in this conflict. I wish especially to take note of the activity of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev. His speech yesterday received high praise in our country. We want the authority of the USSR as a partner in the struggle for peace to be increased. We can see that the Soviet leadership is doing everything possible to bring about peace, and we ourselves are striving for this."

Yosef DRABKEN, press attache of the Israeli consulate in Moscow:

"First of all I would like to draw a distinction between the Iraqi people and the Iraqi leader. The latter has made too many mistakes. S. Husayn uses strange rhetoric which is a mixture of anticolonial slogans and the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism. Taking into account the fact that Saddam Husayn has created a regime of totalitarian despotism, he is utterly indifferent to the fate of the peoples of the region, including his own people. We are gratified that under the new conditions the world community has managed to create a unified coalition which evaluates the situation in the world more realistically. I wish to note that this time even Syria, our long-standing rival, has joined this coalition. This shows that the approach of this country's leaders in this conflict more realistic than it has been in the past.

"It was clear that it was practically impossible to assure that the blockade of Iraq would be completely effective. Therefore we do not think there was any point in waiting until the sanctions had their effect. Any delay would play into the hands of the Iraqi dictator.

"Since in Iraq one person makes all the decisions, everything depends on him. Apparently the answer to this question could be given by someone who knows S. Husayn well. We have no such people in Israel. I think that as long as Iraq is ruled by a person whose power depends on bloodshed, he is not in a position to leave Kuwait quietly and peacefully.

"The fact that from the very beginning of the conflict in the Persian Gulf the USSR has cooperated with the world community signifies a new landmark in the creation of a new order on the planet. In this case we take an extremely favorable attitude toward the position of the USSR. We hope that the USSR will be able to make its positive contribution to the processes of development in the Near East as well. For example, we are very seriously considering Moscow's proposal concerning the disarmament process in the region within the framework of Near East regulation.

"We categorically reject all Iraqi statements to the effect that Israeli servicemen participated in the attacks of the multinational forces. This is a complete fabrication on the part of Iraq."

'Abd-al-Amir RAMADAN, first secretary of the embassy of the State of Kuwait:

"We regard the situation as extremely dangerous. It is known that any war harms the people. But now it is necessary to wage this war so that peace and justice will prevail.

"This is possible. But it depends on one person. Only he can make a decision for immediate and unqualified withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait.

"We value very highly the position taken by the Soviet Union in this conflict. From the very beginning the Soviet Union has supported the just cause of the Kuwaiti people and government."

Defense Officials View Iraqi Chemical Threat

Regional Dangers Eyed

PM2901155891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops, by V. Litovkin; place and date not given: "Weapons That Have Not Yet Been Used"]

[Text] The air forces of the United States and its allies, news agencies report, are continuing their strikes against Iraqi chemical and bacteriological weapons storage bases, as well as the plants that produce these weapons. What kind of potential does Iraq have in such weapons, what kind of danger do they represent for the country itself, for the states bordering on the regions of hostilities, including the southern Soviet Union, and for the coalition troops?

Our correspondent's questions are answered by Colonel General S. Petrov, chief of the USSR Defense Ministry Chemical Troops.

[Petrov] You will understand that we cannot judge Iraq's chemical and bacteriological potential sufficiently accurately. There is too little information about this in the open press. I know the Americans also have no reliable data on this matter.

Nonetheless, according to specialists' information, Iraq's chemical weapons stocks could amount to between 2,000 and 4,000 tonnes of chemical agents. This is mainly mustard gas, prussic acid, tabun, and sarin. The country's leadership asserts that Iraq also has binary weapons, but nobody knows what type [markirovka] they are or what their components are.

There are reports that the development, production, and storage of chemical munitions took place at more than 10 to 12 facilities. Among these one can name, for instance, the chemical research center for the production and storage of chemical agents at Salman Pak southeast of Baghdad and Al-Kasha [as transliterated] not far from the northern Ar Rumaylah oil fields, facilities for storing these weapons in the Az Zubayr region, which is in the south of the country south of Basra, and also in the northwest, in the Samaria region and elsewhere.

This potential was created by Iraqi chemists themselves, they are very good specialists in this sphere, although there are reports that certain Western firms gave them assistance.

About Iraq's biological weapons: The same sources which I have already cited assert that the country has strains of anthrax and cholera and may possess exotic forms, unknown to everyone, of pathogens of fatal African diseases.

Nor can it be ruled out that Iraq has toxic weapons in the form of botulinum toxin, that is, the natural products of certain bacteria that are a terrible poison—the most powerful currently known to science. One hundred grams of this substance could kill hundreds of millions of human beings. If a strike is carried out against the sites where these weapons are stockpiled, the consequences could be totally unpredictable.

Iraq's stockpiles of bacteriological and toxic weapons are not known.

If chemical weapons—should their storage depots and facilities on Iraqi territory be destroyed—can hurt the country's civilians living in the vicinity of such facilities, the release of biological agents, under certain conditions, can pose a lethal threat to the population of neighboring countries, too.

[Litovkin] Is there any information that facilities for the storage of chemical agents and bacteriological weapons have been hit?

[Petrov] Chemical agent and biological weapon storage facilities have been hit by aircraft and cruise missiles. It is known that they have destroyed nuclear reactors and chemical weapon development, production, and storage facilities. To be frank, experts consider that hitting targets of this kind is not the best way to prevent chemical and biological warfare.

All the indications are that the U.S. Air Force's efforts to destroy Iraq's chemical and biological potential have not been completely successful—strikes are continuing. Therefore it cannot be ruled out that as yet the probability of Iraq using these terrible lethal weapons remains.

[Litovkin] We sold Saudi Arabia 5 million gas masks. Has the USSR Defense Ministry given other countries of the region assistance in antichemical defense?

[Petrov] Nobody has asked us for such assistance. Naturally we are not giving it to anyone at this time.

[Litovkin] Are our southern republics threatened by a possible chemical and bacteriological danger from Iraq or areas of hostilities given that we are only some 250 kilometers away?

[Petrov] We are attentively monitoring events on Iraqi territory and also the situation in border areas. As yet there is no chemical danger to us.

As for the two Iraqi nuclear reactors, some Soviet experts claim that the reactors have not been destroyed, just damaged. The main point is that all these reactors had their core—that is, the nuclear fuel—removed back during the eight-year Iraq-Iran war. Even if they were completely destroyed there would be no significant contamination of the locality.

Medical Consequences Viewed

PM2901191191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Interview with Colonel of the Medical Service N.Ye. Uskov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate Sanitary and Epidemiological Department, and Honored Physician of the RSFSR, by A. Golts under the rubric "Specialist's Opinion"; place and date not given; "How Real Is the Bacteriological Threat?"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] The foreign press reports that a special briefing for Congressional leaders was held at the Pentagon. In the course of the briefing details were given, among other things, about the destruction of centers in Iraq where production of bacteriological weapons was being conducted during the international forces' air raids. What may be the consequences of the destruction of these centers? KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Golts has put this question to Colonel of the Medical Service N.Ye. Uskov, deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Central Military Medical Directorate Sanitary and Epidemiological Department, and Honored Physician of the RSFSR.

[Uskov] First of all I would like to emphasize that the use of bacteriological means in war at present, on the threshold of the 21st century, when most countries have signed the convention banning this barbaric weapon, would be a heinous crime for which there is no justification, nor can there be one. It must also be said that we do not have at our disposal any kind of official information to the effect that centers for the production of such weapons were located on Iraqi territory. It is true that foreign press articles speak of the production in Iraq of pathogenic organisms capable of causing terrible diseases like bubonic plague, malignant anthrax, tularaemia, and toxins causing botulism. I would like to draw your attention to the following circumstance here. If such centers did exist, and if they did contain certain quantities of bacterial cocktails, then the consequences should be evident by now, several days after the bombing: mass incidence of disease or epidemics among servicemen and the civilian population in Iraq. To date, we have no such information. Consequently, the question arises whether these means were stored there when the bombing took place? After all, it would be entirely logical to assume that preparing for war and expecting such massive strikes, the Iraqi command could have shipped out these weapons and hidden them securely somewhere.

[Golts] As is known, Saddam Husayn stated recently that Iraq could resort to the use of mass destruction weapons in the war. What could be the consequences of the use of bacteriological weapons against the troops of the anti-Iraq coalition?

[Uskov] In any event the consequences would be extremely grave. After all, no matter how well the troops are protected, the specifics of bacteriological weapons are such that it is impossible to completely rule out contamination. A few grams of the botulism toxin contain millions of lethal doses. Certain types of pathogenic organisms, the spores of malignant anthrax for example, can survive for a relatively long time in the natural environment, retaining their morbific effect.

The casualties among the civilian population could be even more terrible. The use of bacteriological weapons in acts of terrorism cannot be ruled out. This could mean the contamination of water sources and the atmosphere at population centers. I would like to note that the quantities of crude oil that are currently being spilled into the Persian Gulf are threatening to disrupt the water supply in a number of countries. The lack of the necessary quantities of water could seriously complicate the implementation of anti-epidemic measures.

[Golts] Nikolay Yefremovich, could there be any kind of danger to our country if bacteriological weapons were to be used in the Persian Gulf area?

[Uskov] As for the possibility of air currents carrying bacterial means to the territory of our country, the likelihood of this happening is close to zero. The distance between the USSR's territory and the area of the conflict is so great that such cocktails would lose their dangerous concentration. Nonetheless, the Soviet Armed Forces' Medical Service, together with subunits of civil defense, is ready to carry out sanitary-prophylactic measures for the bacteriological protection of both the troops and the population.

Allied Forces Characterized

91UM0310A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Report on an interview with Colonel General of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Soviet Air Force, by Captain S. Sidorov; place and date not given: "In the Sky Over Iraq"]

[Text] **Colonel General of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Force, comments on the operations of the coalition air group.**

[Sidorov] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, the main events in the past days of the war in the area of the Persian Gulf occurred principally in the sky. How would you characterize the operations of the U.S. and allied air forces? Did they employ new combat methods and techniques?

[Shaposhnikov] Before answering the point of your question, I would like to express profound regret that the avoidance of war did not succeed. The greatest suffering will fall to the lot of the people. The number of casualties among the peaceful population is already rapidly increasing today, including casualties resulting from air operations. This is deplorable and deserving of condemnation.

We are following the development of the situation closely, assessing it from various angles. As military people, everything interests us that is associated with the employment of the newest aviation equipment under real combat conditions and on such an unprecedented scale. Because very much has changed since the time of the Vietnam war. There have appeared in the armaments of one of the opposing sides such weapons as modern air-based and naval-based cruise missiles, F-15 and F-117A "Stealth" aircraft, the multipurpose "Tornado" aircraft, and the "Patriot" antimissile complex, etc.

The accumulation and processing of information continues and, in time, I think, we will be able to make sound conclusions about new combat techniques and methods.

The operations of allied aviation in the first days constituted—in tasks, targets, and operational tactics—a large air offensive operation. Apparently, it pursued the objective of putting out of action opposing aviation, command and control points, "surface-to-surface" missile launchers, air defense systems, and, to a certain degree, the disruption of Iraq's economic potential.

Everything indicates that in the initial stage the operation was carefully planned, organized, and supported. Good coordinated action of the committed forces and systems was noted, especially with electronic warfare [radioelektronnaya borba] systems. The impression could have set in from first reports that the objectives of the operation were basically achieved. But now a somewhat different picture is becoming visible. Despite the fact that allied aviation dropped up to 15,000 tons of munitions on targets in Iraq daily, the launches of Iraqi missiles of the "surface-to-surface" class are not stopping, and the PVO [Air Defense] systems are showing serious opposition. In short, the result in fact did not turn out to be quite what the allies were counting on.

[Sidorov] What, in your opinion, was the reason for this?

[Shaposhnikov] Although the Iraqi side, possibly, miscalculated with respect to the periods of the beginning of the war, it, nonetheless, succeeded in conducting a series of defensive measures. For example, the most modern aircraft were dispersed and concealed. In addition, a real combat situation does not, by far, always develop in the way that military commanders and politicians want it to.

[Sidorov] At the present time, the air operations of the anti-Iraq coalition do not now look as forceful as during the first days. What is this connected with?

[Shaposhnikov] Actually, according to our estimates, the intensity of the operations of coalition aviation has dropped somewhat. While in the first days, it constituted two to three combat sorties a day, on the day of our interview it is one to one and a half. This and the other figure is not a high factor. The allies, very likely, would like to increase the "productivity." But apparently they are unable to do this because of difficulties in material and technical support, which have begun to make themselves felt. To maintain and supply such an air armada with fuel and munitions, all the same, is not easy.

A real problem also exists for aviation that is associated with weather conditions. Some areas of combat operations are in an area of low cloud cover, which complicates aimed launches and bombing. Added to the difficult weather conditions was such a factor as the smoke screens from burning oil facilities in Kuwait. It is also possible to talk now about a certain lowering of the spirit of the offense.

[Sidorov] Could you in a few words characterize the operations of Iraqi aviation?

[Shaposhnikov] A certain part of it was destroyed in the course of the first raids. That part that is intact is still not being employed in a broad sense. To all appearances, it is being saved up for planned strikes against ground troops of the opposing coalition and for cover of the combat formations of friendly troops in the event of the initiation of their large-scale operations.

[Sidorov] What is your immediate forecast? How will allied aviation operate in the future?

[Shaposhnikov] The number one task for the anti-Iraq coalition now is not to let Husayn drag Israel into the war. Consequently, it can be assumed that the main attention of aviation will be concentrated on the search for and destruction of "surface-to-surface" missile PU [launchers] and the delivery of strikes on airfields. Gradually, the center of gravity of strikes will be shifted from strategic objectives in the interior of Iraqi territory to defensive fortifications of Iraqi troops along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. This could happen in the very near future.

Gremitskikh Reports Baghdad Embassy Reductions

LD3001083791 Moscow TASS in English 0806 GMT 30 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kanishshev]

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—The staff of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Iraq was cut to 13, after 31 employees left Baghdad on Tuesday and headed for Iran, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh told the TASS world news service.

Asked about the fate of six Soviet journalists who had arrived in Baghdad on their own without notifying the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gremitskikh said: "They remain in Baghdad. No permission for their departure has been given."

The group includes representatives of the Lithuanian public movement Sajudis, Independent Ukrainian Television, Novosti press agency and other mass media bodies.

Further Assessments on Persian Gulf War Issued

Global Consqequences Assessed

PM2901154991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by L. Medvedko: "Persian Gulf: 'Subworld War'?"]

[Excerpts] The first week of a new large-scale war is over. This time, in the Persian Gulf region. As was only to be expected, it has not turned out to be a lightning war with little blood being shed. In this respect my prognosis in a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA interview on New Year's Eve (31 December 1990) has been realized. I frankly confess that this gives me no sense of satisfaction. On the contrary, a sense of grief and anxiety prevails. Together with many like-minded people, in making prognoses on the possible course of the war, I still believed until the last day in the possibility of the conflict's peaceful settlement.

What can this senseless war lead to? Most likely, if we rely on historical experience, once again into an impasse. Proceeding from the purely military distribution of forces, Iraq must lose this war. But this certainly does not mean that someone will emerge the victor from it. The war could again end up without a victory. In other words, neither side will achieve its political, military-strategic, and economic aims! [passage omitted]

Preliminary analytical assessments and some conclusions stemming from them were made both in President M.S. Gorbachev's television address and at the session in the Kremlin on the day war broke out. I cannot help recalling that both the president and the foreign minister used what was, to my view, considered wording: "We did everything conceivable" to prevent war. Unfortunately, we failed to not only halt but even slow down the slide toward war at the very last moment. In my view, in such cases it is necessary to mobilize the country's entire intellectual potential. Then "everything conceivable" can be transformed into "everything possible." This is borne out, for example, by the experience of the United States, where groups of experts are set up in critical situations to analyze and predict the situation.

Having studied the problems of the Near East roughly for as long as "the most protracted postwar conflict of the century" has been going on there, I, like the majority of my colleagues, somehow cannot recall our having been summoned to "the banners of the struggle for peace" not in order to beat the propaganda drums but to use our knowledge to "clear the mines" from dangerous crises. If we had pooled the practical experience of our diplomats, military experts, and orientalists, maybe we would have succeeded in solving the Kuwaiti conundrum. [passage omitted]

They preferred to cut rather than undo the Kuwaiti knot. But, as a result, the knot in the Near East might be pulled still tighter. Therefore one cannot now help feeling great anxiety before the unpredictable nature of the further development of events. In the modern interconnected and interdependent world it is necessary to do not only "everything conceivable" but also "everything possible" to prevent the new "hot war" from escalating into a global storm. Otherwise it could take the form of an as yet unknown kind of "regional war" with global consequences, of something that will later be called a "subworld war." Before "Desert Storm" causes a chain reaction of landslides accompanied by a tornado of devastation and an inundation of ecological disasters, it must be not just localized but stopped.

Opposing Views Compared

91UF0388A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 91 p 12

[Report by observer Gennadiy Gerasimov: "First, the Scalpel"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf is only just beginning to heat up, but many people are already disturbed as to why it is not subsiding. Yet no American leader promised victory over Iraq, which this column noted last week. But in public opinion Blitzkrieg was, as it were, implied. Although the start of the war has been more than successful from the standpoint of an "input-results" analysis, memories of the times of the Vietnam War are already accumulating in public opinion.

Yet there has not been a single ground engagement as yet, not once yet have the parties' soldiers met eyeball to eyeball.

According to the plan, the first phase of the war has been aerial. It is impersonal. The bombardiers press the buttons and return to base. Their victims are for them invisible and therefore abstract. The pilots are thinking not about them but about the breakfast awaiting them at base after the night sortie.

A colonel in E. Hemingway's novel "Across the River and Into the Trees" said that if a man has a conscience, he should stop sometime and think about what military aviation means.

This is what an eyewitness told Morley Safer, the author of the book "Recollections of Vietnam," which was published last year in the United States:

"No previous experience of life prepares us for the B-52. Following a raid by them, you wander around, picking up pieces of bodies and attempting to bury them."

Another witness, a Vietnamese, testifies in the book "Vietcong Diary," which he had published in the United States in 1986: "The horror of the B-52 bombing cannot be compared with anything else, it is a sensation of the most complete psychological terror lasting from day to day."

This on the one hand, on the part of the victims. Let us now open another book recently published in the United States by Colonel David Hackworth, an American Vietnam War veteran, "An American Soldier's Odyssey." He writes:

"We were told—and even the President was told the same—that our military power rained down on the enemy would either hurl him back into the Stone Age or bring him to his knees.... Our bombing merely forced the enemy into hating us even more and merely strengthened him in his resistance."

It is a pity that I do not have to hand an analysis of the effect of the Soviet Air Force on the course of military operations in Afghanistan.

But to return to the present war, the targets have been specified, but the use of air power is being limited also—no one is suggesting, as was advised during the Vietnam War, "bombing Iraq into the Stone Age." So-called "surgical" strikes against purely specific targets are being delivered, and the accuracy of the strikes is being abundantly advertised, what is more. The B-52's are plowing up the deployment positions of the crack Iraqi formations.

At the same time, however, clearly referring to the experience of Vietnam and the criticism on the part of the military of the political leadership—it complained that it was having to fight with one hand tied behind its back—Secretary of State James Baker promised in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee not to repeat the "mistakes" of gradual military escalation in Vietnam. The war will be prosecuted to a victorious outcome, not for some interim compromise.

General Colin Powell, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the same. He explained somewhat arrogantly that this time the Iraqis would be fighting "not 15-year-old Iranians but an exceptionally powerful and capable force, a force pursuing just one goal—victory."

Powell added that the affair would be resolved with "minimal losses."

Accordingly, the war is as yet in the initial phase of the "scalpel" and air strikes against specific military targets. But there is hardly anyone who would presume to predict that it will not go beyond the bounds contoured for it in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The other side clearly aspires to expand the conflict.

In our country there have emerged in connection with this war, which is, however, occurring elsewhere, "supporters" of various categories for both sides. Reflecting, possibly, the overall state of our society, where, it would seem, it is impossible to reach agreement on anything.

"Supporters" of the military equipment category view the conflict as a comparative duel between Soviet (in the armament of Iraq) and American military hardware and from the angle of who smashes whose teeth.

The "supporters" of the ideological category are inclined to see the conflict as a manifestation of the eternal American aspiration to assume the role of world policeman and, correspondingly, the "anti-imperialist" challenge of Iraq.

The "idealist supporters" see the dictator in Baghdad as a threat to the onset of a "new world order" following the cold war. The aggressor must not enjoy the fruits of his aggression.

The "pragmatist supporters" see only oil.

Each possesses a particle of the truth, and for this reason consensus is hard to achieve.

Soviet Peace Committee Appeals to Saddam

91P50075A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Jan 91 Union Edition p 6

[Article by G. Charodeyev; "Appeal to S. Husayn"]

[Text] Hearings took place in the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace on the subject of the situation in the Persian Gulf. Public figures, political scientists, diplomats, and servicemen participated in the hearings.

A Declaration and an Appeal to be sent to the Moscow embassies of those states who have sent their Armed Forces to the crisis area were adopted at the meeting. An appeal will also be sent to Iraq's embassy in Moscow. In the document, the participants in the hearings called upon the Iraqi leadership to "fully realize your share of the responsibility for the situation that has taken shape" in the Persian Gulf region. They called upon Saddam Husayn to begin the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Political & Social

'Vremya' Carries Gorbachev Law Enforcement Decree

LD2901161491 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Decree by President Mikhail Gorbachev on establishing a committee to coordinate the activities of law enforcement bodies, issued in Moscow on 29 January; from the "Vremya" newscast—read by announcer]

[Text] Proceeding from the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the need to decisively step up the struggle against economic sabotage; embezzlement; corruption; attempts upon the lives of citizens and crimes against their health, honor, dignity, and property; as well as other crimes in accordance with item four of the USSR Supreme Soviet decision of 23 November 1990 on the situation in the country, I decree:

1. A committee to coordinate the activities of law enforcement bodies will be established under the USSR president.

2. Comrade Golik, Yuriy Vladimirovich, will be appointed chairman of the USSR Presidential Committee on Coordinating Law Enforcement Bodies' Activities.

3. Comrade Golik, Yuriy Vladimirovich, will be instructed to submit proposals on the composition of the committee, its tasks, rights, duties, and operating procedure.

Further on Decree

LD2901193291 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] Let us begin with two presidential orders. The first one is the decree on the interaction between the Militia and subunits of the USSR Armed Forces in enforcing law and order and in the struggle against crime.

Taking account of the fact that criminal offenses against citizens, those employed in the law and order protection bodies and servicemen and also because other violations of the law are becoming ever more dangerous and frequent, on the basis of point no. one, Article 127, Paragraph three of the USSR Constitution and in accordance with the USSR Law of 24 September 1990 on Additional Measures to Stabilize the Economic and Sociopolitical Life of the Country and the USSR Supreme Soviet decision of 23 November 1990 on the situation in the country, I decree:

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Ministry of Defense are to ensure interaction between the Militia and the USSR Armed Forces subunits in the maintenance of public order in the streets and public places.

With this purpose in mind, joint patroling, including spot checks with the participation of representatives of the public, are to be carried out in towns and centers of population.

The organization for the carrying out of the measures referred to above must be strictly guided by the demands of the USSR and republican laws. [passage omitted]

Ministers Cited on Joint Patrols, Prices

PM2901223191 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 30 Jan 91 p 1

[Aleksandr Nadzharov feature incorporating interviews with Boris Pugo, USSR minister of internal affairs, and Vyacheslav Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices; date and place of interviews not given: "Troops and Prices"]

[Text]

Interview on a Burning Topic with Boris Pugo, USSR Minister of Internal Affairs

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Boris Karlovich! The decree published a few days ago on the start of joint armed patrolling of our cities by the Army and the militia as of 1 February has evoked an ambivalent reaction. Some people are saying that it is an attempt to undermine democracy, that it is part of a possible military coup, others believe that it is evidence of an attempt to maintain order in the light of price rises allegedly scheduled for 1 February. So what is it really?

[Pugo] It is neither the one nor the other. Many thousands of people have come to us at the Ministry of Internal Affairs with a request to impose order in the streets of our cities. They were not referring to rallies, we are used to them by now, but to hooliganism and other criminal phenomena. Just that, and nothing else. As for price rises, I have no information, and if they do take place, they will be just as "pleasant" a surprise for me as for you.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Nonetheless, the measures that will be implemented are unprecedented.

[Pugo] Why unprecedented? In the Ukraine, and in many other places, joint patrolling has been in operation for several months and has produced quite good results, judging by the population's response.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Representatives of the new organs of power are expressing misgivings, justified misgivings in my opinion, that under the leadership of Army commanders these patrols will no longer be under the jurisdiction of soviets of people's deputies and thus will be outside their control.

[Pugo] This will not be the case. Seniority in a patrol comprising servicemen and militiamen will always rest with a militia staffer. And he, as is known, is directely subordinate to the organs of soviet power. And one more point. Any decision to abolish reinforced patrols for the maintainance of order is in the hands of the republican leadership. If they do not want to have them, good luck to them, it is their own affair.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] In an interview with the USSR minister of internal affairs, it is impossible not to touch upon the topic of the Baltic republics. What is the situation like there now?

[Pugo] The situation is stabilizing slightly. All Army assault units were withdrawn from there by 28 January. Only ordinary troops remain, those who were on the territory of the Baltic republics even 10 years ago.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] What about internal troops?

[Pugo] As of yesterday, 29 January, two thirds of them had been withdrawn. One-third remain for the time being, but judging by the situation which is growing calmer, they will not be there forever.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] Has it been possible to clarify who gave the order to open fire in Vilnius in the night of 12-13 January?

[Pugo] Nobody issued such an order. I knew that an acute situation had developed there, but when I was told that shooting had started, I was shocked. Looking at it soberly with hindsight, I believe that a whole chain of tragic mistakes by both parties to the conflict was to blame...

The Second Interview Is With Vyacheslav Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee on Prices

[Senchagov] Price rises as of 1 February? You will understand that I cannot vouch for all republics, but on the scale of the USSR as a whole, general price increases are not planned as from this date.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] As things stand at this moment?

[Senchagov] No. [as published] Incidentally, we must prepare people for a certain liberalization of prices that will take place. The specific time-frame for the implementation of the price reform will be discussed at the Federation Council.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] And compensation? Especially for people on low incomes?

[Senchagov] That is an essential condition. And what is more, compensation must come first. The payments to supplement wages, pensions, grants, or allowances must be paid out first, and only then can specific retail prices be increased.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] What then is the purpose of such price increases? After all, they will be "swallowed up" by the compensation payments.

[Senchagov] Briefly, the purpose lies in changing the structure of price formation. At the moment, unprofitable production of food products, for example, is being subsidized by the state, while under the new system the supplementary payments will go to the consumer. It will be he who decides what he needs more urgently at a given moment—meat, or cured sausage, for example. Enterprises will no longer be "propped up" by subsidies, and their collectives will earn their living.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] An idyllic picture.

[Senchagov] No, it will be hard, of course. Especially at first, during the first year or two... However it will help the production of food, goods, and services to find its feet, and will ultimately lead to an appreciable rise in living standards.

[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA] And meanwhile higher prices for food and consumer goods are inevitable? I was told at the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Trade that the former will more than double, and the latter will almost double.

[Senchagov] You must understand that it would be foolish to announce in advance the date when prices will go up. The ballyhoo and panic that will inevitably ensue are by no means conducive to the establishment of proper order. But try to understand that this is inevitable. Light industry enterprises are currently on the brink of closure. Prices for raw materials have risen, wholesale prices have increased, and retail prices have remained unchanged. Soon there will be no money at these enterprises to pay out wages that, incidentally, have risen almost everywhere during the past year. The same applies to radio and electronic equipment, household goods, and food. For the same reason trade is also sustaining huge losses. So that we will all have to swallow the bitter pill which is, however, vitally necessary. [Senchagov ends]

As you can see, both ministers have said much that is interesting. Although they have expressed themselves with utmost caution when speaking about possible price increases. Let us be grateful that at least they did not deliberately lie to us, they did not deceive us as some senior officials had done when "reassuring" us that there would be no money exchange. This is hardly an example to be followed today, because when someone predicts our economic future and sticks his neck out, he can confidently expect to have his head chopped off.

And so, the time of unpopular decisions, to put it mildly, has come. Many of them are clearly economically inevitable. Many. But this does not include lies and disregard for the interests of honest working people.

Interior Minisrty Official on Joint Patrols

LD2901130691 Moscow TASS in English 1249 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—"The decree by the USSR defence and interior ministers to send, starting from February 1, troops out onto city streets with police patrols pursues only one goal—to prevent crime on the streets and ensure citizens' security," Eduard Ryazanov, first deputy head of the USSR Interior Ministry's Main Department for Social Order Protection, said at a Soviet Interior Ministry briefing today.

He emphasised that the decree did not pursue any other objectives.

As for combat and armoured vehicles, Ryazanov said they would be permanently based in garrisons and would not take part in patrols. He noted, that "arms with which patrols will be equipped correspond to standards envisaged by the law and there is nothing new here."

Ryazanov said that on the joint patrols a policeman would always be a senior member of a detail and "will be held responsible for a serviceman subordinate to him, for all his actions during the patrols."

Constitutional Committee To Review Order

LD2901124391 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] The current joint order by the minister of internal affairs and the minister of defense on the patrolling of the streets of major cities by the militia and servicemen, which is to go into effect on 1 February, has been accepted for consideration by the Committee for Constitutional Surveillance of the Union Parliament. It seems that the discussion will be complex and difficult. It still cannot be said with complete confidence that this decree will be approved. Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Surveillance, has refused to make any comments.

Several political figures, not few in number, consider the order as an impermissible and moreover illegal measure for regulating the life of the country. For example, Sergey Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow soviet, has expressed such an opinion, as have representatives of the more conservative wing of deputies. Leonid Sharin, chairman of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Issues of Defense and State Security, also turns out not to be delighted. Sharin states that he is convinced that the army should not have to perform tasks that are not part of its proper function. Incidentally, this same opinion is quite prevalent among members of the country's Armed Forces themselves, especially among field officers.

Decree for Joint Militia-Army Patrols Discussed

Shatalin, Others Discuss Plan

PM2901165391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general headline "1 February 1991: The Militia and the Army Are Already United. Is It Up to the People?" and the subhead "Fellow Countrymen! Let us Preserve Peace and Not Give a Reason To Be Patrolled": "Advice from 'Outsiders'"]

[Text] We asked some members of the former Presidential Council to express their opinion on the joint order of the defense minister and the internal affairs minister. And so, what would their advice to the president be?

Grigoriy Revenko, USSR people's deputy:
"In the cities where people's lives and health are really threatened, I would rely more on the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] forces. In my opinion, the Army should not be used. It should be concerned with its own affairs."

Stanislav Shatalin, academician:
"To be honest, I have no desire to comment on this order. All this is beyond discussion...."

Valentin Rasputin, writer:
"We have already been talking about establishing order for three years. But all we are doing is talking. I support this decision, of course, if it really assists in establishing order."

Chingiz Aytmatov, USSR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Luxembourg:
"You have to bear in mind the fact that I am away from home and am giving my assessment from a distance. If the decision is based on the aim of establishing peace, then I do not have any particular misgivings about its implementation, although the proposed measures are a sign that we cannot stick to appropriate democratic forms and are giving an advantage to the two departments.

"It is also very important for corresponding actions to be taken in conjunction with the republics."

Concern Expressed at Decree

PM2901163991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 1

["KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA File" feature under the general headline: "1 February 1991: The Militia and the Army Are Already United. Is It Up to the People?"]

[Text] From the State Defense Committee Resolution dated 19 October 1941:
"...3. Major General Comrade Sinilov, commandant of Moscow City, is to be tasked with the protection of the strictest order in the city and in the suburbs, and

therefore NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] internal defense troops, the militia, and workers' volunteer detachments are to be placed under the commandant's command..."

S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee:
"Obviously the joint order of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] minister and the defense minister will be received for examination in our committee, so for the time being I will refrain from making any comments. But the mere fact that this order will be discussed by the Constitutional Oversight Committee, to my mind, describes it sufficiently well."

L. Sharin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions:
"On the one hand, I understand the ministers' unease about the deteriorating situation in the country. But on the whole their order puts me on my guard. Our committee is taking a tough stance: The Army should not participate in interethnic and domestic political conflicts. This demand is given first place in our draft law on military reform. The Army should be freed from functions that are not within its sphere."

Justice Minister Affirms Primacy of Union Law

LD2901141191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0745 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—"The parade of sovereignties" and "the war of laws" are a reality and one must not close one's eyes to that. The origin of this phenomenon, which is something new for us, has its roots in the fact that many republics do not define or understand their sovereign rights quite correctly, USSR Justice Minister Sergey Lushchikov said in an interview published in the latest edition of PRAVITELSTVENNIY VESTNIK. They are placing stress first and foremost on their own rights and powers."

"We live in a single state whether some like it or not. For that reason we must have a single legal and economic space and adequate protection of a person's rights and interests regardless of which republic's territory he is living in. A Union constitution and Union laws are in force for all of us. In turn, the fundamental and other common state laws take into account the particular features of the republics."

"During the work of the Committee on Legislation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to prepare any draft law, deputies always asked how it would be received in the republics. At the same time some republics, when promulgating a law, are thinking of something else: how can it counteract the position of the Union, of the center. The situation is quite unacceptable from a legal point of view. Furthermore, in almost any Union law the final sections note the position on international treaties and agreements. This means that if the norm of the Soviet law is in contradiction with the international norm, it is the latter which has force."

"Here is the other way around: if the norm of the republican law is in contradiction with the Union one, the republican proclaims its primacy. Any Western legislator or lawyer will tell you: This is nonsense."

End of Gorbachev 'Silence' on Baltics Welcomed

PM2901162891 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

["Political Diary" article by Yuriy Feofanov: "The President's Voice and the Current Moment"]

[Text] I wrote this "diary" twice: before the statement by the country's president at a Foreign Ministry news conference 22 January, and after. The difference is substantial. Before, the country was in turmoil, expressing indignation and making demands; after, it was distracted by money matters and had no time for democracy. But this diversion is purely temporary: We will surrender our banknotes and return to politics. I greatly hope that the president's voice will not be forgotten, will not escape public attention, because at long last the head of state said: The law of force must give way to the force of law.

A week of presidential silence when events were at their height first in Vilnius then in Riga, and silence at the time of the Moscow demonstrations and the strike threats, caused almost as much tension in society as the events themselves, especially after the speech at the Union legislative session which was perceived more as a general secretary's speech than a president's.

In this connection I would like to take readers back nearly a year to the Third Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies when the post of president was instituted. There were heated debates; there was moderate criticism of the candidate and fierce attacks against him. I have looked back at the stenographic transcript and think I found in the speech by Deputy I.N. Sidor, a doctor from Lutsk, what the country expected of its leader. These are his words:

"Today what we need is the kind of person with the kind of character, the kind of approach, the kind of concept, that could find a **healthy compromise** (my emphasis—Yu.F.) among the different positions that exist in our country."

Some people think that compromise means losing your mainstay, or as they used to say in the old days of the party, "spinelessness." That is hardly fair. Compromises are necessary in any society, especially a troubled society like ours in its sixth year of political reforms. But a **healthy compromise** is fruitful on only one basis—the basis of the law. The newly elected president understood that and, swearing loyalty to the Constitution, he said in his speech:

"I will also stress that as I understand it the president should feel and act not as a representative of some particular stratum or political current, but as the agent of the entire people."

Has the president fulfilled his solemn vow? If you carried out a referendum in the street, there would certainly be quite a wide range of opinion: from unconditional support to demands for his resignation. The past year brought too much upheaval: The old order is crumbling. The new one is not yet fully fledged. Incidentally, when the demand for a multiparty system sprang up in society and began to be put forward with increasing urgency, it was none other than Mikhail Sergeyevich who warned that that is not the point; even when there are many parties there can be a dictatorship. Let us remember those words—Gorbachev proved to be a prophet here. We have no end of parties, but they have not ensured a democratic order. It is no accident that "ordinary people," disillusioned with what we call democracy, have begun to feel nostalgic for a "firm hand."

Between these extremes, only the law can give a society stability. But the law has not yet become the mainstay of the state. Everything is fragile, indefinite, hanging in the air. Every morning you wait with sinking heart to hear what the radio will bring, how the delicately poised confrontation will explode. You only have to add the tiniest extra grain to a saturated solution, and the liquid will crystallize. Or if you like, set as hard as bone. That is what we are waiting for—to see whether what emerges is the crystals of a democratic rule-of-law society, or the backbone of a totalitarian state. That is what we are wondering: whether the tanks will move off in tight columns, whether the miners will go on strike....

Although there is much to inspire hope, nearly six years of perestroyka and political reforms have not only stripped the shelves in the stores. But they have also raised the people from their knees and created "provincial" state structures that are hardly likely to submit blindly to diktat from above—a hopeful, but very worrying situation. The legitimate authorities in the Baltic republics are erecting barricades around their legislatures while the rebel committees threaten to seize power. You have to conclude: Yes, the rally-oriented society has risen up against tyranny, but the legal protection of democracy is not operating at statewide level.

So is there a state, does it still exist? The country's legislature broke off its session when events were at their height, when the tragic consequences of those events were already becoming known. The Constitutional Oversight Committee has explained why it has refrained from evaluating the status and actions of unconstitutional committees which are trying to overthrow by force the authorities elected by the people. The USSR Prosecutor's Office quite rightly demanded the immediate disbandment of one side's unlawful armed formations, but pretended there were no combat forces on the other.

Amid this social confusion and state chaos, it is fatal to join your voice to the "President, resign!" demands. Not emotional extremes but an exclusively law-based, systematic approach was the only way to keep the torrent of democracy within its banks when it threatened to burst through the dam of prudence. The president's voice was needed for that purpose. Not a one-sided, irritable voice, but a calm, objective one emerging not from an awareness of strength but from a sense of lawful responsibility.

That voice was heard.

The president has repeatedly given quite a tough assessment of the acts of certain republic legislatures that are indeed unlawful and do not conform to international norms. He was profoundly right because the norms inserted in the Criminal Code by those legislatures are capable of too broad an interpretation so that they could easily be taken to cover any political activity.

In his recent statement the president said:

"Unconstitutional laws adopted by republic Supreme Soviets and resolutions by their governments must be revoked, first and foremost those that violate human rights."

We have, I repeat, seen this before. What we have not seen before and what the worried public was waiting for so eagerly was the following statement:

"Any social organizations, committees, and fronts—whatever programs they put forward—can lay claim to come to power only by constitutional means, without the use of force. All attempts to resort to armed forces in the political struggle are impermissible.... All unauthorized actions by troops are impermissible."

In this case the president was fulfilling the promise he made when he took office—**"to act not as a representative of some particular stratum or political current, but as the agent of the entire people."**

In all probability, tranquillity will not come soon to our country. As the phrase goes, everything is fraught: in the Baltic region, Georgia, Moldavia, and on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. The president is obliged to prevent a breakdown. The great Roman general Gnaeus Pompey once uttered this self-reliant phrase: "Why do I need the law, when I have an army...?" He preferred his army, and as you know he came to a bad end. It seems to me that our president has been resolving the same dilemma. He has chosen the law. For the current moment, this is a lifesaving choice.

Gubenko Ponders Causes of Baltic 'Tragedy'

91UN0776A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 3

[Letter from USSR Minister of Culture N. Gubenko under the rubric "Feedback"]

[Text] D. Kuolys, [Lithuanian culture minister], R. Pauls, [Latvian culture minister], L. Sumera, [Estonian culture minister], and P. Krigers [title not identified].

Dear colleagues!

I am addressing you as a colleague in the arts not in my official position. Simply as a man. Misfortune, unhappiness, calamity, catastrophe, condolence, sorrow—these are the feelings of today.

But when people die at the hands of people, a sense of protest is added to these feelings. There can be no doubt that just as the rights of the individual cannot be trampled, in the same way internal political problems should not be resolved by armed forces.

Just six years ago one could hardly imagine that absence of diversity of opinion and of initiatives by the USSR president and the parliament at all levels to democratize society would lead the country to fierce, painful conflicts with a bloody outcome. The country is very sick. But the disease cannot be healed by death. To build an enormous edifice like our state does not mean to wipe off the face of the earth what was built earlier.

Today we have not arrived at the final line, but people are tired of reprisals and near the end of their tether. How can we guard the country against future misfortune? How can we wash away the blood stain that will ineluctably go down in history as one of its worst pages?

We must not evaluate the consequence without seeing the cause. Who is to blame? Why did the trouble occur in Vilnius and Riga and not in city X? What provoked the violence? Did the experience of Sumgait, Baku, Osh, and Tbilisi teach us nothing? Will the guilty be punished? Why was it that the parliament of Lithuania reached those particular decisions and not some others in their relations with the Russian-speaking population? Why were the proposals of the USSR president and the USSR Congress of People's Deputies on the illegality of particular enactments violating human rights not promptly adopted? Who now gains from the overthrow of the president and from fanning the flames of civil war? What is the role of the mass media and what have they done to maintain calm? How can the blood of the victims be expiated? Why is a referendum, offering the right of secession from the USSR on a legal basis, not being held by the parliaments of individual republics as an instrument of the will of the people? Finally, where are the guarantees against a repetition of what has happened?

The victims are the consequence, but the causes lie in the answers to these questions, and there are many others.

A crisis like this one may be historically inevitable in the life of our society, as a condition of transition. But every effort should be made to deal with it without blood.

Only if that is done can we hope for better times. And here, politicians at all levels must be patient and prepared to compromise.

There are many privileges in the world, but the most scandalous and cynical of them is the privilege of amateur politicians who, to achieve their ends justify every means, forgetting about the fate of simple people.

Let us all recognize our responsibility and let us not give people the choice of war or peace.

While expressing my condolences to the relatives of the victims, I hope that the tragedy of these January nights in Vilnius and Riga do not lead us far from the human foundations and bases, and will serve as a lesson for all, including those to blame for them. No one should be reconciled to violence. The guilty must be punished. Otherwise none of us will expiate the shame that until the end of our days will remind us what we failed to do to prevent enmity and hatred.

Culture is the antithesis of brutalization. We can hardly quickly correct our mistakes, but we can admit them quickly. The intelligentsia is obliged to do everything that it can to promote peace and prevent other violence, and to do this with the sense of justice inherent in it. This is what the interests of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and all of society expect from us.

[Signed] N. Gubenko, USSR minister of culture

Central Committee Department Discusses Referendum

PM2901162591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by S. Oganyan: "Meeting in the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A meeting with journalists was held yesterday in the CPSU Central Committee Nationalities Policy Department.

Opening the meeting, Head of Department V. Mikhaylov proposed that those present exchange opinions on preparing to hold a USSR referendum on the question of preserving the USSR as a renewed federation. It was noted that this is the first time our country has adopted a Law on the Referendum and the first time such a referendum has been held. The situation is such that some republics are opposed to a vote of this nature being held in their territory and have rejected the idea of a referendum.

The CPSU Central Committee fully supports the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, which are aimed at preserving our Union. The task of the press is to create a favorable political climate in the run-up to the referendum and do everything possible to promote its being held. It is important to approach 17 March with one's eyes open and not concentrate exclusively on the organizational aspect of the preparations, but bear in mind its meaning and political import above all else.

Journalists taking part in the meeting voiced a number of ideas aimed at overcoming stereotypes.

Veterans Backs Referendum on Preserving USSR

LD2801162991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] An All-Union Council of War, Labor, and Armed Forces Veterans plenum adopted an appeal in connection with the referendum scheduled for 17 March on the question of preserving the USSR. As you know, all the country's citizens are to give their reply as to whether they consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a renewed federation of union republics enjoying equal rights in which the rights and freedoms of persons of any nationality will be fully guaranteed.

The veterans have come out in support of this decision by the country's Supreme Soviet as a necessaary and urgent step toward lifting the country out of crisis and saving the fatherland from what the document calls the shame of disintegration and the destruction of the centuries-old ties binding its peoples.

'Absolute' Sovereignty Said 'Incorrect'

91UN0781A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by G. Tunkin, president of the Soviet Association of International Law and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Sovereignty of the State and Individual Rights—Reflecting on the Union Treaty Concept"]

[Text] Moscow—**The broad and interested discussion of the draft of the Union treaty, and now the concept, indicates many things. Most of all the fact that, despite the fierce campaign of destructive forces in some regions that are trying to break up the Soviet Union into pieces, a majority of the people understand that to destroy the mutually beneficial ties between the peoples of our country that have developed over a long time would be disastrous for everyone. And these ties, particularly in the sphere of human contact, have undergone great development during the years of Soviet rule, despite all of the distortions of the socialist idea. A majority of the people have stopped paying attention to differences in nationality, and all have worked amicably. Inherited ties must be developed further, and they will be stronger yet on a new democratic foundation.**

Of course, the power relationships between the center and the republics need a radical restructuring. The sovereign republics, as envisioned in the concept of the Union treaty, will in fact exercise authority within the bounds of powers defined by the demarcation between the Union and the republics.

It is time to understand that it is not perestroyka that is the cause of the crisis, although it itself is a difficult and painful process, but the activity of centrifugal anti-perestroyka forces. The parade of sovereignties, the incitement of national hysteria, and aspirations to stand apart and pull apart the integrated economic complex of the Soviet Union into pieces—this is our main trouble.

The scientific-technical revolutions, and they are coming one after the other, cannot be stopped by anyone, and they are inexorably leading to the integration of various states. Although this is an uneven process by regions, and a contradictory process in the sense that it has both positive and negative sides, it is an irresistible historical process that has to be dealt with. And our self-styled democrats, who loudly demand the liquidation of the Union as a state on behalf of the alleged freedom of the nations, are nothing more than reactionaries, and, according to the definition of Dal's explanatory dictionary, this denotes "people who are retrograde, backward, go back on their word."

The parade of sovereignties, starting with the Union republics and ending with individual rayons, is not entirely a blessing for the people. Sovereignty is power. Let it be exercised on behalf of the people, but realistically it is in the hands of organs of authority; that is, in the hands of a specific group of people.

And there are two aspects here: Authority in the state must ensure law and order, the protection of individual rights, and so forth. But authority opens up the opportunity for its abuse by those who have it in their hands. A person must have a defense against authority. And the more "sovereignties" there are; that is, the more authorities, the more difficult it is for a person to protect himself from them.

Moreover, rights must be equal for everyone, regardless of which republic a Soviet citizen resides. That is why the highest and most reliable guarantor must be the Soviet Union and its superior organs, (by virtue of their position as organs established by all of the Soviet people) to whom people of any nationality, religion, etc. will be equal. The Soviet Union, of course, in a renewed form, as is envisaged in the concept of the Union treaty, must not only ensure the economic development of the country but also to guarantee individual rights and individual freedom.

Many of our political figures misunderstand sovereignty. They say that "sovereignty is unlimited power," and "sovereignty is when there is complete authority..." etc. This is a concept of absolute sovereignty, supported by many in the past. Thomas Hobbes, based on this concept, asserted that there exists in relations between states, inasmuch as there is no supreme authority above them, a so-called "state of nature", he called "a war against everyone by everyone." Hegel also took the position of the absolute sovereignty of the state.

At one time the concept of absolute authority was not far from reality, but for modern society this is the past, it is nonsense.

There is no such state now whose sovereignty would not be limited. Every state—a member of the international community—has responsibilities under international law that it is expected to fulfill. It does not have complete freedom of action, and its sovereignty thus is limited, but in the process it retains the basic attributes of sovereignty. Norms of international law are established by way of agreements between states. On this basis, international law moves forward, reflecting the general interests of states. In this connection, the concept itself of the "basic attributes of sovereignty" of a state is changed. Actually, as early as the beginning of this century the most important attribute of state sovereignty was "the right to go to war" against another state. According to current international law, that state unleashing a war is also committing a grave international crime.

Thus, the sovereignty of any state is limited by international law. The sovereignty of states that are members of the European Economic Community is limited additionally by pertinent treaties that are the legal basis of the community. In any federal state, the sovereignty of the members of the federation, in addition to international law, is limited by the constitution of the federation. In the United States, members of the federation are states. They possess broad powers, although the sum of these powers of each state are not called sovereign. Therefore, as President M.S. Gorbachev properly emphasized, the main question is the distribution of powers between the Union and the republics. In this respect, the concept of a Union treaty contains an optimal version as a whole. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that, according to this concept, in many ways the powers of the Union and the republics are exercised jointly, and therefore the sovereignty of the Union republics is also exercised.

Some of our politicians of various ranks root at the top of their voices for individual rights, but in fact they operate as if until the conclusion of a new Union treaty the Constitution and the laws of the USSR no longer function and it is not necessary to consider them. But this would mean that we are living in a legal vacuum. But rights and freedoms cannot exist in a legal vacuum. A legal vacuum is the supremacy of arbitrary rule, while individual rights and freedom require legal regulation and law and order. Unlimited freedom of the individual would denote the negation of the freedom of other people, just as unlimited sovereignty of a state would denote the negation of the sovereignty of other states.

It is not out of place to mention how individual freedom was defined by Montesquieu, the author of the theory of power sharing that received such wide dissemination in the world and without the implementation of which it is impossible to guarantee human rights. "Liberty," wrote Montesquieu, "is the right to do everything that is permitted by law, and if one citizen could do that which is prohibited by law, liberty would cease to exist because all others would have the very same right."

But there is no legal vacuum in the USSR. The USSR Constitution exists, and, although some politicians call it old, it is the supreme law of the state. No one has abolished it. Therefore, the Constitution, and the basic laws of the USSR published on its basis, are in force and must be complied with on the entire territory of the Soviet Union. If we are for a rule-of-law state, and an overwhelming majority agrees with this, then the laws of the USSR must be followed. Not only communists but all sensible people must support the 11 December 1990 CPSU Central Committee Plenum resolution stating, in particular, that the "maintenance of law and order in the country requires respect and the strict implementation of Union laws in force. They remain in force right up to the signing of a Union treaty and the adoption of a new Union Constitution."

And one more thing. It seems to me that in recent years we have somewhat forgotten somewhat the distinction between the law and legal standards and the biblical commandments. Two thousand years ago in ancient Rome, that gave us a legacy of much that is good, especially in the sphere of law, it was considered a firm rule that the law must be observed and that the state should achieve this. Right and law presume an ability to apply not only persuasion and admonition but also compulsory measures to ensure their observance.

This is not a return to the old, to authoritarianism, but it is a necessary condition for the existence and development of democracy. A lot is being said in our country now about civilization and culture, but in so doing it is usually forgotten that strict implementation of the laws is the most important indicator precisely of civilization and culture.

Centrist Bloc's Composition, Aims Described

PM2301112991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 91 First Edition p 6

[Reply by Lieutenant Colonel N. Poroskov to reader's letter: "Who's Who; Third Force?"]

[Text] "I have learned from fragmentary newspaper reports that a Centrist Bloc of political parties and movements has been formed. The information about this bloc is contradictory. Could you please tell me who has joined the Centrist Bloc and what objectives the Centrists have set themselves?

"[Signed] Captain V. Baturin, Arkhangelsk"

At a news conference held in Moscow in December, the Centrists' leader V. Voronin briefed journalists on the Centrist Bloc's program for extricating the country from crisis. First of all, it states the desire to join world civilization. The obstacle to this, in the opinion of the document's authors, is the half-hearted nature of perestroyka and its inability to involve all strata of society in the renewal process (people are allowed to speak but they are not allowed to act). Hence the crisis of confidence in the authorities.

The Centrist Bloc is in favor of a sovereign Russia within a voluntary Union and a confederation with a presidency. In the foreign policy sphere, it advocates actions in the interests of the entire world community and the disbandment of military-political alliances.

The program of economic measures is calculated to cover 100 days. It is based on issuing every working person with shares worth 25,000 rubles. The holder may invest in business at his own discretion. This figure is based on data provided by the USSR State Committee for Statistics: It is the estimated value of the average workplace. It also proposes to replace state planning with marketing and free enterprise and to transfer land to private ownership with a five-year trial period.

The threat of the country's collapse and never-ending civil war, the program says, forces Centrists to propose radical measures. They include the introduction of a special situation, a moratorium on political processes in the country, and the suspension of all parties' activity.

What kind of mechanism is envisaged to implement such radical changes? Relying on existing Army, KGB, and Internal Affairs Ministry structures, the Centrists propose to hand over power to the National Salvation Committee and its representatives at local level extinguishing the fires of civil war and guarantee citizens' social protection. Their ultimate aim is to preserve the Union and end the squandering of national wealth.

The major measures to be implemented in the new conditions include fighting corruption, sabotage, and crime and changing the composition of the law courts. At the same time, one of the points in the program is a policy of free economic development and diversity of forms of ownership.

At their own admission, the Centrists are "closer to the Winter Palace than to the Smolnyy" [the Smolnyy Institute in Leningrad]. They see themselves as a third force after the government and the democratic opposition.

The bloc is currently made up of 22 political parties, including various movements: the Liberal-Democratic Party, World Russian Synod, Russian People's Front, Blue Movement, Peace Party, Democratic Communist Movement, Party of the Individual, Russian Union of Private Owners, Russia Association, and others.

The Soyuz group of deputies is the most prominent. Revival, the all-union cultural-educational society of Germans, recently joined the Centrist Bloc. Another four parties wishing to register are waiting in the wings.

It is hard to say how many people belong to the bloc as a whole and to each party individually: Many who share the Centrist Bloc's views are simply not registered as members. The bloc's supporters subdivide into members and observers of three ranks. The Centrist Bloc has a difficult relationship with other parties. The bloc is in opposition to the CPSU but does recognize it—unlike the Russian Democratic Party, for example. The latter does not even recognize the Centrist Bloc. Centrist leader V. Voronin was almost thrown out of the First Russian Democratic Party Congress, despite the fact that he had been invited. Russian Minister M. Poltoranin came to his assistance by letting him have his delegate's mandate instead.

G. Gusev, leader of the Democratic Communist Movement, had this to say about N. Travkin's party: "The Russian Democratic Party has nothing to do with either democracy or Russia. It is a social mimicry." At the same time, the Centrist Bloc is glad to see several Communists in its ranks. On the whole, party differences are not so important to the bloc. The main point is its general objective: To replace organs of authority and political parties with national salvation committees.

The bloc's attitude to the draft Union Treaty is ambivalent: Yes, it is needed but not in its present form, because it appears to have been copied by incompetent people from European documents and does not take account of the interests of the Russian people.

The Centrist Bloc Program also contains the following statement: We will forgive mutual offence and not allow a political Chernobyl to happen.

Measures Against Drug-Trafficking Examined

LD2901150391 Moscow TASS in English 1447 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—A free market will generate new problems for Soviet society, related to the increased drugs trafficking, law enforcement agencies believe. A briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry was devoted to this problem today.

Organisational and practical measures allowed police to step up their efforts to fight drug smuggling—over 34,000 drug-related crimes were uncovered last year. Over 700 hideouts of drug addicts were eliminated.

As many as 1,500 criminal groups of dealers in this area of the shadow economy and 3,000 drug merchants were uncovered over this period. Police seized cash and valuables worth 3.5 million roubles. Speakers at the briefing said 6,000 tonnes of narcotics and dozens of tonnes of raw materials for their production were confiscated.

The operation Poppy-90 helped destroy 100,000 narcotics-containing crops on an area of 450 hectares, including 4,000 illicit poppy plantations. Interior Ministry executives, who carried out the operation, calculated that once the harvest was marketed, its owners would have reaped profits of over a billion roubles.

The recent formation of seven inter-regional departments for fighting drug trafficking at the Soviet Interior Ministry, the divisions of which are located in 39 cities of the country, form an all-Union network to trace and arrest drug dealers.

The new divisions' staff discovered 45 drugs smuggling routes and uncovered 71 groups of dealers.

Dzasokhov Addresses Zil Plant Workers

LD2801215991 Mocow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 28 Jan 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Many of the country's major industrial enterprises and associations are in a difficult situation. Purchase and wholesale prices on raw materials, electricity, and other materials were raised from 1 January, and deliveries are being disrupted. This is affecting the stability of the work of collectives and, as a result, does not guarantee the implementation of social programs. A report by our correspondent V. Stepanyuk from the Likhachev automobile plant.

[Stepayuk] Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, today visited the Zil workshops. Outwardly, there have been few changes to the flagman of our automobile construction [passage omitted on output]

During meetings with workers in the press shop and vehicle- assembly blocks, the problem raised above all others was that of whether Zil could retain its collective of qualified specialists when wages in assembly here are 250-300 rubles [R], and in cooperatives—that many specialists have left to join—the wages are R800 and over. Naturally, during a frank talk with representatives of the works' party and social organizations, Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov particularly stressed that, during the transition of our economy to market relations, the CPSU sees the protection of social guarantees for the working people as its main task. He elucidated the CPSU Central Committee's stance on inter-ethnic relations and the new Union Treaty, and demonstrated the continuity of the Soviet Union's foreign political course.

[Begin Dzasokhov recording] I have again been convinced today that such meetings are extremely necessary for us, to better understand the mood of work collectives and their views and predictions on the most urgent matters in the life of the Soviet state and our people. Following this meeting I received literally dozens of questions. They are not narrow, but broad, relating to how the Supreme Soviet is working, to what tasks are being tackled in the Party, and what forecasts there are for the realization of the new economic environment. In other words, a vigorous, civic, and responsible interests in the country's most urgent affairs. All this, and also the workers' understanding of the situation in the country which is, of course, contiguous to a better kind of life, in the sense of foodstuff and industrial supplies, on the one hand, but also the understanding, above all, of the need for all our political activity to be shifted into a constructive channel—this is what is prevalent in the arguments of all generations of workers whom I met today. [end recording]

Cabinet of Ministers Discusses Coal Industry

PM3001105791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "USSR Cabinet of Ministers Session"]

[Text] On 29 January the USSR Cabinet of Ministers continued to discuss stabilizing the work of the base sectors of the national economy and to develop them. There was an examination of current and long-term issues of the coal industry, providing approximately 20 percent of all the country's fuel and energy resources. Taking part in the session, chaired by USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov, were his deputies, leaders of ministries and departments, representatives of the union republics, general directors of production associations for the extraction and enrichment of coal from the main coal mining regions of the USSR, chiefs of mine building combines, and directors of machine building plants.

The attention of the session's participants was focused on an analysis of the reasons for the sector's present difficult position and a search for ways out of it and on the strategy for the development of the coal industry in the nineties. It was noted that the plans adopted by enterprises for 1991 are below the real needs of the national economy, and is having an adverse effect on the work of a number of sectors, primarily power and metallurgy, and also on the satisfaction of the population's municipal services and consumer needs. The radical alteration of the situation, the speakers said, requires the solution of a broad complex of problems, including the provision of financial resources, an increase in the commissioning of new production capacities, the acceleration of the production and delivery of advanced equipment, and the introduction of order in material and technical supplies and primarily in the supply of supports and metal. The persistent acuteness of social issues was noted, which is creating tension in the labor collectives.

Many speakers pointed out that the main reasons for the reduction in coal extraction lie in shortcomings in production organization, in the lowering of labor discipline, and in the high turnover of manpower. In this connection the need was stressed to take steps to increase the prestige of mining work.

The speakers, including local representatives, expressed themselves in favor of retaining centralized leadership of the country's coal mining sector at the present stage of the transition to market relations, at the same time providing for urgent changes in the functions of the union ministry and its relations with republican and local organs of power and specific steps to expand the autonomy of enterprises and associations.

On the basis of the discussion instructions were given to prepare decisions which would ensure the speediest stabilization of the work of the coal industry and its dynamic development in subsequent years.

USSR President M.S. Gorbachev met with the participants in the session. There was a specific talk on urgent questions of the coal mining industry's economic and social development.

AES Shutdown, Generating Capacity Data Cited

PM3001100591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 3

[Report by V. Reshetnikov under the "IZVESTIYA Calling" rubric: "How Many Nuclear Installations Have Been Shut Down?"]

[Text] According to information received at the USSR Ministry of the Atomic Power Industry, today in the country as a whole nuclear power installation projects nearing completion such as the Rostov, Crimea, Tartar, and Bashkir nuclear power stations and power units at the Smolensk, Khmelnitskiy, Zaporozhye, Kalinin and other atomic stations have been suspended, mothballed, or redesignated. The design and construction of 60 electricity-generating stations with a total capacity of 160 million kilowatts has been halted. As was noted at the December 1990 congress of the country's power industry workers, since the 1980's the power sector has lost its dynamic growth. Between 1965 and 1980 the average yearly rate of commissioning of generating capacity stood at around 11 million kilowatts. Between 1983 and 1988 the figure was around 10 million kilowatts. In 1989 it was 3.8 million kilowatts. In 1990 6.6 million kilowatts of capacity was commissioned.

KGB on Problems of Opening Krasnoyarsk

91UF0389A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 4

[Report on interview with Yuriy Chikhanchin, head of Krasnoyarsk Kray KGB counterintelligence department, by Yu. Litvinov in Krasnoyarsk; date not given; published under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "The Declassified City Remains a Point of Interest for Western Special Services"]

[Text]**The USSR Council of Ministers decree allowing foreigners unlimited access to the city of Krasnoyarsk has been in force since 3 December 1990. However, together with its new status the city has acquired a number of problems. Among them, for instance, is difficulty safeguarding state and industrial secrets from the attention of various special services. Yuriy Chikhanchin, head of the Krasnoyarsk Kray KGB counterintelligence department, comments on the decree and on the resulting situation:**

[Chikhanchin] First I want to say: The suggested 50 percent reduction in arms would lift the veil of secrecy from many locations belonging to the Ministry of Defense. After that we will open neighboring territories. The decree, by the way, does not mention Krasnoyarsk exclusively. The list of cities named in the decree is rather long. But Krasnoyarsk is a place of special importance. It is practically a city with a million population, and we have defense industry installations here, as well as space research facilities.

Today Krasnoyarsk, together with most of the kray regions, is open to foreign visitors. This does not mean, however, that anyone can enter the city, with no exceptions. The procedure for issuing approval for a visit has not been canceled completely either; we have just considerably cut down on the restrictions. The procedure for visiting the city will most likely be as follows: Foreigners would be able to come to the city if they have an invitation from there. A visa will be issued through the corresponding sectors of consulates or the OVIR (Visa and Registration Department). The decision of the kray-ispolkom [kray soviet executive committee] would be sufficient for businessmen and experts to travel on.

[Litvinov] Will foreigners be able to travel just as freely to Krasnoyarsk satellite towns—to the "Devyatka," for instance, known among journalists as Atomgrad?

[Chikhanchin] Unlimited access regulations do not cover satellite towns. In fact they are not towns but rather special-purpose installations that have their own residential zones. Actually, individuals from various countries have been visiting them already. But there are still places left on the territory of our kray that cannot be shown to foreigners yet.

[Litvinov] But as far as I know, the Yenisey River shipping line plans to start cruises down the Yenisey, oriented specifically at foreign tourists. Special interest in such a trip has been displayed by Scandinavian countries. Is this plan realistic if the cruise has to go through closed areas?

[Chikhanchin] Downstream Yenisey is practically all open. But due to considerations of secrecy a cruise between Krasnoyarsk and the Arctic Ocean is not possible yet. So far, only shorter trips are possible; though the restrictions may be lifted in future.

[Litvinov] What part does the KGB and your department play in this new situation?

[Chikhanchin] The same as always—our only interest is in people connected to special services. We are not going to control ordinary visitors in any way. But if the KGB develops well-grounded suspicions of any individual then we will act according to the legal procedures common to all law enforcement bodies. But we also try to uncover illegal dealings that might involve foreigners—smuggling of guns, drugs, etc. In this area we act in close cooperation with the police and other law enforcement bodies.

[Litvinov] I wonder, did many foreign intelligence agents visit Krasnoyarsk before?

[Chikhanchin] In 1990 alone about 20 representatives of foreign special services visited our region. There were three times as many people whom we suspect of spying, and with good reasons. That also includes industrial espionage.

[Litvinov] If it is no secret, what may attract foreign special services to Krasnoyarsk Kray?

[Chikhanchin] Primarily, it is the secret installations that do work commissioned by the Ministry of Defense. To be more specific, it is not the installations themselves but the new research done there. Their second task is to examine our scientific potential, as science is well-represented in Krasnoyarsk, from academic to industry research institutions.

We have to remember that in the nearest future we might confront one more adversary, no less formidable than government special services. It is representatives of international organized crime, the drug trafficking business, and terrorist organizations. The new status of the USSR expands the zone of their transnational activity. The shortest route between the East and the West goes through Siberia...

Finally, we should not forget that one third of American territory is still closed to foreigners, even though the warming trend in our relations is making some amendments to this.

1960's Operations in Latin America Detailed

Part I

91UF0326A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Jan 91 p 4

[Part I of two-part article by Vitaliy Golovachev: "'West' Did Not Make Contact" subtitled "Story of the Hard Lot of Two Soviet Intelligence Workers"]

[Text] Soviet intelligence agents working overseas during the sixties: heroism and baseness, courage and treachery; we are opening up another page of Soviet foreign intelligence.

Losing a Tail

A person assigned the name of "West" flew from Argentina to Colombia to meet a representative from the Center. He left his Argentine passport in the name of L. Merconis at home in Buenos Aires and he had a different document in his pocket. His name now was Jose Fernandez or Don Fernandez. But neither name was his real one. When he was arrested (much later, and this will be discussed below), he called himself Martynov. That is what we shall call him.

Sitting in an airplane flying to Bogota, Martynov tried not to think about his forthcoming meeting and did not submit to the secret hope breaking through to his consciousness with new force that this time he would receive permission for a vacation (the first in many years) in Moscow, that he would be able to see his relatives, wander through the streets of the Arbat and Zamoskvorechye... No, he could not relax, he knew that a vacation trip to Moscow was a very complicated operation. His colleagues in various countries would participate in this operation, many of whom he would not even see... And all this just so that Martynov could spend a month in Moscow? Would this vacation not be a little costly? "But still," he thought, "perhaps the question has already been decided and I will be given specific instructions tomorrow..."

The plane approached Bogota. From the airport Don Fernandez went to a hotel where he took a room with a telephone. A curly-headed, smiling chap in a uniform helped him with his luggage and Don Fernandez gave him not just some change but two dollars. (Later, when analyzing this step of his, Martynov tried to understand why he gave this boy these two dollars at that time. Just to be nice? In order to look like a respectable businessman? Or just in case, say, he would have to ask the chap for some favor? Martynov could not give a precise answer, but his intuition did not let him down and the chap came in handy, and how.)

...The meeting with the emissary from the Center was to have taken place in Bogota the next day in the National Archaeological Museum. Fernandez arrived early in so he could have some extra time. In the hotel lobby he saw the familiar curly-headed chap in the uniform. But he gave Fernandez a strange look and dropped his eyes. The smile vanished instantaneously from his sympathetic face with its prominent cheekbones.

"What the hell was that," thought Martynov. "He treated me quite differently yesterday..."

Fernandez motioned the boy to him:

"Bring me a map of the city and tell me where you kill time in the evenings..."

The boy went up to him and, handing him the map, whispered quietly: "Two men were asking the porter about you; I happened to be nearby. One of them is sitting in the chair over there right now reading..."

Not a single muscle twitched in Don Fernandez' face. Smiling, he moved unhurried toward the exit. "That's a pretty kettle of fish," Martynov thought, suppressing the revolting chill that arising inside him. "Who are those two and what do they want? Could the boy have been wrong and gotten something mixed up?"

Without hurrying, Fernandez walked toward the center of the city, stopping to look in store windows from time to time. He could see in all directions. Again and again Martynov retraced his steps and found no explanation for the tail. Nobody knew him in Colombia; he had just flown in yesterday. If some suspicions about him had arisen in Argentina, he would hardly have managed to fly from Buenos Aires to Bogota with someone else's passport. The counterintelligence would not have allowed it; that was certain. Or at least they would not have asked the porter about him. Something did not add up, something was wrong in this unclear incident, he could not construct a logical chain, the links did not join together... But nonetheless, a fact is a fact—the surveillance continued.

"Maybe this is some kind of mistake," Martynov continued to analyze, "but that does not make it any easier. If I have to go to the police there will inevitably be investigations, which is the last thing I want... No, I have to try to lose them, I can see no other choice..."

Fernandez went into a store, bought a book by a modern novelist, and went back to the hotel. He carefully examined his things in his room: his shirt, tie, and razor were not made in Argentina. He decided to leave all that—he had to travel light. He took a shower and then went down to the restaurant. The spies were still in the lobby: "They are probably watching the other exit from the hotel as well," thought Martynov.

After having a quick steak in the restaurant Fernandez went to the kitchen. "Are you looking for somebody," one of the waiters asked him. "Yes, I have a friend who works here," Fernandez answered. Walking a little farther, he said to someone in a white jacket: "I was visiting the chef and it would be closer for me to leave by the back entrance. But where is it?" "Straight ahead and to the right," the person in the jacket pointed indifferently.

On the street Fernandez hailed a taxi and went to a tourist bureau. From the car he could not check to see whether he was being tailed. In the bureau he asked what tours they could suggest to him. "If you want to go today, there is one place left in an additional group going to the mountains," the guide suggested. And within a half hour he was riding with the others in the tourist microbus.

When the village of Neiva appeared before them (on the upper reaches of the Magdalena), Don Fernandez, who was very upset, asked to be let out, complaining about sudden severe pains in his stomach. He declined to let them call a doctor and said farewell to the group.

In Neiva he bought a "diplomat" type of briefcase, two shirts, a razor, a blue blazer (afterwards he threw away his own checked jacket) and he traveled south across the entire country, to the city of Leticia where the borders of three countries converge—Colombia, Brazil, and Peru. "If they are looking for me," Martynov thought, "of course all the airports will be warned. And maybe the checkpoint as well. But I can try in Leticia." He knew something about this checkpoint...

In Leticia, Fernandez dropped into a cafe where checkpoint workers usually gather. He started a conversation with one of the inspectors, who had a massive gold ring on his finger. They talked about the higher prices, the rise of crime, youth, business... Fernandez inadvertently complained that he had lost his documents and now he did not know whether to apply for new ones or to return to Bogota... And in the city of Iquitos (Peru), which is not far from Leticia, just on the other side of the border, he had an important business meeting and he could lost an advantageous deal.

"Will you lose a lot of money?" the inspector asked.

"So it would seem... But there does not seem to be anything I can do..."

"A solution can be found," the inspector said thoughtfully. "I will try to talk them in to letting you across without any special formalities, but I do not know..."

Fernandez took out a pack of cigarettes, pulled out the last three, and, making sure that nobody but the inspector could see what he was doing, he placed three rolled-up $100 bills in it, one after the other. Then he neatly put back two cigarettes, lit one up, and offered the pack to the inspector.

"Take them both, I have more," said Fernandez.

The inspector, after taking one cigarette, put the almost empty pack in his pocket.

"You know," he said suddenly without making any connection with what was being discussed previously, "they called from Bogota. They got mixed up with some drug traffickers there. And now they are looking for someone."

The inspector looked attentively at Fernandez and asked: "Do you have a lot of luggage?"

Fernandez placed his "diplomat" briefcase on the table and opened it: "This is all."

"Good," said the inspector. In an hour Garcia will go to Peru in his blue van. Get in with him. I will be at the checkpoint..."

"Maybe in Bogota they took me for a big drug trafficker," Martynov thought with a certain relief. They were looking for someone else who looked like me and he did not arrive... It might have been something else as well. But however that may have been, by disappearing I only confirmed their fears. If they called Leticia, that means they were serious..." (Later it was explained through other channels that in Bogota they had indeed taken Martynov for a big drug trafficker.)

An hour later Fernandez and Garcia crossed the border. And after another day he flew from Lima to Buenos Aires. The worst thing of all was that all these scrapes and all this risk turned out to be unnecessary: The meeting with the representative of the Center did not take place that time. Martynov's vacation was postponed for a couple more years.

"A reliable source informs us..."

After returning to Buenos Aires, Martynov became Merconis again. For several months he had no contacts with "sources," making sure again and again that he was not being observed. Everything was calm. Finally he called Gunther Leman (his name has been changed for understandable reasons) from a pay phone and set up a meeting.

Martynov met Gunther in a book store on Florida Street in Buenos Aires. Gunther stood there, having opened a slim volume of Brecht, and was reading it with a great deal of interest. It turned out that it was not difficult to make Gunther's acquaintance, but it was much more difficult to get close to him and understand him.

Gunther was born in Germany just before the war. His father, an ardent advocate of Hitler, advanced rapidly in his career during the war. After the capitulation his father managed to move with his family to South America. A large German colony was formed here and Leman senior enjoyed a great deal of authority. He maintained close contacts with the local military and he had many personal friends among the Americans. The father thought that another war was unavoidable and all they could do was prepare for it as best they could.

What was axiomatic for Leman senior, Gunther had to recognize and interpret from the beginning. He had a natural analytical mind and a passion for books. And after tormenting reflections, Gunther came to some bitter conclusions: We must not repeat a fatal mistake; another world war would be the death of humankind. He kept this inside himself (there were strict procedures in the German colony) and became closed-off and irritable. Slowly and with difficulty he became friends with Merconis, step by step discovering that they shared the same views regarding many issues.

They became friends. And once Merconis told him that he was involved with the Socialist International—the one that was created in 1951 in Frankfurt-am-Main. The Socialist International was against another war. And any information about aggressive plans would be very useful. Martynov knew about Gunther's father's extensive connections. But he could not even imagine how valuable his information would be... "To the Center. According to reports that require additional verification, the U.S. arsenals contain more than 25,000 warheads. "West."

(The report was submitted in 1962.)

"To the Center. A reliable source reports that U.S. air intelligence made it possible to locate on USSR territory 15,000-20,000 targets which are regarded as possible objects of a nuclear strike.

"West."

(This report was submitted at the very beginning of 1964.)

"To the Center. A reliable source reports that in the event of the fall of the junta regime in the Dominican Republic, the United States is prepared for direct aggression and dispatch of its troops there.

"West."

"To the Center. U.S. marines will land in the Dominican Republic in the next few days.

"West."

(The landing of the troops actually did take place at the end of April and the beginning of May 1965.—ed.)

Part II

91UF0326B Moscow TRUD in Russian 10 Jan 91 p 4

[Part II of two-part article by Vitaliy Golovachev: "'West' Did Not Make Contact" subtitled "Story of the Hard Lot of Two Soviet Intelligence Workers"]

[Text]

Arrest

In Buenos Aires, Martynov—according to his document, L. Merconis, a citizen of Argentina—lived with his wife and two children in a three-room apartment on the fifth floor of a seven- story building. In a region called Florida on the outskirts of the city they ran a bar with the German name "Zur Glocke" ("To the Bell"). The bar was intended to accommodate 50 people (10 tables, the bar, and a table for regulars). The two of them ran it by themselves, hiring only one or two dishwashers. Most of the people who frequented the bar were Germans, and many of them knew that Mrs. Merconis was born in Germany.

Late one October evening in 1970 the doorbell rang in their apartment. Raisa Vasilyevna (according to her documents, Mrs. Merconis) had just finished listening to a radio program from the Center. The audibility was poor and she recorded a report on a small tape recorder. Martynov went to take a shower and Raisa Vasilyevna intended to decipher the radio program and then destroy the text, erase the tape, and make dinner.

The doorbell ringing at this late hour surprised her, but she was not alarmed. They had already lived in Argentina for many years, their two daughters were born here, Merconis had excellent relations with the local police, and there were no alarming signs to be seen.

Raisa Vasilyevna went to the door and asked "Who is it?"

"The building supervisor."

She knew him well and opened the door. The door was suddenly ripped out of her hands and about 15 people rushed into the apartment. Two of them had their automatic weapons drawn and the rest had pistols in their hands. Only one person was in a police uniform. After looking over the rooms a man in dark glasses asked: "Where is your husband?"

Without waiting for an answer, three of them pulled open the bathroom door. They ran in there, tore back the shower curtain, and pointed the barrels of their pistols at the wet Martynov. (Everyone in the group for the seizure knew that they were arresting a Russian spy, this was the first one in Argentina, and they were very nervous.)

"Boys, at least let me dry off," Martynov said calmly.

But they threw him the towel themselves and then gave him his clothes, and after putting handcuffs on him, took him downstairs. In the car they put him in the back, got in front, and took him to the station.

Then they ordered Mrs. Merconis to get the children ready (the younger was only eight months old, and the elder, six years). Raisa Vasilyevna stayed calm and consciously noted with surprise that she had absolutely no fear, that she was looking at everything that was happening as if from the outside, waiting for what would come next.

"Well, can I at least get dressed without you watching?" she asked with a challenge in her voice.

Left alone, she quickly hid the tape in her underwear (later she destroyed it in the prison toilet). Approximately an hour later she and the children were taken to the police station and toward morning they were taken to prison.

In the cell she and the children were bothered most of all by the bright, blinding light that was never turned off day or night. It was no better for Martynov: a damp cell—a concrete box about one and a half by two meters, a wet cement floor, a steel door. At night the temperature plus five and from time to time the guard poured a bucket of water on the floor. Martynov got a chill. To get warm he did 40 squats, and then sat on his haunches with his spine up against the cold, rough wall.

Somewhere not far away the terrible scream of a child rang out. It screamed so that it made one's skin crawl. Martynov was worried, he had no doubt that they had arrested his wife as well. But did they really take his daughters?...

Martynov's first thought was that he had to get word to his people and report that they had taken him. In the morning he was escorted to the toilet. A shaggy chap came up to him there and suddenly said:

"Are you a Russian spy? I am on your side. I hate them. They tortured me—these fools thought that I was associated with the leftists... Listen, I am being released today. Is there anything you need?

"Yes." Martynov had no way out. He gave him the address of the nanny who came to take care of his children. "Tell her that we are all in jail."

The most surprising thing is that the guy carried out the request. When the Italian nanny arrived she was terribly upset and went to see the bishop. He called the chief of police, raised a ruckus, vouched for the Merconises, and assured them that there had been a mistake...

But his efforts were in vain, nothing appeared in the newspapers, and our people did not find out about "West's" downfall. To make things worse, during the search they found a map indicating a hideout. Martynov had not managed to destroy the map, and that was his mistake. In the morning at the hideout they arrested two diplomatic workers who were subsequently expelled from the country. This is how the Center learned about his capture.

This episode with the hideout was used against Martynov and his wife as an accusation; the counterintelligence workers had nothing else. But how did the counterintelligence workers come across Martynov? Tens and hundreds of times both of them retraced in their minds the days, months, and years they had spent in Argentina... There were no links, none of their friends were arrested, and nothing was brought to light except the hideout... Both of them drove the idea of treachery out of their minds, but it returned again and again...

Meeting With Gordiyevskiy

In 1967 the Martynovs finally received permission to take a vacation in Moscow. They sent their daughter to a boarding school in Europe and in July they traveled by a very complicated route themselves. On a street next to a park in Copenhagen, Martynov met a Soviet diplomatic worker and gave him a package containing their Argentine passports. He received Soviet passports to replace them. This diplomatic worker was...Gordiyevskiy. The same Gordiyevskiy who worked for a long time in the USSR KGB and who is now living in England. Even before fleeing to London, as we learned later, he had cooperated with British intelligence for many years and delivered secret information to them.

The Martynovs arrived in Moscow in the second half of July. Raisa Vasilyevna had not seen the capital for three years, and he—for seven years. They lived in a suburban Moscow official dacha and then went to the Black Sea for two weeks. Lying on the empty beach, they recalled their youth...

Vladimir Ivanovich Martynov was born in the Ukraine, his father was a white-collar worker, and his mother a secretary-typist. He graduated from the institute of foreign languages in the mid-fifties. He enthusiastically accepted the offer to become an intelligence worker.

Raisa Vasilyevna was a nurse. When they were married she could have no idea that they would both become intelligence workers and would be working overseas. (To this day they say nothing to their daughters about this. "Well, we worked overseas like anyone else..." This article will be a big revelation to their children, and they are not the only ones...).

When Martynov told his wife about his future work, all she said was: "I am with you."

First he went to Buenos Aires alone. He worked as an auto mechanic, served in the Argentine army (Merconis obtained Argentine citizenship), and then went into business. In 1963 he met Raisa Vasilyevna in Europe (according to the story, she was born in Germany). They were married in an Anglican church. So he married his wife a second time. Senor Merconis returned to Argentina with his wife.

A Complicated Game

The investigator did not beat or torture him. He said:

"You are a Russian intelligence officer, that has been proven. I know that you are prepared to undergo any kind of experience. But we are not going to do anything to you. Your wife and children will suffer; we have them. Believe me, it is really terrible. Think about them... Do not forget that we have military conditions and you cannot disappear without a trace."

An unbearable, suffering scream of a child was heard once again on the other side of the wall. Martynov could feel the drops of sweat break out on his forehead. The investigator knitted his brow but the screaming did not stop...

"I must think," Martynov muttered indistinctly.

He decided to start a complicated and dangerous game in which winning meant life and returning home and losing meant death. He understood that his chances were not good, but he decided to take them.

This was the plan: to try to get them to turn him over to the Americans and then he could flee from them—it would be easier there.

The next day he said he was prepared to give testimony and admitted that he was a Russian intelligence officer, his name was Martynov, and his assignment was to gather information about the United States.

Just as he anticipated, after a certain amount of time a CIA agent asked him to cooperate with American intelligence. He agreed. A couple of days later they placed him and his wife and children under guard in a small bungalow.

There were hours of exhausting interrogation, then lie detector tests, and they studied files on all his acquaintances...

Martynov did not tell the Americans anything significant, blaming this the fact that he did not go through the KGB school but underwent individual training, and that he had not worked in the building of the PGU (First Main Administration of the USSR KGB, engaging in foreign intelligence work). Except for the two exiled Soviet diplomats, he did not maintain contacts with anybody any more, he gleaned information from conversations in the bar, and had not yet begun active work at all.

In 1971 it was decided to move them to the United States. Both signed documents saying that they renounced their Argentine citizenship, that they had no claims against the government, and that they renounced their Soviet citizenship as well.

A Hercules aircraft took off from the Argentine airport and headed north...

Flight

The airplane landed at Andrews Air Force Base (United States), and a car quickly took the Martynovs under guard to the little town of Springfield near Washington. Their house was in a wooded area. A picturesque landscape, lakes—it was simply a health resort, if only they had not been prisoners.

At first the guards watched them very attentively. But gradually the conditions became freer. They were permitted to walk in the woods. And this became customary: After dinner they would stroll along the wooded trails.

Martynov was again being trained for illegal work, but now by the Americans. They did not reveal their plans to him, but they taught him Albanian and invented a new background for him. At the same time they showed him photographs of people in whom the counterintelligence was interested. Martynov looked indifferently at the familiar faces as said: "No, I do not know this one either..."

Once late in the evening when all the guards were watching American football on television he noiselessly opened the window (he had secretly oiled the hinges during the day) and went into the forest. He did not have more than four hours. This was his last trial run on the route before he fled.

In the morning they showed Martynov only one photograph. This person he knew well.

"No, I have never met him... The CIA agent looked at Martynov questioningly:

"Very strange..."

After this conversation he said to his wife: "Today after supper we will leave. Put whatever you really need in the baby carriage..." And she took only what was absolutely necessary. What do you think that would be? What would a person take with them if they were fleeing from the American special services? The most valuable thing was the memory of this unusual life. She took a large package of slides. There was there bar in the Florida region, there they were against the background of the Casa-Rosada (the government residence in Buenos Aires), in front of the monument to Columbus, and slides made in Switzerland, Italy, England, France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Greece...

On 7 January 1972 the Martynovs went out for their usual walk after dinner.

"What do you want for dinner?" asked the cook. "How about macaroni with meat?"

"Very well," answered Martynov.

The younger daughter was in the carriage and the elder one ran alongside wearing a red jacket and mountaineering boots. It was about four kilometers to the nearest village. They reached it after about a half hour. Here they parted ways—this was the plan Martynov and worked out. She set out toward the houses and he had to follow the wooded path for another kilometer and a half until he reached another point.

Raisa Vasilyevna was lucky right away: Ten meters from her sat a girl in a black Ford.

"Could you take me to the shopping center?"

"Get in. Can I help you fold up the carriage?" the girl asked helpfully.

Next to the business center Raisa Vasilyevna and her daughters went to a gas station to call a taxi. The timing was critical. Dinner was probably ready at their house. They could sound the alarm there at any minute. Or had they already?

She was waiting for the taxi when suddenly she saw that a police car was coming toward her. Her heart started pounding. But on the outside she remained quite calm. She had an explanation ready: "We got lost. We have called a taxi to take us back to the house." But the police car passed by...

Soon the taxi drove up. Off-handedly she gave him the name of the street where the Soviet embassy was. The half hour it took to get there seemed like an eternity to her.

The gates to the embassy were closed and all the cars were leaving at the end of the work day. When she with her carriage passed directly through the gates onto embassy territory a surprised worker came to meet her.

"I need a security officer immediately," she gasped, feeling her heart beat inside her like a heavy hammer. It seemed to her that her entire body was shuddering from these unbearable blows...

Martynov did not know whether his wife and children had managed to reach the embassy or whether the entry had already been blocked by secret agents. Only one thing was clear to him: One of them would certainly get to his fellow workers and tell them everything, and then they would grab them. And today was their only chance. He bought a hat, a pipe, and a pair of glasses and then took a taxi to the Bulgarian embassy. But an unpleasant surprise was waiting for him there. The duty officer would not talk to him and even threatened to call the police.

"Well at least tell me where the Soviet trade mission is," Martynov pleaded.

It turned out that it was not very far away. He walked through the city as police cars, their sirens howling, roared by him. Were they not looking for him? Back at the house, judging from the time, they had probably already sounded the alarm. He asked passers-by where the Soviet trade mission was and they were glad to tell him. At times it seemed to Martynov that all this was taking place in some kind of nightmare...

There was a guard at the gates. He said to him in Russian:

"I have to go in."

The duty officer appeared and they passed through into the building. There Martynov wrote on a scrap of paper: "I am on the run. I must make contact with..."

He was trembling as though he had a fever. The duty officer gave him a big glass of vodka, an olive, and a piece of cheese. After a half hour he met the person he was waiting for. The first question:

"Did my family make it?"

"Yes."

Martynov turned away, unable to hold back his tears streaming from his eyes...

For about a month the Martynovs lived in a multistory building occupied by workers of the Soviet embassy and trade mission. The blinds were pulled on the windows. The button for the emergency alarm was right at hand. For example, in case the police tried to use the fire escape to get into the apartment through the window.

His daughters heard Russian spoken here for the first time. It seemed strange and unfamiliar to them. The younger was not even two years old yet, and all the events going on did not seem to bother her very much. But the elder, seven-year-old was completely confused.

"We will be living in the Soviet Union, that is our homeland," said Raisa Vasilyevna. "You must learn the Russian language."

"But how do you know it, Mama?" asked the daughter.

"We are really Russians, we were simply abroad on a business trip, we were working here temporarily," said Raisa Vasilyevna, biting her lips so she would not burst into sobs.

And during that time intensive work was going on through diplomatic channels. Everything possible was being done to obtain permission to send the Martynovs home. On 2 February 1972 the USSR ambassador to the United States, A.F. Dobrynin, congratulated Vladimir Ivanovich on his birthday and gave him a small radio as a present. On the same day the Martynovs flew out with Soviet passports from Kennedy Airport to Moscow. They were accompanied to the capital itself by several workers of the Soviet embassy...

The Price of Treachery

For a long time the most incomprehensible thing in this story was why the Martynovs were caught in Buenos

Aires. But then the picture became clear. I was told about this by a worker of the USSR Committee for State Security, Colonel Igor Nikolayevich Prelin. Himself a former intelligence officer who had worked abroad for many years, he participated in the most difficult operations. In a word, he was a real professional.

"At first the exposure of the Martynovs seemed quite inexplicable," said I.N. Prelin. "Through various channels we verified that there had been no snags. And the Argentine counterintelligence had nothing to charge them with except for the plan of the hideout which they discovered in the apartment.

"But the riddle was solved in time. The reason for their exposure was treachery. The Martynovs were betrayed by Gordiyevskiy. For obvious reasons I cannot give here the documentary information at the disposal of the Committee for State Security, but we have no doubts today: It was Gordiyevskiy who "turned over" his comrades to foreign intelligence.

"And the Martynovs were not the only ones. He betrayed his former colleagues wholesale and retail, whether they had children or not. We were able to get dozens of people away from him just in time. But some still ended up in prison because of him."

"Soviet intelligence officers?"

"No, today there are no Soviet intelligence officers in foreign prisons. The country has done everything possible to free its people..."

There are things despicable everywhere and in all times. They include baseness, betrayal, treachery. Baseness can be neither forgiven nor justified. Nobody anywhere has any confidence in people like this—if you have betrayed once you will do so again.

* * *

...We arrived at the Martynovs' Moscow apartment, and they were telling us about their daily life. They have had their share of hard times. But they have not lost their optimism. The younger daughter was reading in the next room—she had just come home from work. The elder had moved in with her husband and they already have a daughter of their own...

"You worked as a mechanic in Argentina," I said to Martynov, "do you do your own car repairs here?"

"I have never had my own car here—neither before my trip nor afterwards... I love carpentry work. I have done much in this house with my own hands..."

Yelena Bonner Condemns Gorbachev Policies

LD2901225591 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 2035 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Interview with Yelena Bonner, widow of Academician Andrey Sakharov, by unidentified reporter, in Prague; date not given; interview conducted in Russian with superimposed Czech translation—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] Esteemed Mrs Bonner, allow me to welcome you in the Events and Comments studio. What is your view of the current situation in the Soviet Union in connection with the events in the Baltic republics?

[Bonner] The situation in the Soviet Union is on the whole very difficult. I would say it is tragic. But what happened in the Baltics is not, after all, only a matter of the present. Already in the past the central leadership and President Gorbachev personally did not wish to see in the development of events a realistic development of democratic trends among the peoples aimed at freedom. They wanted to suffocate this kind of trend at any cost. Lithuania had the right to proclaim independence according to Chapter 72 of the Soviet Constitution, that speaks of the right of each republic to secession. Instead of coming to terms with it, the president first of all announced a blockade, that is absolutely unlawful vis-a-vis the population. This was followed by a moratorium and talks. An additional contingent of troops was sent there later. Where there are troops there is shooting and blood is spilled where shots were fired. This is the last link in the chain of errors committed by the central government and the head of state obviously bears responsibility.

But in connection with the development in Lithuania and Latvia I wish to bring to the attention of Czechoslovak friends, neighbors, and people throughout Europe and the United States that another step, an unlawful one and I would say a deceitful step by our government followed this activity. This was the order by Ministers Yazov and Pugo concerning military patrols in all inhabited places, including major cities. In fact, this is not an order to combat criminality but an introduction of a state of emergency [mimoradny stav] in the whole country. And thus, the country's leadership, headed by the president, continues to deceive the west and also deceives the population of our country.

[Reporter] Is there, in your view, a real chance for a military coup in the Soviet Union?

[Bonner] A military coup, or rather a coup as such took place a long time ago. Almost the whole past year, since February or March, has developed in this manner. It happened as soon as the president was elected—not by the people but by the parliament that intentionally carried out his will. This was the moment when a coup took place in the Soviet Union and it was at this very moment that the Soviet Union ceased to exist. To a lesser or greater degree all republics proclaimed their independence. And the West is committing a huge strategic error by regarding Gorbachev as a president of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union as a united country.

[Reporter] In this context, what place does President Gorbachev hold in a political spectrum?

[Bonner] He has always held a position on the extreme right, although he was pronouncing leftist phrases. But he was promoting the right wing only and never, throughout all these years, has he helped the left. And now he holds a position on the extreme right. This is confirmed by the fact that all people from his team whose views are more or less progressive realized that he had been deceiving them for years and they abandoned him—Yakovlev, who spoke about it already at a party congress; Shevardnadze, who spoke at a party congress and who resigned at the end of the year; Bakatin, whom the president himself expelled; Petrakov and Shatalin, who left the president's team. These people were closest to him, the soul of the real perestroika. All of them understood which direction the president was moving and all of them abandoned him. But the point is that the west has still not come to grips with this fact.

Youth Daily Says Press Law 'Intact'

PM2801224391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 1

[Article by "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA Journalists": "Blaze, Blaze, My Star... "—the headline is separated from the text of the article by a 3-inch by 3-inch photograph of the USSR Law on the Press and Other Media on fire]

[Text] No, no, reader, do not be rash with your emotions on seeing our collage. The law on the press is, for the time being, intact and in one piece, thank God. For the time being? It was not a possible suspension of the law that the president announced to the whole country, as the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet explained in a recent radio interview, but certain changes in the law, a correction for example. But how can you correct Article One, for example? "The press and other mass media are free. ...Censorship of mass information is not allowed." They are either free or not free, anything else is simply impossible.

We would like to believe that it is impossible, as a satirist remarked, "for both glasnost to exist and for there to be no outcries; for prices to go up and for people to sound approval..."

Today, backing the appeal by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and several other publications, we are joining the campaign of journalistic solidarity. And we hope that all journalists who put their professional duty above all else will, at the very least, not print lies, not print information that has been forged in advance. We are in favor of everyone having his own opinion. But we are also in favor of being able to freely express this opinion. If this last guiding star, spelling freedom of expression, were to burn out and fade as a result of political ambitions and the struggle for power, we will remain in darkness for a long time to come.

[Signed] KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA journalists.

Anchorman Bemoans Fate of 'Vzglyad' Program

PM2901143991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 p 5

[Interview with A. Politkovskiy, anchorman of the USSR Central Television program "Vzglyad," by A. Kosulnikov; place and date not given: "'Vzglyad'—Sound But No Vision"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] Some highly placed employees of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] declined the request of your correspondent to comment on the situation that has arisen today at Central Television. The main reason for this is that the house is not in order, and this must be fought out behind closed doors; right now it is too early to wash dirty linen in public. However, not everyone thinks like this. Aleksandr Politkovskiy, anchorman of the "Vzglyad" program, holds a different opinion:

[Politkovskiy] The things that are happening now at Central Television are political events, very typical ones for the political situation as a whole in the country. Therefore to assess them, albeit openly and frankly, at a closed industry conference is strange to say the least. Glasnost, which is manifestly in short supply at Central Television today, has not yet been abolished by express command....

This is what is happening. As is well known, Leonid Kravchenko has been appointed to the post of Gosteleradio chairman by presidential decree. The idea was to ratify the candidacy proposed by the president at the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, or to reject it. But what happened was neither the one nor the other. The deputies were busy discussing the situation in the Baltic and some other problems which, however, is perfectly natural. They apparently forgot about Kravchenko. The upshot is that he has still not been relieved of his powers as deputy and has not become the fully constituted boss at Central Television. You cannot sit on the fence for long, you have to make a choice. The choice of our chairman today is obvious: Central Television, or at least its first program, is to become the mouthpiece of the top leadership.

[Kosulnikov] In other words, something like the official TASS.

[Politkovskiy] Roughly, with this one difference: TASS at least carries news, whereas the news programs at Central Television are becoming increasingly meager....

[Kosulnikov] I have heard an opinion that the Law on the Press should not extend to television and radio broadcasting, that is to say, in effect, to live broadcasting....

[Politkovskiy] Well, let us put it a little more mildly: There is an opinion that pluralism within the framework of one television channel is impractical. There was a proposal, incidentally, to say outright that "we work under conditions of political censorship" simply to warn the viewers about this. That would be more honest. But so far no one "upstairs" has made such a statement.

[Kosulnikov] How does this affect the general creative state of the television staffers? The suspicion arises for me, as a viewer, that the remarkable professionals, of whom there are undoubtedly many at Central Television, are simply not able to work at their full capacity under such conditions. Or are they unwilling to do so?

[Politkovskiy] They have no one to work for. Formerly it was possible to shoot material for "Vzglyad," for example, or for TSN [Television News Service]. Today "Vzglyad" simply does not exist, and all the signs are that TSN is turning into a raw material adjunct of the "Vremya" program. So the last Central Television live broadcast news program has virtually been abolished.

[Kosulnikov] What, TSN is now broadcasting prerecorded programs?

[Politkovskiy] No, live broadcasting is still being nominally maintained, but I do not see any particular purpose in it. Okay, it is so far still possible for some urgent material to be laid on the anchorman's table while "Vremya" is going out. But when TSN is on the air, the success or failure of the program depends only on a more or less successful collage of material that was shot a long time ago. The most important thing has been lost—a personal commentary for which the anchormen of the service were previously renowned. Nowadays they are virtually ordinary announcers; after all, all TSN's material is now geared to the producers of "Vremya" before it is broadcast.

Of course, in purely human terms, it is possible to understand and feel sorry for the guys, but as a professional I do not want to justify them—they have "caved in," as the saying goes. Now, however, you try to get away from what is happening; they are still participants in the assault on glasnost.

[Kosulnikov] What do you think, can another man come to the post of Gosteleradio chairman in today's conditions?

[Politkovskiy] To all appearances it is not a question of a specific name; there are plenty of people like Kravchenko. But it cannot be doubted that this post must be occupied by a figure from among this number. It is people like this the president requires today. People who will relay official information without a second's thought, however curious it sometimes is.

It gets quite laughable: This Monday, for example, they read out a TASS report with the latest statement by the Lithuanian Committee of National Salvation; the very next day, Tuesday, they broadcast a statement by the president which among other things condemned the activity of this very committee. Something here to comment on....

[Kosulnikov] A last question: Does "Vzglyad" have any prospects at all in these conditions?

[Politkovsky] It is a deadlock situation. They offer us some compromises and agreements, but they are all detrimental and do not offer equal rights. If only because our program has a larger credit of popular trust than the leadership of Gosteleradio, and not just that leadership.... Probably that is why they closed down our program....

I do not know how the negotiations will end, but as far as I am concerned my mind is already made up: I will not work under the sharp gaze of a biased editor.

New Feature Launced on Party Organizations' Work

PM3001090991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Article by N. Kozhanov: "At the Cutting Edge of Life"]

[Text] Today we are opening a new weekly information section in this newspaper entitled "Communist Herald." It will carry news, facts, and accounts of events from the day-to-day life of the country's party organizations. We are introducing this section in compliance with the insistent wishes of readers, both Communists and nonparty people.

"Although I am not in the party myself," N. Vasilyeva from Omsk writes for example, "I have been reading the main party organ—PRAVDA—for a long time, and I cannot understand why it reports so rarely and so little about the main concerns of Communists at local level today. It would appear that they should be up to their necks in work. But where is it? They started perestroyka, but they have not carried it through. People are now talking about the Communists as if they were altogether superfluous in the country. And they themselves keep mum. What good is that?.."

Bitter words. And not entirely fair, probably. But let's be frank and admit that up to a point the rebukes are justified. There is evidence of a certain amount of confusion in some party organizations (and not just primary ones), which, having lost their former "cozy" conditions of existence, suddenly face a lot of pressure from yesterday's "informals." Especially in areas where "radical democrats" have come to power. Not shrinking from making any sort of insinuations, certain parties and movements describing themselves as "democratic," together with their "independent" press organs, are persistently depicting the CPSU and its organizations at local level as enemies of society and the people. However, judging by appearances, the initial "shock" is passing. Party organizations are organizing their work in the new conditions with increasing confidence and are not afraid to engage even in open political struggle. In brief, they are acting as befits Communists at the cutting edge of life. And as for people, they too are increasingly realizing that the high-flown demagoguery, extreme revolutionary slogans, and programs of certain zealots for people's welfare have done little to improve people's lives, strengthen order, or develop the economy. And that the only way to success is the day-to-day painstaking labor of each and everyone geared to implementing the economic reform, enhancing production efficiency, and ensuring the political and social stabilization of society—which is what the Communists are proposing.

The "Communist Herald" will report on the practical work of party organizations to this effect, about the accumulation of live experience and rectification of past mistakes, about real achievements and problems which require interpretation and solution. Of special interest is the Communists' practical work in the soviets, the establishment of businesslike cooperation with other parties and movements for the sake of the common objective—overcoming crisis phenomena and improving life in a specific city, village, oblast, or republic. Here there can be no "trifles," no matters of secondary importance which do not deserve attention. Anything which contributes, even in a small way, to the achievement of consensus, of peace and well-being in the country, anything that promotes the country's progress along the path of renewal and strengthening of the CPSU as one of the most influential political and moral forces in our society, is important and valuable.

Comrades, we are looking forward to your letters and reports about interesting experience, about new and effective developments in the Communists' work. We will publish them regularly in this information section. They will also be reflected in the accompanying "Observer's Column" which will sum up, interpret, and comment on the prevailing trends and most important events in party life.

Pakistani Embassy Denies Visa Delays

PM2201125991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Jan 91 Union Edition p 5

[Letter from Pakistani Embassy Third Secretary Sokheyl Khan: "Pakistani Embassy Is Not Delaying Issue of Visas"—IZVESTIYA headline]

[Text] Esteemed Mr N.I. Yefimov!

Concerning the note in your esteemed newspaper of 10 January this year, "Hijackers Still Remain in Pakistan," the Pakistani Embassy in the USSR deems it necessary to announce the following:

So far the embassy has received a request from the USSR Foreign Ministry to examine the question of issuing visas to only two relations of one of the hijackers. We informed the USSR Foreign Ministry that we are prepared to issue the necessary visas to these people but so far the embassy has not received their passports.

As can be seen from the above, there is no delay on the embassy's part in issuing visas to parents anxious to meet with the hijackers in Pakistan.

The embassy would be very grateful to you to bring the above-mentioned facts to the notice of your newspaper's readers.

With respect [signed] Third Secretary Sokheyl Khan [name as transliterated].

Finland Denies Political Asylum for Hijacker

LD2401211491 Moscow TASS in English 1946 GMT 24 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Voitto Leskinen]

[Text] Helsinki January 24 TASS—Finland will not grant political asylum to Soviet citizen Aleksandr Vilesov, who seized a TU-134 Aeroflot plane carrying 66 passengers on November 15, 1990. The plane was flying on the Leningrad-Moscow route when Vilesov forced the crew to land at Helsinki-Vantaa airport.

The decision was made today by Finnish Interior Minister Jaermo Pantanen.

It says that Vilesov's statement on granting political asylum to him does not correspond to conditions which are necessary for this, the Finjnish Telegraph Bureau reports. It was established that Vilesov's political activity in the homeland was not of the nature for which he could be persecuted and, therefore, he did not need any protection.

The hijack is a grave crime and the right to grant political asylum, which is mentioned in the Geneva convention on refugee status, does not aply to persons who commit this crime.

Under the decision, the case of Vilesov, the fourth criminal to hijack a Soviet passenger plane to finland last year, will be finally examined at the Finnish Justice Ministry. Justice Minister Tarjae Halonen is to make a decision on Vilesov's return to the homeland.

Government Extends Early Retirement Rights

PM3001103791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Workers' Benefits"]

[Text] A USSR Government resolution has extended the list of jobs and professions giving the right to a pension regardless of age if these jobs are held for at least 25 years. The list was approved by a USSR Council of Ministers resolution of 29 December 1990.

It also includes mine workers who repair mine drifts (timbermen) employed in reinforcing and extinguishing mine drifts, underground mine workers employed in delivering (issuing) materials and equipment to face and preparatory workings, and underground electrical fitters (duty and equipment-repair electrical fitters (fitters] employed in installing (dismantling), repairing, and servicing equipment in face and preparatory workings.

Economic

Speculation on Prices Increases Challenged

PM2901160591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Interview with V. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices, by F. Ivanov under the "Rumors and Facts" rubric, date and place not specified: "USSR State Committee for Prices: We Shall Free Prices but When Is Not Known"]

[Text] On the morning of 29 January, All-Union Radio cited POSTFAKTUM in a report on an anticipated 140 percent rise in prices for food goods and an average rise of 70 percent for light industry goods.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked V. Senchagov, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Prices [Goskomtsen], to comment on this report.

[Senchagov] I do not know who gave the POSTFAKTUM correspondent this information but I think that it is riddled with inaccuracies. In fact, in accordance with the president's program for the transition to the market and the decisions of the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, we are preparing for the gradual transition to free prices. After all, now when retail prices are artificially low there are whole groups of goods which it is simply unprofitable for production enterprises to produce and the trade system is already refusing to accept them—if they trade in them they do so at a loss. At present two options for the transition to free prices are being examined: the "one-shot" approach in which [illegible] prices are relaxed in one go, and the gradual approach, by means of the broad application of contract prices. I do not hide the fact that I favor option two because it will make it possible to avoid spiralling inflation and ensure social guarantees and compensation for the country's population.

At the moment, however, I cannot venture to say when and how the reform will be implemented. Therefore, I take a quite skeptical view of certain publications which mention precise figures and dates. Yes, the reform of retail prices is necessary and will have to come but the population must be informed in good time. There must be no surprises here.

[Ivanov] Nevertheless, when Muscovites enter state stores they already get the feeling that prices are rising: Matches cost 5 kopeks, eggs around 3 rubles 50, and sunflower oil and other products have increased in price several times over.... Who warned us about that?

[Senchagov] As for matches and certain other goods, we agreed to the new prices because we think that the further curbing of prices will lead to the halting of production and the complete disappearance of goods from the stores. As for prices for products in Moscow, they have been increased by decision of the Moscow City Soviet in accordance with its program for the transition to contract prices. And we support this policy but only with regard to overplan production purchased in addition to centralized funds from cooperatives and private farmers.

Deputy Minister on Impact of AES Closings

914E0048A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 52, Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Ye.I. Petryayev, USSR deputy minister of power and electrification, by R. Akhmetov; place and date not given: "Back to Oil Lamps?"]

[Text]*A local energy program has been submitted for discussion to the residents of the Don area. In particular, it provides for the accelerated commissioning of two new capacities at the already operating TETS [heat and electric power stations], saving up to 12 percent of electricity and heat by means of their rational consumption, and implementing energy-efficient technologies.*

The energy-supply situation in Rostov Oblast deteriorated sharply in conjunction with discontinuing the construction of an AES [nuclear electric power station] on the shore of Tsimlyansk Reservoir. Specialists warn that an uncompensated electric power shortage will necessitate tightening "the energy belt" further. It may bring about the closure of a number of enterprises, cut-offs of electricity to the houses of a million urban and rural residents on a daily basis lasting between three and six hours, and deterioration of central heating.

[Signed] V. Bondarenko, Rostov-on-Don

We asked Ye.I. Petryayev, USSR deputy minister of power and electrification, to comment on this report.

[Akhmetov] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, what has happened over there? After all, it does not happen this way in real life: As recently as yesterday, energy was plentiful, and now they have "an energy famine."

[Petryayev] We must say that power supply in North Caucasus has always been a problem.

It was resolved to build the Rostov AES with four power units, each with a capacity of 1 million kilowatts, to put an end to the shortage. It was planned to commission the first "million" in the beginning of the current five-year plan. By now, two to three power units should have been commissioned.

However, the plan remained on paper for a number of reasons. Despite the fact that the Rostov AES uses reactors of a better design, different in principle from that in Chernobyl, specialists from the USSR Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry once again checked out and improved them after the Chernobyl catastrophe. A lot of time was spent for this purpose. The first reactor was due to be started up shortly, but the opponents of nuclear energy laid siege to the station. Under pressure from them, local authorities demanded that construction be discontinued and the station be mothballed, and this is now being done.

[Akhmetov] What is your view of the position of people who altogether reject the need to develop nuclear power?

[Petryayev] It is a mine under the foundation of our economy. This most complex issue cannot be resolved in the streets and squares. Let us assume that the populace decides to ban the construction of the Rostov station or another station. Extensive calculations have to be done and convincing technical, economic, and ecological justifications should be provided first, to take this serious step. However, this should be done by specialists.

Economic and social consequences should be considered before a station is closed. The construction of the Krasnodar AES had to be stopped not far from Rostov. However, in this case losses were not that great: Construction was only beginning. As far as the Rostov station is concerned, more than 500,000 million rubles have already been invested.

The correspondent is right when he says that the "energy belt" will now have to be tightened further. However, what may the practice of cutting off electricity cause, apart from profound dissatisfaction of the people? After all, there is nowhere to get electricity from.

[Akhmetov] What about neighbors who have always helped them out?

[Petryayev] The quite powerful Armenian AES that, as you know, has now been shut down used to help them. The Ukraine helped generously, also by means of nuclear power stations. However, at present there are also protests against the AES in the Ukraine. As a result, the republic parliament has enacted a five-year moratorium on the construction of nuclear power stations. Furthermore, three "million" reactors were in operation at the Chernobyl AES. Their capacity has now been reduced. This loss of power is not offset in any manner.

[Akhmetov] However, the citizens of Rostov do not think that their situation is hopeless. They decided to make the electricity-saving regimen stricter and to implement energy-efficient technologies.

[Petryayev] For many years, slogans similar to "Turn off the light when you leave" replaced energy supply in our country. In essence, however, these slogans have accomplished nothing, and will accomplish nothing for our society. Fighting mismanagement and slovenliness by means of appeals and slogans alone is cheap but unproductive, we have ascertained.

However, we would be able to save at best less than 10 percent of the electricity even if we always turned off the light when we leave, plugged up all leaks caused by mismanagement, and tapped a number of other small-scale reserves. Setting up the production of energy-efficient equipment and implementing energy-efficient technologies is the only reliable way to reduce electricity consumption.

The citizens of Rostov intend to reduce their consumption of electricity by approximately 40 percent by implementing energy-efficient technologies. However, what does switching to such technologies amount to in a shop? Equipment in place should be dismantled, and equipment that is new in principle should be installed. Alas, unlike in the West, such equipment is not produced in our country. I may state with complete authority that nothing major has been done in our country to reduce energy consumption substantially. This potential of ours has not been touched.

[Akhmetov] What will you say about "the trump card" of the Rostov energy plan—building new capacities at the TES [thermal power stations] already in operation?

[Petryayev] Two "million" need to be started up for Rostov alone! The citizens of Rostov will need a design, funds, and resources to build a TES with a capacity of 2 million kilowatt-hours. A lot of time is required to get all of this, and on top of this the station is yet to be built. How are they to live for eight to 10 years if there is a shortage of electricity right now?

[Akhmetov] However, the Russian Government cannot turn a blind eye to the calamitous situation of the citizens of Rostov, can it?

[Petryayev] A working group of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and a representative commission of the Russian Government will look for a way out of this situation together with people's deputies. However, Rostov Oblast deputies will have the last word.

* * *

At present, the situation that has emerged in Rostov Oblast is not an exception in our country. Rallies and demonstrations protesting the construction of the AES, hydropower stations, and TES are held here and there. TV and radio announcers periodically inform us about the suspension of construction of yet another station in a triumphant tone of voice, as if it were yet another victory. To be sure, the Chernobyl tragedy was horrible. The consequences of ill-considered decisions involving hydropower and thermal energy generation are distressing. However, our future is inconceivable without the development of power generation. Given an abrupt reduction in the commissioning of capacity, we are already embarking on this winter (which can be very severe if folk omens are to be trusted) with a capacity reserve of three to four percent. For comparison, these reserves come to 30 percent in the United States and Western Europe. These are spare energy capacities that constitute a reserve. They are loaded with fuel and started up when the temperature drops precipitously and energy needs increase. After all, a one-degree decline in temperature necessitates increases of 0.5 percent in the consumption of electricity, and of two percent in heat consumption. Therefore, we should have a considerably greater capacity reserve.

Perhaps, our air, water, and all of the environment will become cleaner if all power stations are shut down at once. However, we will have to live with oil lamps. I do not think that people who now man picket lines around the walls of power stations will be happy with this source of light.

This is why there is just one conclusion that the delegates of the All-Union Congress of Power Industry Employees have drawn: Let us not hinder the development of power generation; let us ensure instead that our stations are absolutely safe for the people and for nature.

Appeals Made to Gorbachev To Save Oil Industry

PM2801121291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Yuriy Perepletkin report from Tyumen under "Direct Line" rubric: "Will The Country Buy Oil Abroad?"]

[Text] Representatives of economic, soviet, and trade union bodies and the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] have appealed to the country's President M.S. Gorbachev and members of the Council of the Federation.

"It is painful to see," they write, "that the industrial potential built up over 25 years with enormous difficulties and the participation of hundreds of thousands of workers from all over the country, is literally disintegrating before our eyes.

"Cuts in financing, chronic shortfalls in delivery of equipment, materials, and finished goods, and the dictate of dozens and even hundreds of monopolist plants have led to a situation where the level of oil output in 1990 compared to 1989 decreased by 30 million tonnes, in 1991 it is expected to fall by another 30-40 million tonnes, and in 1995 the country will be forced to buy oil abroad.

"Dozens of extremely important power industry establishments in the oblast have been laid up. The construction of refineries has been suspended. Increases in gas output have been drastically curtailed, and the volume of geological survey work is decreasing....

"The construction complex, at one time the pride of the whole country, recruiting the best specialists in the field, is disintegrating...."

The authors urge that the president, acting jointly with competent Union and republic bodies and also with representatives from Tyumen, review immediately the dangerous situation that has arisen and prevent an economic crisis in the country's chief fuel and power industry base.

Shatalin Calls for Return to '500 Days'

91UN0732A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 16 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by Academician S. Shatalin: "I Would Like To Defend Myself Before the People...."]

[Text] The congresses of the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the 28th CPSU Congress and their subsequent plenums experimentally confirmed, generally speaking, the obvious theoretical hypothesis that radically altering the CPSU is impossible. Created originally as a "party of a particular type" for the "revolutionary" seizure of power (the Bolshevik wing) and command, monopoly control of the country, it is not reformable in depth. But it is precisely this—by definition, as the mathematicians say—that is needed.

Nor, to be frank, is much optimism inspired either by the congresses of people's deputies, the last one particularly, wholly akin to a "turbulent" CPSU Central Committee plenum.

As is known, Christ—in the wilderness, what is more—thrice resisted temptation. This is his greatness. We, however, our entire rag bag, "civil" society, live in a world of temptations and sacrilege, deception, and distorting mirrors. And for this reason—and there should be no illusions here—not only do we not wish to but, in my opinion, we cannot understand who we are, where we live, what we want, and whose interests we represent. The philosophy of plunder, social parasitism, dividing up and crude redistribution, parvenus, and plebeians—this has become the alpha and omega of our existence. We are living in a world of the disintegrating personality, unbridled passions, scorn for one another and an incomprehension of fundamental problems of the development of civilization and culture, outside of culture, essentially. We have flouted faith and we blaspheme, naively hoping that history may be fooled and rewritten in accordance with our wishes. It was about us that Christ, on the cross, spoke his heart-rending words: "Forgive them, Lord, for they know not what they do."

This most profound crisis now began, of course, not in April 1985 and not in the "stagnation" period. Persuading ourselves of this, we are once again being subjected to temptation and losing the real ground beneath our feet, attempting to ascertain how we came to be in such a pit and how to climb out of it, naively supposing that this is altogether possible within the framework of the existing social and political system. It should be firmly understood, for this is axiomatic, that the crisis began in October 1917. Without understanding this, we are doomed. Today we can still have second thoughts, tomorrow—no. People may take issue with me here, saying that, following Berdyayev, we need to look for the sources of the crisis in Belinskiy even. Perhaps so, although I really do not want such historical depth.

In evaluating October the worst thing is to find oneself captive to political and ideological banality and pagan attempts, as irresponsible as they are ignorant, to demand a roll-call vote in the search for culprits. This is an ostensibly objective path, but is, in fact, an absolutely superficial, destructive, and pagan path, a path of general vendetta. It is wholly devoid of historical method and is another temptation. It is irrational and nonoperational regarding it in the following terms: Was October a mistake or a crime. It is better to calmly recognize that it would have been better had it not occurred and to overcome it constructively. Evil may be conquered only by good. "Democrats," do not forget this.

I shall be giving away no secret, I believe, if I say what in our country is called the Great October Socialist Revolution historians of the world called the "October coup" or the "October adventure of Lenin and Trotskiy." It is not, of course, a question of names. But it is difficult even without this to make a more or less objective evaluation of an event whose accomplishment brought us to a historical impasse by no means on account of the moral level or narrowly selfish motivations of its leaders. You may disagree with this assertion, whistle, hoot, stamp your feet, and throw stones at the person who said these things, but this is the simple truth, that, if you believe the saying, is dearer than Plato.

And the truth is that had the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin not believed in permanent world revolution—and this was for them the Old and New Testament both—there would have been no October either. This was one of the tightest knots of the divergence between "revolutionary" and "opportunist" social democracy and of the personal tragedy of not its worst representatives. Lenin saw the historical mission of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in, having accomplished the October revolution, "pushing" world revolution also. But this was the tragic mistake. And if we believe Talleyrand, a crime is not a mistake, but a mistake is a crime. The world proletariat was wholly unprepared for world revolution, and Plekhanov, Martov, and all of Western social democracy were more than convincing in their attempts to persuade the Bolsheviks. Most unprepared for this revolution was the Russian proletariat. Remember the tragic meeting of Kropotkin and Plekhanov following their return to Russia in 1917.

And there should be no taboo placed on a truly scientific analysis of this problem. Without a clear recognition thereof the socialist movement in our country will be forever condemned to total bankruptcy. We need to understand that if we want the people or sufficiently substantial numbers thereof at least to retain some vestige of faith in the socialist choice, we need to evaluate October 1917 honestly and comprehensively, not make signs of the cross before it. Let us cease creating idols for ourselves. The truth is that instead of permanent revolution, our country acquired a permanent general crisis of "deformed" socialism to whose camp were also annexed our former "fraternal" countries, having already been anathematized, particularly at Russian Communist Party congresses and plenums, by their elder brothers.

M.S. Gorbachev, at the 28th CPSU Congress, made, I believe, a final attempt to consolidate the CPSU. Alas, he incurred fiasco on this path. A broken vase, like a broken love, cannot be stuck together again.

Although I realize the whole naivete of this, it is extremely surprising to me, as before, that we declare ourselves to be a party of socialist choice and communist outlook and declare our aspiration to build humane, democratic socialism without having made a precise definition of a single one of these concepts. We are simply reluctant, most likely, for it is politically more comfortable living thus.

I recall in this connection the widely known words of K. Marx: The label of a system differs from that of a commodity in that it frequently deceives not only the customer, but the seller as well. Although it needs to be said for fairness' sake that many sellers have tried, and often successfully, also to sell their merchandise slightly rotten, and certain customers have understood that they were getting it at a price. But how to tally what a brutal price was paid by our society for social hare-brained scheming.

I consider myself, as before, a socialist. But for me socialism means:

—real political democracy based on a multiparty system, the interconnection of public institutions forming a civil society, and an effective parliamentary opposition;
—an economic system based on the real pluralism of property relations, including, of course, private property, and free enterprise;
—a progressive income tax (for our destitute country it should not be as "steep" as it is now) and an efficient system of the social protection of the working people;
—an effective system of environmental protection.

Socialism for me means a cult of the "individual," a cult of the "ego". Unless we understand this, we will perish conclusively. As for the epithets "humane," "democratic"—these are simply an oddity, a truism, and the salvation of Stalin's "super-deformed" "socialism".

As far as the "communist outlook" is concerned, I shall be so "bold" as to maintain that "communism" has never been, is not now, and never will in the history of mankind a society. It is unnatural. Although the propensity of the Russian people (forgive me, I do not wish to insult any people) for eschatological thinking and belief in chiliasm compels me to wonder whether there might not be communism a thousand years hence. Perhaps. Perhaps by this time someone will have solved the problem of theodicy also. Therefore let us leave at least some work to the generations to come after us. Let them, more intelligent than us, build, rebuild, and complete the building of communism. Otherwise, you see, they will become carried away with distribution according to need, and, as we already know full well, there will be nothing to distribute. And there will be no capabilities left either. Can it be that they also, under communism, will have to choose between the introduction of a ration card or coupon system? What would this be: farce or tragedy?

In 1939 Fedor Raskolnikov wrote his celebrated open letter to Stalin. Angrily condemning Stalin for his mass punitive measures and the genocide, virtually—which he was perpetrating against his own people—F. Raskolnikov hurled at Stalin also the accusation that the latter had corrupted and befouled Soviet people's souls. Even F. Raskolnikov, I believe, did not suspect how accurately, comprehensively and profoundly he had evaluated the essence of what was happening and for how long these words would remain prophetic. Although even the Gospel says that the killers of souls are to be feared more than the killers of the body. I do not doubt that each of us, even in private, asks himself whether he fits in this Procrustean bed. Although regarding "each," I have apparently exaggerated considerably.

Television may be greatly thanked for the fact that it has shown that the "befouling and corruption" of souls has not as yet been overcome. We are, as before, living with corrupted and befouled souls. And this is what is most appalling. Unless we overcome this, society will die. So, will we continue to help "Comrade" Stalin or become just a little wiser? Or once again give our, in my view, great poet N.A. Nekrasov reason to say about ourselves: "vandals, savage crowd of drunkards, masters not of creation but of destruction." Or will we once again lose the battle at the Kalka and wait for the next yoke to terminate for us our bloody, fratricidal strife?

It is shameful, repulsive, and nauseating watching the "super-cultured" methods frequently employed by our people's elect and party delegates. Could any normal person not go insane, observing the present-day political shows, that compared with gladiator fights are models of ethics and chivalry.

Do you remember how V. Gilyarovskiy said:

There are in Russia two misfortunes,
Below the power of darkness,
Above the darkness of power.

However, this, generally speaking, most profound assertion is, I believe, hardly suitable for an evaluation of our present situation. There is in our country now below a superpower of darkness, and above, a paralysis of power. Although recent congresses compel one to wonder whether there is not now taking place an integration of the power of darkness at all levels—below, above, and in the middle. All politicians, and not only they, need to think deeply about this if, of course, the interests of the people are for them above provincial political ambitions. It is altogether necessary to have done with the collective rape of the people. I have never before in my life seen such a quantity of concentrated malice as at the congresses.

What is, for that matter, the social base of the CPSU, the ruling party, as we now say? The stereotypical answer is that the CPSU is the party of all working people. But, Lord have mercy, and forgive me repeating myself: Even Jesus Christ was unable to unite all his "sympathizers." And what can be said about the miners who at their first congress in Donetsk publicly disavowed the CPSU? And is it just they?

Let us say plainly: The CPSU was never a party of workers (do you remember Shlyapnikov's "worker opposition"), it never personified the "dictatorship of the proletariat," it was always a "party of a particular kind"—that is, a party of the apparatus directing the party masses, me included. On behalf of the working people we enslaved the working people and made labor forced, and the system a slave-owning-feudal empire of the "soldier" class of the USSR. We "abolished" man's exploitation of man, but observed and continue to observe with great pleasure how the state of workers, peasants, and the people's intelligentsia is super-exploiting the one, the other, and the third.

It is shameful when an audience of communists rapturously applauds I. Polozkov, for whom conviction as to the rightness of Marxism-Leninism is higher than feeding, shoeing, and clothing our destitute, half-starved population. I feel ashamed of Belov, the new-sprung theorist-ideologist of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, who is calling on everyone to sober up, but proposes intoxication with the raw vodka of his "home-brew," "moonshine" communism. I feel ashamed of myself.

I am absolutely certain that the reader will be asking in perplexity why S. Shatalin needs to waste time repeating these truths setting teeth on edge. Why indeed? Only to one end: to warn, if only myself, against another temptation to achieve something without altering anything. And recent events in the country are a tocsin warning of coming catastrophe and another temptation. We wish once again to accomplish the insoluble task of squaring the circle: the erroneous, superficial evaluation of the situation in April 1985 in terms of the "deformed" socialism—the choice of varnishing policy (acceleration, S&T revolution)—failure of the strategy—the call for humane, democratic socialism without private ownership and man's exploitation of man and without alienation of the working people from the product of their labor—a new varnishing of policy and... the edge of the abyss. An absolute shortage of absolutely everything, other than words, and the attempt at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies to take the abyss in two jumps. My God, how many times has all this already happened in Russian history. Or was Hegel apparently right in saying that the main lesson people learn from history is that they learn no lessons from it? And for this reason a study of the sources of Russian communism is by no means an academic competition in liveliness of intellect.

We found ourselves frighteningly far from the people and came to a stop at historical materialism, showing more than convincingly that the "market-capitalist" economies have defeated the "planned-socialist" economies by a stunning knockout. I believe that even in a fantastic dream K. Marx would not have dreamed of the shelves of "socialist" stores filled with air and would have personally pronounced anathema on all his quasi-Hegelian reasoning concerning commodity fetishism. But Torquemada and Ignatius Loyola had not yet been born, evidently.

How indifferent does one need to be toward one's own people to be able to speak about their "socialist choice" and "communist outlook" of not producing but making fetishes of commodities. Need it after this be explained why the "500 days" program was turned down to the rejoicing of the "upper strata" and the "masses"? A "thousand and one nights" program would not have helped here. The interests of self-preservation and power once again proved higher than the interests of the peoples.

The Fourth Congress of People's Deputies did not breathe a word even about how to emerge from the most profound economic crisis and the total collapse of the economy, although it discussed the question of power against the background of a general and absolutely obvious shift to the right.

Why this happened is a question for a separate analysis. Either the actors did not understand what the director wants or wanted of them or the director "scored" an artistic failure or...? I do not know all the "or's." Society, unless spurred by hunger and cold, once again wishes to fall into a lethargic slumber and content itself with its brutish way of life that it is so habituated. Interethnic relations and democracy have once again been delivered a clumsy, but planned blow. What, have they already started a referendum in Lithuania? Too much has already been said about the knockout of the economy, but does the president of the USSR wish to entrust the salvage operations to the right people? Or does he believe that the team which sustained a most telling punch has the incentives and courage to put things right? Or does he think that the final match for the World Cup can be won from the bench? The referee had already counted to nine, but the bell sounded. Or have we, for the umpteenth time, not heard it? The Politburo has once again given a reminder of who the true master in the country is. But is this not a Pyrrhic victory?

People's deputies, change your minds and think: Will you have once again to assemble for a special congress? What currently represents the "transition to the market economy" is chaotic suicide and navigation without rudder and sails. Hardly in the history of Russia have there been instances of a more "dexterous" reduction of the state budget deficit, its outcome will merely be superinflation and economic catastrophe. To swim in this "sea" a new, intelligent and strong-willed team is needed to quickly become a team of interethnic and interparty cooperation, that is particularly necessary now, perhaps, in the sphere of the economy. But it should be finally professionals who are cooperating. The present organization of power will not solve this problem. Let us immediately return to the "500 days." If they are not enough, we will add "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." I personally would like to defend myself before the people for my lack of principle.

Gosbank Official Discusses Ruble Exchange

914A0376A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 pp 1,4

[Interview with Yu. Balagurov, chief of the Administration of Monetary Circulation of the USSR State Bank, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent G. Valyuzhenich; place and date not given: "Exchange Fever"]

[Text] **Rumors about an action aimed at confiscating 50 and 100 ruble [R] bills started to circulate as early as two to three months before it was implemented. Even some newspapers reported this in a haste to render service to the operators of the shadow economy.**

Yu. Balagurov, chief of the Administration for Monetary Circulation of the USSR State Bank, with whom our correspondent met, responded that the action had been prepared secretly, and no employee of the State Bank [Gosbank] and USSR Savings Bank establishments could have prior knowledge of it. He himself found out about it several hours before the official announcement.

[Valyuzhenich] Yuriy Alekseyevich, the mere fact that rumors about this action had been "leaking" is proof of the information leak. This leads many of our readers to believe that the wheeler-dealers who had a large number of these denominations in their possession had enough time to convert them or deposit them into a savings bank. Is this supported by your data—by the fact that during the last two months more than the usual amount of R50 and R100 bills was received by banking entities?

[Balagurov] Neither we nor the USSR Savings Bank have this information. The money comes to us without source identification.

[Valyuzhenich] Nevertheless, Comrade Pavlov said in his comments that two thirds of the R50 and R100 bills do not return to the bank....

[Balagurov] He made this statement on the basis of a special survey of bill circulation we conducted in 1990. Now we are in the process of conducting such a survey as of 22 January. We will analyze the data received.

[Valyuzhenich] Can you at least tell whether there has been an increase in savings bank deposits lately?

[Balagurov] To be honest, we were worried that there might be an "outflow" of deposits from the savings banks, since there have been quite a few rumors and proposals on freezing deposits and on monetary reform.

I must say, though, that there have not been any significant deviations from the average.

As to the information leak, unfortunately it did take place. For instance, in the city of Kovrov R50 and R100 bills were already not being accepted in December. The KGB is now investigating these types of facts.

[Valyuzhenich] Yuriy Alekseyevich, why was such a short time period—three days—allotted for the money exchange?

[Balagurov] This period was established not to exchange money but to surrender it to the bank, and thus prevent people with large unearned holdings from dispersing it.

The mechanics of the exchange itself is as follows. Let us say that you have 20 R100 bills on hand. You bring it to your organization and surrender it. They should exchange an amount equivalent to your monthly salary on the spot. The rest of the money is registered on a special list, showing the amount surrendered and a brief description of the money's origin. For instance, you say that you have R1,000 on hand because last month you received a large bonus or honorarium.

[Valyuzhenich] It could be, for instance, that someone withdrew $15,000 from the savings bank recently because he was planning to buy a car....

[Balagurov] Then he will write this in the explanation, indicating the savings bank number and the account number.

Next, enterprises and organizations send these lists to special commissions that are to be created under the rayon and city executive committees; within a 10-day period these commissions must issue permission to exchange the money or a well-founded refusal. On the basis of this permission the enterprise will receive money in the bank and distribute it to its employees.

[Valyuzhenich] Does the commission have clear criteria for distinguishing earned and unearned income?

[Balagurov] The commissions, which will consist of people's deputies and representatives of the financial and banking organs, have a right to determine and define these criteria on the basis of the law and common sense.

If, for instance, a person brings R50,000 to exchange, and his monthly salary is only R150, it probably is a good case to look into.

[Valyuzhenich] What if a person had never used a savings bank and had kept all his money at home? If he brings R10,000-20,000, can he be certain that this money will be exchanged?

[Balagurov] Of course. If someone worked all his life and had a good salary, and never used a savings bank. This is easy to establish.

[Valyuzhenich] Would not you agree, though, that the subjective manner the origin of the savings is established may lead to some conflict situations?

[Balagurov] Everybody has a right to appeal the commission's decision at a higher level, up to republic commissions.

[Valyuzhenich] Is there a time limit the appeals must be resolved?

[Balagurov] No. These appeals will be handled in accordance with general procedures defined by the law.

[Valyuzhenich] Will the cooperative and consignment stores now sell expensive goods though noncash transactions?

[Balagurov] We cannot force them, but I think it will be better for them in this situation. [Valyuzhenich] What about privatization, the purchase of shares or stocks? Each person can only withdraw R500 a month...

[Balagurov] That is money he can use to buy shares—if he wants to.

About privatization. I believe that the overwhelming majority of the population does not have and never had the money to buy out stores, enterprises, etc. Privatization can only be accomplished through an extensive use of bank credits, but expansion of such credits now would only bring another boost to the inflation spiral. Therefore we have a vicious circle. During privatization it is important to make sure that the shadow economy does not get everything under its control; we have to cut off at least a part of the underground capital. This is one of the goals of this reform.

[Valyuzhenich] Will this action have an effect on individual loans issued by the banks?

[Balagurov] They will continue to be issued in a regular way, but there will be limits imposed on them.

[Valyuzhenich] Will the organizations be permitted to loan money to their employees?

[Balagurov] There are no changes in this area, either. If the bank loans the money to the organization, it can use it that way. I must note, however, that the interest rate on loans has been increased.

[Valyuzhenich] Was additional money printed so that R50 and R100 bills could be exchanged?

[Balagurov] No. At the initial stage the bills will be exchanged for old money. In our calculations, there should be enough of this. Later, new R50 and R100 bills will be circulated; they will be better protected.

[Valyuzhenich] What does that mean?

[Balagurov] The technology used for making bills designed in 1961 lends itself to counterfeit. The new bills will be made using new technology; in that sense they will be solidly protected from counterfeit.

[Valyuzhenich] How much money will have to be replaced?

[Balagurov] Thirty-four percent of cash circulation as of the beginning of this year.

[Valyuzhenich] Yuriy Alekseyevich, in accomplishing such a huge action, it was probably difficult to foresee the multitude of situations people may find themselves in. For instance, how will long-haul seamen who are now at sea, or our personnel abroad, exchange the money they left at home?

[Balagurov] In such cases the matter will be resolved on an individual basis. There will be exceptions made for them.

[Valyuzhenich] What about those who were on the road at the time the announcement came?

[Balagurov] We have directed the Ministry of Railroads and Aeroflot to accept these bills from passengers as payment for tickets. Passengers can surrender the remaining money to the special commissions at stopovers, where they will be given a receipt: They can take this receipt to their place of work, and the money will be paid back to them.

We suggest that all questions arising in regard to money should be directed to the appropriate commissions at the rayon executive committee.

Gosbank Aide on Issues Raised by 'Ekho' Deal

PM3001085191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with O. Mozhayskov, chief of the USSR State Bank Board Foreign Exchange Administration, by I. Zhagel; place and date not given: "What Are 140 Billion Rubles Worth?"]

[Text] The USSR KGB Public Relations Center has released a report that a British national, P. Pearson, has been detained at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport carrying documents relating to a deal between the Chelyabinsk subsidiary of the "Ekho" ecological production firm and the British company Dove Trading International. This deal envisages exchanging 140 billion rubles [R] for $7,756,000,000. The foreign national also carried letters on assistance for the contract [pisma o okazanii sodeystviya kontraktu] signed by G. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers....

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked O. Mozhayskov, chief of the USSR State Bank Board Foreign Exchange Administration, to comment on this report.

[Zhagel] Oleg Vladimirovich, the USSR KGB report stirs the imagination. On the one hand, there is the astronomical sum of R140 billion, comparable with a republic or even all-Union budget in scale. On the other hand, you have this modest regional organization. The one does not go with the other.

[Mozhayskov] You are right. Not only you but many others are also intrigued by this fact. All I can say at the moment so soon after the event is this: This is one of the negative aspects of the decentralization of our economic life compunded by a complete lack of legal expertise, adventurism, and irresponsibility.

I would like to add immediately that I am not against business or entrepreneurial initiative, but there are limits to everything. Undoubtedly, the scale of this well-planned operation and its potential consequences are such that it was absolutely necessary for Union and republic organs to intervene. Entering into such a deal without a major economic feasibility study or consultation with specialists is an irresponsible step to say the least.

[Zhagel] As I understand it, the intentions of the Soviet participants in the deal ultimately included buying consumer goods for rubles. What is wrong in that? This method of replenishing the consumer market was approved by the country's legislature and included in its program for the transition to the market economy.

[Mozhayskov] Essentially the fundamental objections are that our country has still not devised an economic system for conducting import operations in rubles. We must well consider the manner and terms whereby we can allow foreigners to acquire rubles and use them on USSR territory to our mutual satisfaction. There is a host of technical details here that would be simply criminal to ignore. In addition, it is exceptionally important to remember that dealings in rubles by one republic will inevitably affect everyone's interests. We have a single currency unit across the whole country. Therefore, there must be a single set of "ruble import" terms.

But in fact our complaints are far more serious because despite the specious aims and tasks, the deal under discussion here is a major economic adventure with ruinous consequences for the interests of all republics. I should like to draw attention first to the proposed rate of exchange of Soviet currency for foreign currency.

[Zhagel] Yes, the rate used in the deal—$1 for R18—is of course very substantially different from the official and commercial rates used by the USSR State Bank [Gosbank]. But it is very close to the auction rate. Many people consider this rate realistic.

[Mozhayskov] No, that is not so. I shall try to explain why. Given the nonconvertibility of the Soviet ruble, the USSR Gosbank is forced to fix several rates, each performing a special role in the system of foreign economic ties.

Furthermore, there is a relatively limited range of goods that are not included in any of the official rates. Their prices in our country are 20-25 times higher than the world prices. Private individuals and individual enterprises trade as middlemen in these goods—personal computers, television and radio equipment, and videocassettes—and make colossal profits by buying them abroad and selling them on the domestic market. In the market economy such activity is quite normal and even necessary for the purpose of maintaining competition.

In the Soviet economy's transitional conditions, however, this activity is clearly speculative in character because prices for these goods are formed not by competition but by acute shortage when demand exceeds supply many times over. As a result a narrow range of wheeler-dealers get rich to the financial detriment of enterprises and organizations.

The only thing that the state can do is to syphon part of the profit off into the budget as an import tax. In addition, to restrict the opportunities for the "shadow business community" to become rich through acting as the middleman in the trade in scarce goods, the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity has organized a trade in foreign currency by auction: Some enterprises are now able to sell foreign currency to others at the supply and demand rate, that in present-day conditions could be called the "computer rate."

But if that rate is used for foreign currency dealings in the purchase of consumer goods, raw materials, machinery, and equipment, this will lead to a fantastic escalation in prices. You can see that for yourself if you visit commercial stores where foreign sports shoes can cost R500.

When cooperatives and individual specialist enterprises engage in such operations at their own risk, that is their affair. But when government agencies become involved in this game, this fueling of inflation almost becomes a state economic policy.

[Zhagel] Evidently the plan was to buy not only tape recorders, cars, and track shoes but also goods in daily demand that should not be subject to price rises.

[Mozhayskov] What they did or did not intend is of no great importance. After all, by concluding a deal at an exchange rate of 1:18 the Russian Government is committing itself to pay its foreign partners R140 billion. This is equal to the amount of cash that all Soviet people have in their pockets, purses, and "under the mattress." By making such a commitment, the Russian Council of Ministers will simply no longer be able to sell the population goods at prices less than 18 times the world price.

The most elementary calculation illustrates the financial aspects of this deal for the population. At current prices for consumer goods based on the traditional import range, you could buy goods costing $7.8 billion making it possible to earn around R30 billion in the domestic market. Therefore, to earn R140 billion the goods must be sold at far higher prices. Meanwhile, to the R140 billion of direct commitments to foreign partners you must add another R26 billion import tax. Thus the sale value of the goods to be bought must be at least R166 billion.

Consequently, the retail prices must be increased by a factor of at least five-six.

[Zhagel] There is another intriguing aspect to this story: It places R140 billion at the disposal of foreign investors. If your bank statistics are to be believed, this figure exceeds the total sum of money owned by all enterprises and organizations. It is even greater than all the cash owned by the USSR population. Are you not daunted by the prospect of an unexpected flood of money under the control of foreigners?

[Mozhayskov] You are putting the question in a somewhat dramatic form. I would not preclude the use of overseas ruble deposits by foreign citizens for deliberately subversive actions. But I would not give it paramount significance. Such actions are neutralized to a considerable extent.

It is a different matter if unjustified economic privileges are being created for foreign investors and if government organs are helping people obtain rubles at a preferential rate. The accumulation of such astronomical sums in rubles on terms offered by our Russian traders will enable foreigners to buy up real estate in the USSR for effectively next to nothing.

The estimated value of the 24,500 production facilities whose construction was temporarily halted or which have been mothballed in 1989 amounted to R29.5 billion. It would cost a foreign investor who concluded a deal to buy rubles at a rate of R18 to $1 just $1.6 billion to buy the lot .

[Zhagel] Can IZVESTIYA readers expect more detailed information when the facts of this case become clear?

[Mozhayskov] Undoubtedly. We shall try to give you that information in a few days' time.

Editorial Note: We tried to elucidate the RSFSR Council of Ministers' position on the detention by KGB organs of a foreign citizen found to be carrying documents signed by G. Filshin, deputy chairman of the Russian Government. When we asked at the RSFSR Council of Ministers office, however, we were told that there will be a special press conference on this matter. Unfortunately it is being held after the issue was signed to press. We shall report on it later.

Omsk To Produce AN-74 Planes for Civilian Use

LD2701203491 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Text] An aviation plant in the Siberian city of Omsk is to be restructured for the production of AN-74 planes for national civilian aviation, although for many years it has turned out aircraft for the Soviet Air Force. The AN-74 can fly reconnaissance missions in the Arctic, service drifting research stations, and transport cargoes. The Russian Federation's Government has earmarked over 200 million rubles for the restructuring. Experts say the newly oriented plant will bring the republic substantial profits. The unique know-how and sophisticated equipment of the former defense plant will enable it to operate with high effectiveness and turn out high-quality products.

Military

Decree Issued on Joint Army-Militia Patrols

PM3001101391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[Decree of the USSR president "On Collaboration Between the Militia and Subunits of the USSR Armed Forces in Safeguarding Law and Order and Struggling Against Crime"]

[Text] Considering that criminal offenses against citizens, workers in the law enforcement organs, and servicemen and other violations of the law are acquiring an increasingly dangerous and broad-based nature, on the basis of Point 1 of Article 127, Paragraph 3 of the USSR Constitution and in accordance with the USSR 24 September 1990 law "On Additional Measaures To Stabilize the Country's Economic and Sociopolitical Life" and the USSR Supreme Soviet 23 November 1990 resolution "On the Situation in the Country," I decree that:

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Ministry of Defense ensure collaboration between the militia and subunits of the USSR Armed Forces in maintaining public order on the streets and in public places and to this end carry out joint patrols, including spot checks with the participation of members of the public, in cities and population centers.

In organizing and carrying out these measures they must be strictly guided by the requirements of the legislation of the USSR and the republics.

[Signed] USSR President M. Gorbachev

[Dated] Moscow, Kremlin, 29 January 1991

Deputy Interior Minister on Decree

LD2901162391 Moscow TASS in English 1601 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Borisov]

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—Tougher struggle against street crime is the aim of a recent order issued by the Soviet Interior and Defence Ministries on the joint patrolling of city streets by militia officers and troops, First Deputy Interior Minister Ivan Shilov told a news conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Centre here today.

He noted that the order was prompted by growing crime in the country and a permanent shortage of militia personnel. Shilov said that joint patrolling had also been used earlier and "yielded the most positive results".

Asked which cities will be patrolled jointly, he stressed that "the question concerning patrolling in regions and republics will be settled in each particular case".

No armoured carriers, about which so much has been said now, will be used in patrolling, Shilov stressed. They will be stationed at their bases. Their use is provided for "in hot pursuit of armed criminals to avoid the death of militia officers and troops".

Joint patrolling does not provide for arming personnel with firearms, he emphasised. As was the case in the past, troops will patrol with bayonets and militia officers with clubs.

Speaking about joint patrolling in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Shilov said that "these issues will be settled in each specific case by commanders of appropriate army units together with interior ministries in those republics".

Asked who gave orders to storm the Latvian Interior Ministry by the all-Union Interior Ministry's special task force, he said: "Nobody from the USSR Interior Ministry in Moscow gave orders to storm the Latvian Interior Ministry".

Asked when joint patrols may use their arms, Shilov stressed that "patrols will use arms only in cases provided for by operating regulations. They will not be granted any additional rights".

The deputy minister stressed that "the order will operate until the crime wave subsides in Soviet cities. It will be repealed when the need for it disappears".

Draft Provisions for Military Control Commission

91UM0282A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

["Draft Provisions on the Control Commission for the CPSU Organization in the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] 1. The Control Commission for the CPSU organization in the USSR Armed Forces is elected by the all-Army party conference so that Communists can monitor execution by the all-Army party committee, and also party organizations in the Army and Navy, of the program documents and CPSU Rules, and decisions of party congresses and conferences.

In its work the Control Commission is guided by the CPSU Rules and these Provisions, and it is independent in its activity and accountable to the all-Army party conference.

2. The Control Commission does the following:

—monitors execution of program documents and the CPSU Rules and observance of democratic principles in the activity of the All-Army Party Conference, and lodges protests against any of its decisions that are not in accordance with program and statutory provisions;

—reviews appeals sent to it by party organizations and communists and takes steps with respect to instances of bureaucracy, suppression of criticism, abuse of official position, and other violations of the norms of party life;

—provides assistance for party organizations in strengthening the unity of their ranks and party comradeship, and helps to enhance the authority and independence of the primary party organizations;

—defends the rights, honor, and dignity of Communists;

—monitors to ensure that the rights of minorities to defend their own position are not violated in the party organizations and elected party organs;

—checks on observance of established procedure for reviewing appeals from party organizations and letters and statements in the all-Army party conference and its apparatus;

—in accordance with the CPSU Rules, holds liable to the party any communist who violates party discipline and the norms of social morality. A decision by the Control Commission on holding a Communist liable to the party is brought to the attention of the appropriate primary party organization. In the event that an objection is raised to it, it is reviewed again, with representatives of the party organization invited to attend, after which any decision is regarded as final;

—reviews appeals from communists against decisions of party committees and control commissions in the branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, districts, groups of forces, and fleets entailing liability to the party, and resolves questions of party rehabilitation;

—reviews differences arising between party committees in the branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, districts, groups of forces, and fleets, and the corresponding control commissions;

—monitors execution of the budget in organizations of the CPSU in the Armed Forces and audits the financial-economic activity of the all-Army party conference and its press organ;

—studies and analyzes practical work by control commissions in the organization of the CPSU in the Armed Forces and provides them with methodological assistance.

3. The Control Commission of CPSU organizations in the Armed Forces and its chairman are elected by the all-Army party conference. Communists elected to the Control Commission cannot be members of the all-Army party conference or workers in its apparatus.

Plenary sessions of the Control Commission are held as required, but at least twice annually, and also at the request of at least one-third of its members.

At its plenum the Control Commission elects a presidium and defines its powers, and forms standing commissions for its avenues of work from among the members of the Control Commission and also other Communists. The presidium annually submits to a plenum of the Control Commission an accountability report on work done. Members of the Control Commission render accountability reports on their own activity to the party organizations.

Members of the Control Commission participate with the right of voice but no vote in the plenums of the all-Army party conference, and the chairman of the Control Commission and his deputy participate in the sessions of the party committee bureau.

4. The Control Commission for the CPSU organization in the USSR Armed Forces adopts resolutions on matters falling within its purview, and according to the results of audits, confirms enactments and informs the bureau of the All-Army Party Conference and the leaders of party organizations, who are obliged to inform it promptly about steps taken.

Members of the Control Commission have the right to use all documents of the Armed Forces party organizations to carry out the functions envisaged by the CPSU Rules and these Provisions.

5. The Control Commission for the CPSU organization in the Armed Forces uses funds from the party budget needed for the work of the apparatus and to provide material-technical support for its own activity. Funds for this purpose are allocated at a joint plenum of the all-Army party committee and Control Commission.

6. Differences arising between the Control Commission and the all-Army party committee are resolved by conciliation commissions set up on a parity basis, and also at joint plenums or sessions of the all-Army party congress bureau and the presidium of the Control Commission. A joint decision is considered adopted when at least a two-thirds majority is obtained in separate votes by members of the party committee and of the Control Commission.

7. The Control Commission for the CPSU organization in the USSR Armed Forces carries out its work publicly and it systematically informs the party organization about its activity and maintains close links with the mass media.

To Our Readers

The draft provisions on the Control Commission for the CPSU organization in the USSR Armed Forces were prepared by representatives of the party organizations of the branches of the Armed Forces, combat arms, military districts, and main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of Defense and are being submitted for review by communists in the Army and Navy.

We ask that proposals and comments on the draft be sent to the Coordinating Committee for Accountability Reports and Elections for party organs of the Armed Forces, troops of the USSR Committee for State Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs, and railroad troops that has been set up by the CPSU Central Committee, and also to the organizational committees of CPSU organizations set up to conduct the accountability-and-election campaign in the military districts, groups of forces, fleets, combat arms, and branches of the Armed Forces.

Belorussian MD Officer Discusses Troop Cutbacks

PM2901153991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major General A. Fomin, chief of the Belorussian Military District Personnel Directorate, by correspondent Colonel A. Smolyanko under the "Armed Forces Reduction" rubric; place and date not given: "At Headquarters at the Beck and Call of..."]

[Text] These are busy times for workers in the Belorussian Military District personnel organs: Troop numbers are being cut and units from East Europe are arriving. They all need to be accommodated and assigned to posts and many social questions have to be tackled. How is this process going?

Major General A. Fomin, chief of the Belorussian Military District Personnel Directorate, talks about this to your correspondent.

"Every Wednesday we invite to the directorate 30-40 of those who have submitted a separation request or have come under the cuts," was how Anatoliy Petrovich, aware of why I had come, began our conversation. "We make personal enquiries and study all the circumstances which have induced an officer to leave the Army, and only then do we make our decision. Last year we saw more than 1,000 men in this way. I would stress that the overwhelming majority of officers and NCO's are aware of the prevailing situation and treat the everyday problems that arise with understanding. That makes our work easier."

[Smolyanko] Yet a large body of so-called "supernumeraries" has formed in the district. How is their future being decided?

[Fomin] I will start with the figures. We now have 40 colonels and more than 1,000 company, battalion, and squadron [divizion] commanders surplus to the table of organization. Two-thirds of them do not have 20 years' service, that is to say, are not entitled to receive a pension. We are naturally not recommending them for discharge unless, of course, they themselves express the wish. Although there are indeed some problems with regard to their assignment, all of them will, I think, be found posts by 1 September this year. While those officers with 20 years or more of service will in the main be recommended for discharge. Provided, admittedly, that they have accommodation.

It is a different picture with platoon commanders. The district has no surplus in the table of organization. On the contrary, we have a shortage of more than 700. They are particularly lacking in the artillery troops, signals troops... What is the solution? We may even have to resort to training officers for these posts from among leading sergeants, who will undergo special training courses. This is, of course, an enforced measure....

[Smolyanko] Yes, but the officers are taking the news that they are surplus to the table of organization badly. They essentially become redundant, frequently perform work that is not within their area of specialism, and are unable to make full use of their professional knowledge, expertise...

[Fomin] I appreciate that this is a psychological shock for military men. Officers have been taken off the table of organization before, but only for 2 months, and they were sure that they would be found a post after this. Everything is more complex now. This is the first time we have encountered this situation, I admit. Some personnel organs have not proven fully ready to solve these questions promptly and to protect officers. But, do believe me, the last thing this signifies is a callous or bureaucratic attitude—this is the reality of the situation.

Those removed from the table of organization have now been instructed to place themselves at the disposal of appropriate commanders and superior officers. This in no way means that they can now idle their time away. On the contrary, they have quite a lot to do for the unit and have to show their activeness in work. The problem is that the "supernumeraries" have sometimes been left to their own devices. I was in one division recently. I met with a captain and asked him: "What are you doing now?" He answered: "I am at headquarters, at the beck and call, as it were, of the officer in charge." It happens that some commanders ignore these people, others do not entrust them with serious work, yet others... Every officer in charge should determine the place and role of such officers in the life of the unit and outline the range of their duties and tasks. In general I think an appropriate document regarding them should have been adopted long ago across the whole of the Armed Forces. Be it a provisional regulation or a directive—the name is not important. But it should legally enshrine the duties of the officer in charge and such "attached officers." This would protect them from unwarranted reproaches. Such a document is all the more necessary as the process of troop withdrawal and reduction will go on for some years.

[Smolyanko] Anatoliy Petrovich, the facts indicate that some commanders on the pretext of reduction are seeking to get rid of unwelcome, refractory officers, but are also sometimes getting rid of intelligent, competent officers....

[Fomin] There were such cases last year. We study not just personnel files but also travel to units to resolve conflicts which have arisen. If an officer has been treated prejudicially and an injustice has been committed, we immediately take measures to rectify the mistakes. In short, we do our utmost to ensure that no one leaves the Army at this trying time aggrieved, harboring a grudge. Competent, promising officers, la creme de la creme, should remain in the service of our motherland.

[Smolyanko] It is tough in general for military men today. Many of them encounter problems with exchanging coupons for food and industrial goods and there is no accommodation. Persons of no fixed abode already appeared....

[Fomin] Yes, accommodation is our principal problem. There has been much talk about housing construction, but the question is being tackled too slowly. Servicemen spend years waiting for an apartment. I think something has to change here. For example, around 100 officers are annually discharged or transferred to other districts from a district headquarters directorate. You would think that some apartments would be vacated. But there are none. And that will continue until we create a well-thought-out system for providing housing for officers and NCO's. I think that a special stock of service apartments should be introduced. Moreover, we need a law whereby each officer would himself choose his place of residence two years before his discharge into the reserve or retirement and would receive from the organs of Soviet authority a document stating that an apartment is awaiting him. Only then will he be reassured about his future. But for the time being no one in Minsk wants to leave. All kinds of reasons are found. Some have even agreed to being discharged without pension provided they retain an apartment in the capital.

[Smolyanko] The draft law on compulsory military service has been published. What can you say about it within the context of our discussion?

[Fomin] Its adoption should not be put off. We have long needed the legal buttress of such a law which will enable us to tackle personnel questions more successfully. Second, it should clearly stipulate everything concerning the social protection of officers, their benefits, their privileges, and so forth. Not to mention differentiated, performance-related remuneration. For the time being, however, it quite often happens that those who work more get less. There are such examples in our headquarters too.

Last, the law should give a commander more scope to show initiative and independence in making decisions for which he bears responsibility. That is a requisite of our time.

Defense Budget Structure Review Urged

PM2301130591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jan 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Rear Admiral R. Zubkov, candidate of military sciences, under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "What Kind of Defense Budget Structure Do We Need?"]

[Text] The question posed in the title was provoked by G. Khromov's response, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, to an article by the well-known and prestigious academics A. Kokoshin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and Major General, Retired, V. Larionov, entitled "Military Doctrine in the Service of Peace" (KOMMUNIST No. 15, 1990). Let us recall that this article expressed the opinion that one way of achieving a reasonable and reliable sufficiency in the sphere of defense may be to alter the ratio of budget appropriations for arms purchases to appropriations for maintaining their functioning, in favor of the latter. It is well known that this ratio in the United States was 1:2 in 1990, whereas in the USSR it was the reverse (to be more exact, 1.6:1). Roughly the same ratio, incidentally, is planned in our country for the foreseeable future—through the end of the 20th century.

However, not all of us agree with the conclusions drawn by A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov. The main argument is that the respective items of expenditure in the Soviet and U.S. military budgets are "incomparable." But is this the case? Let us turn to the documents.

Appropriations for maintaining the functioning of arms in the USSR are allocated from the "Army and Navy Maintenance" budget item and in the United States from the "Maintenance of Servicemen" (minus pensions for servicemen) and "Functioning and Logistical Support" (of troops and forces—R. Z.) items.

The analysis I have carried out of the contents of these items in both countries' military budgets makes it possible to draw the conclusion that the "Army and Navy Maintenance" item in our budget is virtually identical to the two aforementioned U.S. budget items. The same can be said of the contents of the USSR and U.S. budget items for arms purchases. Thus, for all the differences in absolute values when designating the individual components of these items, the main elements of the structure of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the United States are perfectly comparable.

The overall picture does not change even when account is taken of a U.S. military budget expenditure item like payment for land leasing, which does not figure in our budget. The fact is that various types of lease payments (not just for land but also for the use of buildings, facilities, and so on) account for less than 1.5 percent of the total amount of expenditures provided under the "Functioning and Logistical Support" item (in this item's sections on the maintenance of the equipment of branches of the Armed Forces).

The authors of the article in KOMMUNIST are also reproached for supposedly comparing incomparable quantities, since the financial maintenance of servicemen in the United States is higher by a whole order of magnitude than that in the USSR.

I have calculated the aforementioned ratio, leaving out the financial maintenance of servicemen and the wages of workers and employees. It turned out that in this case the ratio of expenditure on arms purchases and on ensuring their functioning is 1:1 in the United States and 2.5:1 in the USSR. So that, even with this approach, the picture does not favor our Armed Forces.

Other changes can be made in the method of calculating this ratio. But the final conclusions will nevertheless remain unchanged. They make it possible to understand, for example, why the number of days at sea per ship and the number of hours spent in the air per pilot in the United States is several times greater than in the USSR, while the duration of refitting and re-equiping ships is correspondingly far less over there. There are many indications that their naval base facilities, air bases, and combat training grounds are better equipped than ours. It is no accident that the numerical strength of rear services in the United States constitutes 48 percent of the Armed Forces' numerical strength, against our 2.6 percent. I assume that, as a result, maintenance of a high level of combat ability in the U.S. forces does not demand the Herculean efforts that it often does from us. And the main cause of this is, I think, this very expenditure ratio, and, in my view, A. Kokoshin and V. Larionov rightly drew attention to the need for changing it.

I will remark that it is hardly possible to expect a significant enhancement of the USSR Armed Forces' combat ability, even if the financial maintenance of our servicemen did become comparable with the United States', while they continue to fly, sail, and train in the use of arms only as much as they do today.

To ensure the required efficiency of the everyday activity of our Armed Forces and the enhancement of their combat readiness and combat ability, there is a pressing and objective need to take a fresh look at the structure of the Soviet defense budget. I believe that this problem deserves businesslike and substantive discussion by specialists in various spheres on the pages of the military press. At the same time, the interests of the defense industry must also be definitely taken into consideration.

Baltic Republics

Landsbergis Addresses Supreme Council 29 Jan

LD2901134191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0821 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Speech by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Good morning, respected colleague deputies. On the Lithuanian situation, I can say that, considering the conditions under which we now live, our state's systems are functioning and the people are disciplined and are discharging their duties. This is our resistance's main feature. On the other hand, it can be said that violence continues, with heavy consequences.

You may have heard that last night a young man was severely injured at an illegally established military cordon, where we have injured people and some dangerous incidents every night. The details are such that a young man did not stop as ordered and his car was fired upon. He was hit on the head. I do not like to have such sad thoughts, but his life is in danger. Artificial respiration is applied, the centers of regulating breathing are injured in his brain. In brief, we may have yet another victim.

Again, this is a warning. As we already said more than once, we do not wish to have anything against soldiers as such—especially against individual soldiers—but one must be careful. The Army's presence under these conditions and with authorization from their leadership to ignore Lithuania's authorities and Lithuania's laws endagers the lives of the civilian population. This danger is clear every day, particularly at night. Perhaps this is how they wish to adapt us to occupation conditions—by living in danger—or to adapt not only us but also the world.

There are also new features of this adaptation and intimidation, like the bombing incident. An aerial bomb was dropped on Salcininkai rayon, 50 meters from houses. It was either dropped or fell accidentally. Fortunately, it was 50 meters from the houses. The hole created by the explosion is 15 meters in diameter [words indistinct] fortunately, there were no casualties. Damaged electrical cable, smashed windows [words indistinct] the event is being investigated, unless the military claims responsibility. Once again, this is very dangerous to the peoples' lives. We recall how bombs used to explode in Riga and Tallinn to set a certain psychological atmosphere for future, more extensive military acts. Perhaps this is not all coincidence.

A rather refined disinformation campaign against Lithuania continues. For example, there are publications abroad under grand titles: "Lithuania Rejects Moscow's Proposals." They phone me and ask, but we, of course, have not received any proposals. The intention is to present us in a certain light. On-the-spot, local stories are being created for those who believe in the Soviet Union or those who do not understand events, about how people who have different veiws are being persecuted in Lithuania, CPSU members being an example. We already heard news disseminated abroad about the devastated CPSU premises in Lithuania, even though this has not been proven. Yesterday, I received two different letters from Moscow that deal with three instances of persecuting people. They are all in Radviliskis, for some reason linked with the railway depot or the CPSU organization. We investigated all of them, but nothing has been found. One of them describes how a party secretary is being terrorized by death threats to his family. He allegedly moved his family from Lithuania. However, it appears this family lives in Lithuania, at home. There was nothing, except a single telephone call in which his work as the CPSU secretary was mentioned.

Another letter was from the Soviet Union's railways minister, demanding an explanation of why the deputy head of the railway depot was beaten up at night while his family watched. Four people entered his apartment; it was established that some four Russian-speaking people entered his apartment and asked him to show his military document. He argued; they pushed each other; they departed. He made no complaint about the incident; they were his acquaintances. There were no problems.

Stories are being created about all this on the union scale. We will probably encounter a stream of such inventions. It will probably tire us and occupy our time, answering and explaining. Trying to present us in the same way—by saying that an internal political struggle is taking place in Lithuania—is a psychological warfare tactic. A new feature is certain subversion, and we must be careful about that. It was forecast last autumn in Leningrad that this winter a series of various accidents would take place. It has started here. Perhaps, these are minor incidents, but there is economic sabotage; there is a report from Griskabudis in Sakiai rayon. We must be careful about some strange, seemingly innocent, minor articles left on the streets that may explode when picked up, as happened in Klaipeda, where a box of matches exploded in a man's hand when he picked it up. This recalls some grim reports from the war in Afghanistan. In brief, people must be warned.

Our resistance, as I already said, is normal work and the restoration of damaged links. We can enjoy the fact that the second Lithuanian radio program will resume broadcasts this afternoon. Intensive political and diplomatic work is taking place. Bronius Kuzmickas and Emanuelis Zingeris today will participate in CSCE. We expect Russian Federation representatives in Vilnius today. We will improve and edit the Lithuanian-Russian treaty. Russia does not intend to capitulate to the threat of 1 February and its stand will be very important here, as well as in the whole great clash of democracy and totalitarianism.

There is news—it must be verified since it has been passed verbally—that the introduction of the army to Georgia was continuing now from the side of Sukhumi. It seems they are paratroopers.

The world knows with whom it has to deal. One must live both with bad systems and with dangerous partners. However, now there are fewer illusions about perestroyka and the Soviet Union's president.

A letter of support from the Czech writers' organization defines very accurately that, no matter what is said or speculated about the position of these forces in Moscow, Gorbachev is still responsible for these events and human sacrifices. This is the opinion of the Czech writers: The world cannot ignore this issue; we are still waiting for a reply to the question of who among the highly placed leaders sanctioned these actions and the style of these actions, which are compared to their experience, by the Czech writers, with the formula used by the Nazis: Nacht und Nebel Aktionen [Actions Covered by Night and Fog]. In their opinion, the third aggression—the first and second in Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1969, and now in the Baltic states—is a historical verdict about the Soviet Union's further existence. The writers say: We demand that any violence against the Baltic states be stopped if the Soviet Union is capable of remaining a civilized country.

Let us hope that it can become a civilized country. We will help as far as we can. We will help with our bearing and set a certain example for other oppressed people and those in danger.

Landsbergis Interviewed on Gorbachev Meeting

PM2901122691 Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Jan 91 p 13

[Interview with Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis by Laure Mandeville in Vilnius—date not given]

[Text] Vilnius—[Mandeville] Mikhail Gorbachev thinks that the Soviet people should settle their own internal problems and that the West should not interfere in what is happening in the Baltic republics. What is your view?

[Landsbergis] I agree that the Soviet people should settle their own affairs. But they should not interfere in the Lithuanian people's affairs.

[Mandeville] What are the results of your latest meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev's representatives?

[Landsbergis] I have met in particular with the USSR deputy general prosecutor who was sent here to investigate the events and the crimes committed in Vilnius. He examined the possibility of establishing cooperation with us in conducting that investigation.

[Mandeville] Do you now have hope of solving the current crisis by political means?

[Landsbergis] We do not see any other course. We want to solve this situation by political means, restoring law and justice. To do that, it is vital to determine who is responsible for the death of innocent people.

[Mandeville] What subjects will you discuss with Moscow's envoys in the future?

[Landsbergis] Still the same ones: We must identify those responsible for the 13 January aggression, demand the restoration of the occupied buildings, and secure normal working conditions for our news organs. We must also demand the withdrawal of the special troops sent here to punish us. Nobody understands what crimes we are being punished for.

[Mandeville] A general attack by the conservatives against democracy is taking shape in the USSR. In these conditions, how can Lithuania's legal government stand firm? What practical measures can you take?

[Landsbergis] We are still here. We are standing firm.

[Mandeville] But how can you achieve real independence?

[Landsbergis] In the same way as we have done so far: By establishing state structures, by building a rule-of-law state, by protecting the rights of our citizens irrespective of their nationality.

[Mandeville] What if there is another armed intervention?

[Landsbergis] What can I say? So far that armed force has not destroyed us. But how long can we withstand this pressure? The question does not just arise here. The whole of Russia is wondering how long it can hold out.

[Mandeville] What is your attitude to the thousands of people ready to take up arms to defend themselves?

[Landsbergis] We are peaceful people, we are very patient but our patience has limits. Our people now see the chance of finally achieving their freedom. They have already achieved inner freedom and it will therefore be difficult to turn them into slaves again.

[Mandeville] Gorbachev explained that the blood which was shed in Vilnius is the natural result of the discrimination exercised by the Lithuanians against the Russian military. Do you agree?

[Landsbergis] That is absolutely untrue. Why say such things? I do not know whether Gorbachev is basing his policy on this type of report because he has no others, or whether he knows full well what is happening but is deliberately using this slanderous propaganda.

[Mandeville] You have been trying to negotiate for more than a week. Has the political situation changed?

[Landsbergis] People are no longer being killed!

[Mandeville] Is there less risk of an attack on the legislature than before?

[Landsbergis] Yes at first glance, but our adversary is unpredictable, we never know what he will do.

[Mandeville] How useful was the mission sent by the Council of the Federation?

[Landsbergis] It enabled us to stay in contact with Gorbachev. It established the link between the military and our legislature. It probably prevented the provocations which could have led to an attack on the legislature.

[Mandeville] What is your view of Boris Yeltsin's political fight against Mikhail Gorbachev? Can a democratic front really be established with the support of Boris Yeltsin's Russia?

[Landsbergis] This front will be developed sooner or later. The fate of many peoples will depend on their ability to unite, not just in the USSR but throughout the world.

[Mandeville] What do you expect from the West?

[Landsbergis] The West must understand that they must now choose between the Soviet empire and democracy. For the Western countries, it was customary and comfortable to regard the USSR as a united state, to maintain relations with a single government and, to a large extent, with a single man. But this comfortable position led to moral and political concessions which could cost your governments very dear. However, I think that this policy is losing its credibility. The Western countries realize that such a path is fraught with difficulties.

[Mandeville] Is it possible to build an independent Lithuania without having armed forces? Is this not an essential attribute of sovereignty?

[Landsbergis] Existing as an independent state requires minimal armed forces for the protection of borders and maintaining law and order. But, when it comes to defending independence as is the case now, it is impossible to do it without an army. In 1918 and 1920, when we were fighting for our independence against four burdensome neighbors, Lithuania had to create its own armed forces. First, an army of volunteers, then a real army.

It was only then that we were able to protect ourselves from the Red Army to the east, the White Army to the north, from Poland and from the Germans who refused to leave. Now, we have our own armed forces in this legislature. They are people who have sworn an oath and who are soldiers. I would be happy not to have to increase their number.

[Mandeville] Is there a "Polish question" in Lithuania?

[Landsbergis] Yes and no. There is a Polish minority on which the Communist Party is working. The Polish question was created under the Communist regime, which always discriminated against the Poles. We have begun to change that situation by opening Polish schools and theaters.... By allowing people to live as they wish. It is true that the Poles were unhappy with the law on the Lithuanian language which gives them three years to learn Lithuanian. We have decided to extend the period, to make a concession.

[Mandeville] Moscow is still demanding a referendum on independence. Will you eventually give in?

[Landsbergis] Moscow can make its own demands. We are dealing with our affairs. What we intend to hold in February is an opinion poll, but certainly not a referendum as the Kremlin is proposing.

[Mandeville] Two weeks after the event, how do you view the price increase orchestrated by Kazimiera Prunskiene, your former prime minister?

[Landsbergis] I am tempted to think that she did not realize the consequences of such a price reform. She had just returned from a long foreign trip. She made the mistake of supporting a sudden large price increase hitting the workers hard. However, we had warned her that, because of the 15 January Gulf ultimatum an attempt at political destabilization in Lithuania was entirely likely. We told her that there was a need for caution.

[Mandeville] A mysterious "National Salvation Committee" almost brought down your legislature, do you have additional information on this organization?

[Landsbergis] No, none. We may one day realize that it never existed.

Landsbergis Cited on Postponed U.S.-Soviet Summit

LD2901224991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2020 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpts] The U.S. consul general in Leningrad, Richard Miles, and Consul Robert Peterson arrived in Vilnius today. The U.S. consul general in Leningrad introduced Peterson to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council. He [Peterson] has been authorized to spend two weeks in Lithuania to follow the situation.

During the course of the meeting, the visitors were briefed on the illegal actions of Soviet military forces in Lithuania and the political situation.

Richard Miles informed Vytautas Landsbergis in more (?detail) about the meetings of U.S. President George Bush and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker with USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh. [passage omitted]

Vytautas Landbergis, upon hearing the news from Washington, stated: I hope the postponement of this meeting will not stimulate the Soviet militarists to rush into those actions projected in the order of Dmitriy Yazov and Boris Pugo concerning the introduction of military patrols [words indistinct].

Landsbergis Receives Bulgarian Deputies

LD2801213191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1600 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Summary] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, has received a group of deputies of the Bulgarian National Assembly comprising deputies representing various political forces of the republic.

The guests said the events in Vilnius have grieved Bulgarians; protest meetings and mourning has taken place in the republic. The president of Bulgaria and government representatives expressed their opinion on the actions carried out by the Soviet military forces in Lithuania.

The declaration on the killings of civilians in Vilnius, adopted by the Bulgarian Assembly, was brought to Lithuanian by the visiting group of deputies.

The deputies stressed that the military aggression against Lithuania is a dangerous return of Stalinism. They said they are sure that Lithuania will be free and independent.

Paper Criticizes Landsbergis Statement on Army

PM2901142791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Statement by the Head of the Legislature"]

[Text] Vilnius, 24 Jan—"Evil, inhuman terror is reigning in Lithuania," V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, affirmed at a sitting of the Supreme Council where he spoke about the political situation in Lithuania.

He informed deputies that he had appealed to G. Tarazevich, the USSR presidential envoy, who was in Lithuania, for a clarification of why, "despite the USSR president's statements about the inadmissibility of using the Soviet Army for the protection of the interests of any organizations or committees, subunits of the Soviet Army are continuing their arbitrary activity." He expressed indignation that yesterday "the military seized another building and the material valuables in it and drove out the workers who were there, threatening them with weapons." However, he did not specify that the building (a warehouse for newsprint and printing ink) belongs to the Lithuanian Communist Party and has been taken under protection in accordance with the USSR Presidential Decree "On Measures for the Protection of the Inviolability of Property Rights in the USSR."

The head of the legislature also made it clear that it was none other than the military who were to blame for "the abduction of the student Mindaugas Yuzukonis yesterday." At the same time no proof was presented to back up this statement.

"Again the words and deeds of the Soviet leadership are essentially at variance," V. Landsbergis concluded, asking the question: "To whom does power belong in the Soviet Union?"

Broaching the subject of the collaboration that is being set up between the Lithuanian Republic General Prosecutor's Office and the USSR Prosecutor's Office group for the investigation of the tragic events in Vilnius on the night of 12 January, V. Landsbergis stressed the need to "establish who is financing and feeding the detachment of terrorists who organized and carried out the bloodshed," and demanded that "the question be asked about the form and sources of finances given to false organizations." It remained unclear if he had in mind the illegal armed formations who opened fire first outside the television tower in Vilnius 13 January, or some other illegally formed armed detachments of fighters.

Lithuania Adopts Statement on Diplomatic Treaties

LD2901213991 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent K. Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius January 30 TASS—The republican parliament Tuesday adopted "the statement on the Lithuanian Republic's obligations ensuing from international treaties on diplomatic and consular law".

Addressing the plenary meeting, Lithuanian parliament President Vytautas Landsbergis noted that "days of international and diplomatic recognition of the Lithuanian state are approaching" and that "the Lithuanian Republic will respect and honestly fulfill all international obligations".

Speaking about the situation in Lithuania, Landsbergis said that "violence with the gravest consequences is continuing against Lithuania. Civilians are dying or being wounded virtually every day". He called on residents "to display caution, especially during night-time".

He told legislators that a parliamentary delegation from the Russian Federation is expected to come Tuesday. Together with Lithuanian colleagues, it will continue work to improve the bilateral treaty's text.

Supreme Council Delegation Departs for Moscow

LD2901204491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2000 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Council delegation for negotiations with the Russian Federation departed for Moscow today. The delegation is headed by Supreme Council Deputy Chairman Ceslovas Stankevicius.

TASS Charges Lithuanian Press 'Disinformation'

LD2801173691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1605 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Anatoliy Aladinskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Jan (TASS)—You cannot help recalling the saying attributed to Confucius that has become a classic: "There is no point in looking for a black cat in a dark room, especially if it is not there." Not so long ago, at the very height of the events in the Baltics, which have stunned the whole country, the following report was published in the REPUBLICA newspaper, which is published in Lithuania: "TASS has issued information which states that Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, and Godmanis, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, went to see USSR President Gorbachev and asked him to introduce presidential rule in Latvia."

The paper then confidently goes on to give its own "verdict" in the form of what it calls "TASS disinformation." To give this conviction it publishes a protest of the Latvian Foreign Ministry on this matter.

Who, in fact, is the disinformer here?

On Monday, 21 January, under the heading 'A Deputy's Supposition,' TASS issued a report on a news conference given by A. Denisov, chairman of the Ethics Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in which he made a supposition that (we quote from the teletype) "Tomorrow a meeting will take place between USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and the Latvian leaders A. Gorbunovs and I. Godmanis, following which the head of the Soviet state may announce the introduction of presidential rule in the republic."

The chairman of the commission who headed the delegation of the country's legislature which was in Latvia from 17-20 January to study the situation had every right to express his opinion about the development of events in the republic. Indeed, many papers carried their own reports from the news conference, quoting what the deputy said. In his words "even the leaders of the republics do not object to presidential rule as long as a number of conditions are observed."

Of course, in neither the newspapers nor in the TASS report is there a single word (indeed there could not be) to the effect that the leaders of the republics, having seen the president, made "a request to bring in presidential rule."

So what do the writers of such "loose translations," to put it mildly, from the original usually count on? First of all of course, on the uninformed leader or viewer. Perhaps they'll take the bait...

But a person who is used even to glancing through papers representing a reasonably wide political range of opinions and not a one-sided position can quickly and easily establish the ignoble role of the genuine purveyors of disinformation. It seems that their diligence knows no end.

The Lithuanian paper of the Democratic Party of Labor TIESA has even started a permanent column "Tradition of Disinformation," having decided to "intensively unmask the lies flowing daily over Lithuania." Where does it think it can see these "lies"? Is it not in those publications that they are trying to dig down to the truth which, as is known, lies unpalatable on the surface?

The republic's news agency reported recently that this and other papers of the Lithuanian mass media had published a rebuttal by the local procuracy of the TASS report. But what did they "find it guilty of" this time? Of the fact that the teletype carried a report about "the death on 13 January of USSR KGB officer Viktor Shatskiy, who had put on the uniform of a marine and who allegedly was left to languish neglected in hospital after a shot from the crowd."

And once again we have this chasing after "a black cat in a dark room." It does not matter that the telegraphic agency did not transmit anything of the kind. They are again counting on the gullible reader "pecking" at a stale propaganda canard. In such a situation, it is clearly useless appealing to journalistic ethics or elementary decency.

By all accounts, this orientation toward "exposure of disinformation" has been well programmed. It did not stop there, either. Even the official authorities did not refrain from juggling with the facts. For example, the following confirmation was made in a statement by the Lithuanian legislature on republican radio: "On 13 January, TASS reported that only two people had been killed." It then goes on to conclude: "The Soviet mass media is tendentiously playing down the number of victims."

Here too the official 'blindness' clearly proved to have been well thought out. Indeed, in the very first hours after the tragedy in Vilnius it was reported that "unfortunately, as a result of the clash, there are casualties. According to preliminary data, two people have been killed and 32 wounded." But two hours later the news agency, referring to the Lithuanian minister of health Yu. Olekas clarified: "13 people have died; two of them died in the hospital as a result of injuries received; 112 people have been wounded."

Now someone or other, as they say, plainly does not wish to see this last clarification, made incidentally in keeping with international news practice. It is obvious—it does not pay...

The scenario for all these 'exposes' is already painfully familiar. All that is required is the exacerbation of the political situation in one region or another when, prompted by those political forces striving headlong for power, but not always capable of keeping the situation as a whole under control, a wave of attacks on the press is born and a "search for black cats" begins.

So, is it worth blaming the mirror?

TASS Issues Rebuttal of Disinfomation Accusation

91UN0777D Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

["Statement of TASS Journalistic Organization"—MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The newspapers MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA of 16 January carry a statement by the presidium of the Moscow Union of Journalists with respect to the events in Lithuania. In this statement, TASS is accused of biased presentation of information leading to the aggravation and arousal of national discord.

In this connection, the TASS journalistic organization declares that such a serious accusation against TASS journalists does not conform to the facts. We express our disagreement with the evaluation of the work of the agency that is presented in the statement of the Presidium of the Moscow Union of Journalists that was approved by a poll. It is difficult to say what guided the authors of the statement, but obviously it was not a striving for objectivity. Unfortunately, it is necessary to state that the Presidium of the Moscow Union of Journalists did not take pains before the publication of the statement to acquaint itself with the materials of the TASS correspondents and the agency as a whole in reports on the events in the Baltics, of which more than 300 were issued in the last three days alone. As a result, the statement contains assertions that do not correspond to reality.

We would like to inform the journalists of the capital that one of the members of the Presidium of the SZHM [Moscow Union of Journalists], specifically TASS journalist G. Petrov, is in Lithuania and transmits objective information every day.

In the Baltics, as in other regions of the planet, TASS sets as its sole objective—to report in a timely and accurate way on events that are taking place. Any other interpretation of the work of the agency is not honest.

Lithuanian Referendum Preparation Reported

PM2901144591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Lashkevich and Aleksandr Protsenko under the "Direct Link" rubric: "Lithuania: Preparation for Poll of Population"]

[Text] Vilnius—As is well-known, the general poll of the republic's population will be held 9 February. During the Lithuanian Supreme Council plenary session on Monday the electoral commission, with the deputies' agreement, adopted a new formulation for the poll, included in the bulletin. The title is as follows: "General poll of the inhabitants on Lithuania's independence." And the question itself is: "Are you in favor of the Lithuanian state being an independent democratic republic?" The answer must be "yes" or "no."

The republican electoral commission, which sat last Sunday, has decided to include in the poll Lithuanian citizens who are abroad, in missions of Moscow and Estonia. It has become known that Swedish legislators will come to Lithuania as observers. The forthcoming poll has given rise to keen objections from organizations and movements associated with the Communist Party of Lithuania. Thus, the Socialist Federation of Working people has called the poll "a new political trap" and urged the USSR president to declare it illegal.

The Lithuanian Supreme Council in these days before the poll has been making vigorous efforts to bring the republic's foreign language-speaking population over to its side. On Sunday the Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium gathered for a sitting with the participation of the Polish deputies' faction. In the very near future it is planned to make a number of substantial additions and amendments to those laws which affect the interests of national minorities.

As Ch. Stankyavichyus, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, stated on radio, the future reform of the republic's administrative division will take account of the wishes of the inhabitants of Lithuania to live in compact groups. A new territorial unit—the okrug—will probably be created. It provides for the equal functioning of other languages alongside the state language. When he receives a new passport everyone who wants to may insert his surname without Lithuanian suffixes. The session also decided to prepare by the end of April a special program for national minorities which will lift the barriers on the path of studying in their native language in higher educational establishments.

"There were no fundamental differences," Ch. Stankyavichyus stated. "The main thing remains—implementing these good plans in practice."

Navigational Malfunction Cited in Bombing

LD2901193191 Moscow TASS in English 1856 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow January 29 TASS—The press centre of the Soviet Defence Ministry reported today that a Su-24 jet piloted by Lieutenant Colonel V. Podkorytov dropped a bomb during a training flight on Monday under difficult weather conditions.

The bomb exploded 150 meters from a farm in the vicinity of Paskiskis [name as received] village, Salcininkai district in Lithuania. There were no casualties.

A water main and the farm's roof damaged by the explosion were repaired.

Reasons for the bomb drop are not clear for the time being. In the opinion of specialists, the bomb drop outside a testing ground could be caused by the malfunction of the plane's navigational equipment.

A commission is working to investigate this event.

Fires at Mazeikiai Oil Refinery Cause Concern

LD2901111691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0930 GMT 29 Jan 91

[From the "Crime Chronicle" program]

[Text] We are concerned about fires at the Mazeikiai oil refinery. We received a report from the refinery this morning saying that fiber wool used for insulation at the oil loading platform had caught fire. I have lost count of the fires there have been in recent months, so I cannot say where this comes in the series.

Latvian Salvation Committee Suspends Power Quest

LD2901215891 Moscow TASS in English 2143 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga January 30 TASS—The All-Latvia Social Salvation Committee has announced that it "suspends its consent to assume power functions in the republic".

A committee statement circulated here today explains this step by "the show of goodwill" and "response to the USSR president's wish" as well as by a desire to clear the way to dialogue. The statement expresses hope "for similar steps on the part of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Citizens" of Latvia.

At the same time the statement emphasises that the committee "proceeds from the principled position" ruling out a violent way for the advent of any political force to power.

The All-Latvia Social Salvation Committee was set up in November last year by a decision of a number of Latvia's public organisations and movements that come out in favour of keeping Latvia as part of the USSR.

A statement issued by the committee two weeks ago about the transition of all state power of the republic into its hands was regarded by Latvian President Anatolijs Gorbunovs as "anti-constitutional". His opinion is that the statement strongly destabilised the situation in the republic.

Latvian, Estonian Leaders Meet Germany's Genscher

LD2901141691 Moscow TASS in English 1353 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Samozhnev] txt [Text] Bonn January 29 TASS—German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on Monday [28 Jan] received Latvian and Estonian Foreign Ministers Janis Jurkans and Lennart Meri.

Genscher emphasised that Germans were interested in the peaceful development of the situation in the Baltic republics and strongly opposed violence there, the German Foreign Ministry reports.

He said that all problems should be solved through dialogue and negotiations on the basis of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The new European realities should have as their bedrock human rights observance, democracy and peoples' right to self-determination, Genscher said.

Jurkans Reaches 'Understanding'

LD2901224391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1607 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sosnovskiy]

[Text] Bonn, 29 Jan (TASS)—"There is complete understanding of the problems of the Baltic republics." That was how Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans summed up the results of his conversations and talks with German politicians. During the course of the visit he was received by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the FRG foreign minister, and he had meetings with Willi Brandt, Honorary Chancellor of the Social Democratic party, Otto Lambsdorff, chairman of the Free Democratic Party, Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union faction in the Bundestag, and others.

J. Jurkans spoke at a news conference today at which, among other things, he introduced Andreis Urdze, "the plenipotentiary of the Latvian Government in the FRG." The minister stated that the Latvian Government has endorsed him in this office.

Western assistance is very important to us to avoid further bloodshed in the USSR, the Baltic states and Latvia, the minister said. The Baltic states, he said, "have always been a motive force of the democratic processes in the USSR." At the same time he pointed out that of no less importance is support for the Baltics from the democratic forces in Russia and the other republics, a manifestation of which were the massive demonstrations of solidarity in Moscow, Leningrad and other cities.

The minister called for a solution to the problems of the Baltics at the international level. He welcomed the fact that Western reaction to the recent incidents in Vilnius and Riga was quick and unambiguous.

Replying to journalists' questions, J. Jurkans stated that, in his opinion, "perestroyka in the USSR is in no way an illusion," but this process cannot function "from the top down." People must gradually accustom themselves to the rules of democracy.

Gorbunovs on Supreme Soviet Deputies Meeting

LD2901162991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1446 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 29 Jan (TASS)—Latvian legislature Chairman Anatolijs Gorbunovs held a news conference in the Latvian Supreme Soviet today. Its theme was yesterday's six-hour meeting between deputies and leaders of the Latvian legislature and the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

In Gorbunovs' words, during the discussion on the prospects for talks between Latvia and the USSR, the representatives of the Soviet legislature reported on the decree of the country's president which is being prepared on talks on this issue. The head of the Latvian legislature described as "interesting" the view expressed by Rafik Nishanov that these talks should be held on the basis of clauses in the USSR and Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitutions and with respect for the 4 May declaration of Latvian independence. At the same time, Gorbunovs reported, Nishanov categorically denied the possibility of examining the Baltic issue in international terms.

Touching upon the possibility of holding a referendum in the republic, the head of the Latvian legislature noted that the conditions for it "should be defined exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Republic." In Gorbunovs' view, all permanent residents of Latvia should participate in a referendum. Having noted that the legislative bodies of Lithuania and Estonia have already defined their attitude regarding a referendum, Gorbunovs said that all political organizations in Latvia should express their views on this issue.

In response to journalists' questions about the recently published order of the USSR Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs on joint patrols, Gorbunovs noted his "contradictory" attitude towards this document. On this subject, he referred to the guarantee given by Colonel General Fedor Kuzmin, the commander of forces in the Baltic military district—who was also present at the meeting with the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation—that from 1 February the number of patrols and their composition in the republic will not be changed, and that armored troop carriers will not be used with the joint patrols.

Latvian People's Front Discusses Nishanov Visit

LD2901233391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1400 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpt] At this morning's session of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia the LTF [People's Front of Latvia] faction evaluated the results of the talks held yesterday with Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities.

The most important thing was that he reported about the USSR's formations of three delegations for talks with the Baltic republics, that in addition to the USSR-Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution he has a respectful attitude toward our 4 May Declaration, and he asserted that the president's decree on joint patrols in Latvia by the Army and the militia will not be implemented with the assistance of military equipment. Next, he noted dissatisfaction in the fact that the Baltics had sought and found political support in the West.

However, the purpose of his journey was to achieve an agreement that here, at the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, a work coordination commission will be created between the two factions, and that the Equal Rights faction will return to the hall.

This afternoon two deputies of the opposition faction, Safonov and Bartashevich, came to the Supreme Council. On behalf of their faction they reported that they support the formation of the consultative coordination commission between the factions, and they requested that five named deputies be included in this commission. There could only be a difference of opinions on whether the leaders of both factions should be in this commission. They offered to begin work even tomorrow, 30 January, in the Supreme Councils permanent commissions. When the coordination commission has drawn up the agenda to be recommended for the plenary sessions, Safonov said, they will also attend them.

However, in discussing this announcement, the deputies from the LTF faction said that this interpretation is arbitrary because it is not being considered that this commission will determine the agenda for plenary sessions. This is determined by the Presidium; this has been well-known until now. This commission should in the first place merely recommend any proposals to be examined at the plenary session. In order to create such a commission at all, as the LTF faction's deputies said, the status of such a commission must be determined first. So then recommendations to the Supreme Council, and not a mandate to it, are forming the foundations.

As a result of the debate, the deputies rejected these new demands by the opposition faction. Anatolijs Gorbunovs, for instance, said that since the leaders of the two factions had not jointly agreed on the course of examining this question at a plenary session, examination of this question here must be discontinued. It was decided by a vote that the faction leaders will meet to discuss the scheme of forming the coordination commission, on how this would be discussed first among the factions and only then at a plenary session, in order to find a working mechanism for such a consultative commission for coordinating the work of the factions. [passage omitted]

Gorbunovs Discusses Referendum, Army Relations

LD2901184691 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1605 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpt] Arrangements for the referendum and the possibilities for holding it should be determined by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Council, announced today at a news conference in parliament. Permanent residents of the republic will participate in the referendum. Various forms are possible for servicemen's participation in this referendum.

Concerning relations with the Army, Anatolijs Gorbunovs noted that very good relations have been established with Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District. Agreement has been achieved that [word indistinct] transport will not take part in patrolling. Replying to a question on whether he envisages army interference in tackling political questions, Gorbunovs said that until now Fedor Kuzmin has kept his word. Of course, this cannot be guaranteed. [passage omitted]

Further on Gorbunovs Remarks

LD3001010391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 2200 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Remarks by Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council, during a news conference in Riga on 29 January—recorded]

[Text] [Gorbunovs] I am also worried about what the results of this referendum could be and also how it could generally influence the further development of our state.

I fully understand the negative attitude of Latvian exile organizations toward a referendum, but I am even more worried as we remain on this undefined formula: the USSR Constitution, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Constitution, the 4 May declaration. With this formula we would not have a point of support for how to proceed further, because everything concerning our history has been stated in the 4 May declaration. Because of this alone, the Republic of Latvia will not become an independent state, and there are fewer citizens (?of this independence).

And, secondly, I have certain worries that Lithuania and Estonia have already expressed their position. Yesterday the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Estonia adopted a resolution on a ballot—quote, referendum, unquote—by the people. And the question will, of course, be further examined by the Supreme Council. Therefore, I am for all of our public-political movements and organizations to seriously consider this question and express their positions, all the fors and againsts.

What concerns the Army then, despite the, I consider, the very good relations with the commander of the Baltic Military District, I cannot give any guarantees, because the Army acts on orders.

[Unidentified correspondent] How long should a person reside in Latvia before becoming a permanent inhabitant?

[Gorbunovs] The status of a permanent inhabitant has not been juridically formulated. It is accepted here to regard as a permanent inhabitant one who resides here and who has a permanent registration of abode. This standpoint of mine is based upon quite a simple consideration: either all the permanent inhabitants of Latvia will democratically form an independent state, or, there will not be such an independent state, because half the inhabitants of Latvia cannot form an independent state by themselves without the other half.

[Correspondent] Do you have worries about the joint (?patrols) in Riga beginning with the 1 February, and do you also worry about a split at the Ministry of Interior?

[Gorbunovs] Of course, there is worry. Yesterday, in discussing this question with Nishanov and the Commander Kuzmin, we came to the conclusion that the armored personnel carriers, as it is envisaged in this order, will not be used in patrolling. As Colonel General Kuzmin explained the patrols themselves will not differ in any way from patrols that are already present.

I would only like to note my view that until now Col. Gen. Kuzmin has kept his word in the agreements we have reached.

The second question, concerning the split in the militia. Yesterday we met for four hours with the militia of Riga. We examined all the questions raised by the Riga militia, and I have grounds to believe that there will not be a split in the Riga militia.

Gorbunovs Invited to Federation Council Session

LD3001111291 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1000 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Excerpt] A plenary session is now taking place at the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia. In the morning Anatolijs Gorbunovs informed those present that he has been invited to take part in the 1 February session of the USSR Council of the Federation at which one of the central items on the agenda could be connected with the situation in the Baltics. Yesterday, members of the Supreme Council's Presidium agreed to the visit. Nevertheless, Anatolijs Gorbunovs regarded it as necessary to consult the participants in the plenary session and asked for a resolution to be adopted by the end of the day, and also for deputies' standpoints to be expressed on what our republic's position should be and what are the principle arguments in defending the interests of the Republic of Latvia at the expected USSR Council of the Federation session.

After that, at the plenary session where 96 deputies registered today, the agenda was discussed. [passage omitted]

Latvian Official on Independence, Gorbachev Talks

AU2901160391 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 25 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with Vilish Kruminsh, adviser to the Latvian premier, by Lubos Kriz; place and date not given: "Barricades—for How Long?"—first paragraph is VEREJNOST introduction]

[Text] Riga—According to the information provided by Vilish Kruminsh, adviser to the Latvian premier, Riga was analyzing the meeting between Gorbunov and Gorbachev yesterday.

[Kriz] Are there still barricades in Riga?

[Kruminsh] The Supreme Soviet discussed whether the barricades in the center of Riga should be removed. Gorbunov said that after the Moscow talks the barricades should be removed, provided Moscow will respect its promises. Since there are no tangible guarantees for this, the most important barricades will remain in place. Some less important barricades will be dismantled tomorrow.

[Kriz] What new factors have emerged from the analysis of the Moscow talks?

[Kruminsh] In fact, there was no discussion about presidential rule—Gorbachev only asked whether they counted on his help during consolidation. Instead, he stressed [the issue of] human rights a number of times. This sounded quite paradoxical, however. A new factor is that Gorbunovs admitted the possibility of holding a referendum. The legislature has yet to decide on it.

[Kriz] What should the referendum comprise?

[Kruminsh] This should be decided by the legislature—it should pertain to the independence of Latvia.

[Kriz] The greatest problem is who will be allowed to vote....

[Kruminsh] ....yes, there are a number of opinions. My opinion is that all original inhabitants of Latvia, irrespective of their nationality, should have the right to vote, plus a certain number of citizens over the age of 15 residing here.

[Kriz] What do you mean under the term "original citizens"?

[Kruminsh] Citizens who lived here until June 1940, their descendants, and spouses. In order to show you a clear picture, I have to say that 80 percent of the immigrants have been living here for more than 15 years.

[Kriz] Does this mean that the remaining 20 percent would not be allowed to stay here after Latvia is declared to be independent?

[Kruminsh] Not at all. They would have all the rights, except the right to vote. They will be granted this right only after they are granted Latvian citizenship. For your information: Many people who are returning from prisons from all over the USSR are settling right here, because we have the highest standard of living here.

[Kriz] What are the newest reports from Riga?

[Kruminsh] According to the sociological research, 94 percent of Latvians and 72 percent of other nationalities are in favor of independence. Another piece of news pertains to the ten people who took the Black Berets to prison during the attack on Sunday. If they are not found guilty of violating the law within ten days, they will be released. On Friday, a funeral of the victims of the attack on the Latvian Ministry of the Interior will take place in a large cemetery in a forest. The funeral is supposed to be a grandiose one.

Split in Estonian Communist Party 'Completed'

LD2901222191 Moscow TASS in English 2157 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[Text] Tallinn January 30 TASS—The split in the Estonian Communist movement was completed after the congress of the Independent Estonian Communist Party, the plenary meeting of the Estonian Communist Party (supporting the platform of the Soviet Communist Party) noted here on Tuesday.

A decision by the plenary meeting stresses that documents adopted by the Independent Communist Party are inconsistent and contradictory. The party is increasingly isolating itself from the Communist movement.

This is corroborated by its support for the policy of the Estonian parliament and government for the restoration of the bourgeois republic outside the Soviet Union, which would maintain only economic relations with the USSR and Union republics.

The meeting stated that a new party was set up in Estonia, which retained the name "Communist" only for tactical reasons.

The plenum suggested that the CPSU Central Committee determine its attitude to the Communist movement in Estonia and immediately send a commission to the republic to settle questions concerning the registration of Communists and stock-taking of the CPSU'S property.

The meeting adopted an address to Estonian Communists.

'Autonomous' Party Declared

PM2901170391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Leonid Levitskiy: "Confrontation Persists"]

[Text] Tallinn—The autonomous Estonian Communist Party was officially proclaimed Saturday [26 January]—part of the republic's political system with its own statutes, program, and membership.

The congress (287 delegates represented the new party's 5,000 or so members at it) elected the Estonian Communist Party's leadership organ and ratified a number of documents. It is typical that only 52 percent of the delegates have already registered their membership of the autonomous Communist Party. So, dual membership—of the CPSU and the Estonian Communist Party—will continue.

The conflict between the interests of the Estonian republic and the USSR is the reason for the split and the creation of two Communist organizations. This was said outright at the congress. The Estonian Communist Party proclaimed that in its policy it will proceed on the basis of the interests of the republic's permanent population.

The term "permanent residents" is also being actively introduced into statements by Estonia's officials and in various documents. But since its substance is unclear, a large proportion of the Russian-speaking population treats the new category extremely cautiously. This was also manifested during the meeting between A. Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and members of the coordinating committee who back the republic strike, now into its 10th day.

Supreme Soviet leaders should have given the striking collectives a concrete response. But during a two-hour meeting both sides once again maintained their positions. The only real positive step was the discussion of the possibility of setting up a conciliation commission. Confrontation between the government and labor collectives persists. Enterprises in Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, and Sillamae are involved in the strike.

Stockholm Paper Interviews Estonia's Savisaar

PM2901102991 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 27 Jan 91 p 8

[Report on undated interview with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar by Mert Kubu: "Fears of a Coup in Tallinn"]

[Text] Tallinn—"The risk of tough new attacks on the Estonian Government is very great, but I do not think that anything serious will happen before the meeting between Bush and Gorbachev on 13 February. However, after that I expect dramatic attempts to topple the government," Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar said.

"Our opponents in the Intermovement, however, have not learned much. They are using the same old tactics. They try to whip up discontent, they complain about prices, talk about human rights, arrange a few explosions, a few murders occur; they want to show that chaos rules and that the Army must intervene and some sort of salvation committee take over," Savisaar explained.

The interview with Prime Minister Savisaar took place in a magnificent anteroom connected to his office in the palace on Toompea Hill. He has a very bad cold and ought really to be at home recovering, his staff told me.

[Kubu] What sort of relations does the Estonian Government have with the Soviet Army in Estonia?

[Savisaar] I think that they obey what the central government in Moscow decides. If they receive the order they will take over the legislature building on Toompea Hill. But I do not think that they will do anything on their own initiative.

[Kubu] President Gorbachev has promised negotiations at the highest level on Estonia's future. They were to have been held within the next few days.

[Savisaar] He promised the negotiations on three occasions last year. He does so every time international talks are on the horizon. We will have to see how it will be this time. The time of promises is past.

[Kubu] How dangerous are the local combat groups which the Russian Intermovement is using as a threat?

[Savisaar] They exist, but without the Army they will do nothing. At least they are not a threat to us on Toompea Hill.

[Kubu] How much does the political crisis damage foreign enterprise in Estonia and joint venture enterprises?

[Savisaar] In the past Estonia has been among the most stable regions in the east. It is clear that bombings and murders frighten people off. We will be able to manage a few months more, but no longer. However, I hope that by then we will have gotten over the crisis.

[Kubu] How much does Sweden's support for Estonia and the Baltic region mean—for example, Foreign Ministry Under Secretary of State Pierre Schori's visit?

[Savisaar] We value highly the friends who come when times are hard and not only when we have song festivals. Alongside Iceland and Norway, Sweden is the country that is in the forefront of support for the Baltic region. This has very clearly had some effect in Moscow.

[Kubu] Do you think that the Swedish attitude to the Baltic region has changed?

[Savisaar] Yes, the change is tangible.

[Kubu] There has been a threat from Moscow that from 1 February military patrols will patrol the the streets of all major cities.

[Savisaar] That would mean that the military would be given the power to carry out house searches, check people's documents, and behave like policemen. In Moscow I approached Prime Minister Pavlov and asked him to prevent anything like that in Estonia. I said that it would mean that we are on the road to military dictatorship. He has promised to look into it.

[Kubu] There are around 9,000 Estonian boys who are now in hiding to avoid military service in the Soviet Army. How great is the risk that they will be forced into service?

[Savisaar] We have so far succeeded in preventing this through negotiations, but I am afraid that within the next few weeks the Soviet military will start hunting them. I am really afraid that this will happen and that they will start to hunt for the boys. Not simply to get them into the Soviet Army, but to destabilize the situation.

In Lithuania and Latvia they arresting boys on the streets without worrying about whether they were even old enough for military service.

Savisaar Says Army in Estonia 'Being Observed'

LD2901122991 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpts] Here on Toompea the Supreme Soviet started work at 1000. [passage omitted]

The prime minister went up to the rostrum first. Edgar Savisaar said that Army movements are being observed to obtain information. The Army itself has not provided corresponding information to the republican government. [passage omitted]

Estonia's Ruutel on Upcoming Swiss Economic Quorom

LD3001095591 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 0700 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Interview with Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium, by an unidentified correspondent in Moscow; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpt] In Moscow, before flying off to Switzerland, Mr. Arnold Ruutel explained the aims of his visit.

[Begin Ruutel recording] Last September I received an invitation to the worldwide economic quorum as a guest of honor. As is known, heads of state or persons in second or third place in a state are always invited there as guests of honor. [passage omitted] And within the past couple of weeks I have also received proposals from representatives of several major European states to meet and exchange ideas both on political and economic issues. So, those three or four days have been planned—the quorum will evidently be on a tight schedule—and yet at the same time evidently there will be numerous opportunities to exchange ideas with leaders or representatives of different states on our Baltic issue, as well as on our Estonian topical political and economic problems. [end recording]

Estonia's Ruutel To Visit U.S. 'Soon'

LD3001111691 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Summary] A political observer notes that having been received by Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador, today, Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, is due to visit the United States soon and meet George Bush.

'Lysenko's Hitmen' 'Inciting Tension' in Tallinn

LD2901122591 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpts] As is known, last night in Tallinn near the Drama Theater a three-strong military patrol was seen getting out of a military vehicle, armed with truncheons. They gave a fright to the people waiting for a bus in Kentman Street. A two-strong patrol armed with truncheons was bothering people at Kotka Street, in Tondi. It was noted that the patrolmen did not wear the traditional armbands.

In order to throw light on the matter I telephoned Vice Admiral Yuriy Belov, commander of Tallinn Garrison. The admiral replied that they had not dispatched the patrols. Having learned of the negative attitude of the Republic of Estonia Government and Supreme Soviet to the two USSR ministers' directive, according to which militia and Army are due to start joint patrols of cities from 1 February, they approached the command of the Baltic Navy with a proposal to continue with garrison duties as before. Permission for this was granted, so that Tallinn Garrison will behave loyally in the future, too. [passage omitted]

And so we can take it that those nighttime patrolmen inciting tension were from the Dvigatel construction batallion, and Lysenko's hitmen. So let us continue to be careful in the streets.

Estonian Radio Director Protests 'Jamming' Claim

LD2701143191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0822 GMT 27 Jan 91

[Report by Moscow Radio correspondent Andrey Trapeznikov from Tallinn]

[Excerpt] [Taneznikov] I began my working day today by calling the duty officer at the republic's internal affairs directorate. He told me that the night had passed peacefully. I asked him what he thought about the joint order of the ministers of defense and internal affairs on the institution, from 1 February, of joint patrols on the streets of republican capitals by militia and the Army. It serves no purpose, was his answer.

As I have now been in Estonia for some time, I will tell you my own view. The implementation of this order may not only destabilize the situation here—it will certainly cause additional friction between the republic and the center. By the way, Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Estonian Government, has already said that he will work for the abolition of the order on Estonian territory.

Peeter Sookruus, director-general of Radio Estonia, has sent a protest to the USSR State Television and Radio Committee and to Leningrad Television over material by Aleksandr Nevzorov on the situation in the republic. The protest rejects claims made by Nevzorov, particularly, that the Intermovement radio station Nadezhda is the only source of radio broadcasting in Russian, and that its transmissions are subjected to jamming. Statements made by Nevzorov that the moment the last soldier leaves Estonia the blood of the Russian people will be spilt are provocative, the protest note says. They also insult the Estonian people and aggravate confrontation between peoples. Estonian Radio has demanded an explanation for these statements. [passage omitted]

Claim Called 'Crude Falsification'

LD2901135291 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 26 Jan 91

[Text] Peeter Sookruus, general director of Estonian Radio, has sent a protest letter to the USSR State Television and Radio Committee, to Leningrad Television, and to the Leningrad Council. It says that on 23 January Leningrad Television broadcast a "600 seconds" program in the course of which announcer Aleksandr Nevzorov presented a crude falsification. According to what the announcer said, the Nadezhda radio station is being jammed. In fact no radio transmitter is being jammed on Estonian territory.

According to tests, the zone of good reception for the Nadezhda radio station is 80 to 100 kilometers. The radio station is located on an Army unit's securely guarded territory, with civilians having no access. For this reason civilians are no threat to the radio station, as Nevzorov is trying to claim. According to the announcer's claim, Nadezhda is the only Russian-speaking radio station in the republic. In fact, Estonian Radio broadcasts 5.5 hours of Russian-language programs in any 24 hours. Nevzorov did not even attempt to get in touch with Estonian Radio [words indistinct]. There are also radio stations working in the republic that relay the first all-Union program, the Mayak station, and the third all-Union program.

The letter draws one's attention to the fact that registration of the Nadezhda radio station by the USSR State Television and Radio Committee does not [words indistinct] as the station has not been registered—according to the procedures laid down—by the State (?Committee) for Electrical Communications at the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic Ministry of Communications, nor at the USSR State Radio Frequency Committee. Thus the Nadezhda radio station is unlawful according to both USSR laws and international norms.

Nevzorov claims that [words indistinct] Soviet Army [words indistinct] a bloodshed for all those here who speak Russian. In addition to being provocative, a statement of this kind is also a crude insult to all Estonians and incites interethnic (?tensions). In connection with this, Estonian Radio voices its indignation, and demands an explanation from Leningrad Television.

Centrist Bloc Blames Baltic Leaders for Events

LD2901233791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1639 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jan (TASS)—Moscow is not to blame for the tragic events which have taken place in Lithuania and Latvia. Chairman of the Centrist Bloc Vladimir Voronin and Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) of the Soviet Union, which is a member of the bloc, who visited Lithuania and Latvia as members of a bloc delegation, stated this today at a news conference here.

The Centrist Bloc, set up in June 1990, now includes some 20 political parties and movements. According to the bloc's program, its aims are "making the economy of the Soviet Union more healthy" and interaction to this end with all other parties, including the CPSU.

Unlike the leaders of the "Democratic Russia" movement, who put all the blame for the tragic events in Lithuania and Latvia on the USSR president, the Army, and the CPSU, the leaders of the Centrist Bloc believe that the present-day authorities of these republics and not the center must bear the full responsibility for these events.

In Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's view, the press organs that covered the events in Lithuania as "aggression and seizure" on the part of Moscow also bear a considerable part of the blame. "There has been no aggression and no seizure at all," he believes. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said that the Baltics were the first to start the "war of laws." The decisions to proclaim Lithuania's independence during the early morning of 11 March 1990, while not agreeing on this issue with anyone, and to abrogate the Constitutions of the USSR and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic served as a spur to "unleash civil war". In his view, "it was started" by Vytautas Landsbergis.

Vladimir Voronin believes that Landsbergis deceived the people of Lithuania. On his way to the top, he said, Landsbergis did not put forward the slogan of separation from the Soviet Union. Had he put forward that slogan, the people of Lithuania would not have followed him, the leader of the Centrist Bloc stressed.

Baltic Leaders' 'Pilgrimage' to West Criticized

PM2801145391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS political observer Ye. Babenko: "Not of Our Making"]

[Text] The pilgrimage to the West by representatives of various rank from the Baltic republics has been going on for some months, and in general few people can be surprised. However, the hope that a rich foreign benefactor will send large presents and will be able to solve all the acute economic problems of the Baltics has, it is true, not yet been borne out. Although the bowing and scraping to foreigners continues and is even increasing.

But the emphasis during such trips has now shifted. On Tuesday deputy chairmen of the Lithuanian and Latvian Supreme Soviets and an Estonian government minister in Washington on a private visit were received by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. The theme of the Baltics' appeal to the American leadership, as they themselves reported, was as follows: The need to apply economic sanctions against the Soviet Union and cancel the Soviet-American summit meeting scheduled for 11-13 February in Moscow, at which is is proposed, incidentally, to sign the treaty reducing strategic offensive arms.

I want to dwell on two aspects only. First, you often hear in the Baltic leaders' speeches about Moscow's "gross interference" in their affairs, about "violation of sovereignty," and so forth. And the immediate question that comes to mind is how you evaluate their argument regarding the need to impose sanctions and cancel the meeting between the USSR and American leaders. Surely this is manifest interference in relations between two states whose sovereignty can hardly be doubted?

And second, those who visit Western capitals have clearly become familiar faces there. It is essentially the same people. And consequently you get the same discussion and rehashing, so to speak, on the principle that if you say something often enough it will stick. It should be acknowledged that this is occurring to some extent with the Baltic representatives. Already some people in the West are advising that in relations with the Soviet Union there should be a return, as it were, to the bad old days.

In approaching domestic events in the Soviet Union it would probably be worth heeding not just local leaders who are ready to sacrifice the end of the cold war, the disarmament process, and virtually the whole world order for the sake of their arrogant ends. Is it necessary to drink always at the same well?

Judging by all accounts, a big impact was made in Western political circles by the following words from the USSR president's statement: "It will be regrettable and dangerous if the achievements in international relations of recent years are threatened as a result of such an incorrect interpretation." It is well-known that destruction is not construction. The almost-complete edifice bearing the inscription "new international relations" could be destroyed in a moment by a single ill-considered move.

"The West should weigh up carefully all the pros and cons before helping overthrow the Soviet president by putting economic pressure on the USSR"—this warning is not of our making. We merely cite precisely a commentary from Britain's DAILY TELEGRAPH.

RSFSR

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Bodies To Meet 29 Jan

LD2801213391 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet will continue working in committees and commissions today [29 January]. The elaboration of a package of draft laws, primarily on social protection for citizens of the republics during the transition to the market, is being completed. It is planned to examine also the issue of appealing to the USSR president, the USSR Procuracy, and the country's committee for supervision of the Constitution in connection with the joint order by the USSR ministers of internal affairs and defense.

Federation Treaty Debated

LD3001084191 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 30 Jan 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 30 TASS—Departing from its agenda, the Russian parliament today began its session with a brief joint sitting of its two houses.

The speaker of the Council of Nationalities, Ramazan Abdulatipov, informed deputies about the drafting of a federation treaty for Russia. The treaty would delineate powers between federal authorities and members of the Russian Federation.

The parliament will then continue the debate at separate sittings of the houses.

The deputies will also discuss a draft resolution on President Boris Yeltsin's report on the political situation in the Russian Federation and Russia's pension fund.

Stankevich, Police Chief Cited on Joint Patrols

PM3001110591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by D. Sabov and K. Belyanov report under the general headline "1 February 1991: The Militia and the Army are Already United; Is It Up to the People?" and the subhead "Fellow Countrymen! Let Us Preserve Peace and Not Give a Reason To Be Patrolled"]

[Text] Moscow—S. Stankevich, deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, described "this way of regulating the country's life" [The Defense and Internal Affairs Ministries' order on joint patrols of cities by militia and military personnel] as "inadmissible and unlawful." "This is a question of introducing elements of a state of emergency" and "a change in the political regime in the USSR." "Maybe the order was adopted because our leadership has planned some other unexpected decisions for the beginning of February, which will have to be backed by armed force?"

An appeal to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium has been adopted, urging the abrogation of the departmental order as "illegal."

"I cannot say that the situation in the city is uncontrollable," General N. Myrikov, deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Main Administration, believes. "But nevertheless the number of crimes is growing, almost half of them are committed in the streets, and the Moscow militia's 3,500 men are not enough! At the moment I do not know anything about the Moscow City Soviet's position. So we will implement the order."

RSFSR Deputies Criticize Joint Patrol Order

LD2901220691 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1603 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Discussion with S.A. Nosovets, RSFSR people's deputy; Army Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Kotenkov, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation; S.Ye. Vitsin, doctor of juridical sciences, professor, major general in the internal service, and expert from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation; and S.A. Kovalev, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Human Rights; from the "Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet Diary" program—recorded]

[Text] [Nosovets] Work is in full swing in Russia's Supreme Soviet. Under discussion now here at the Committee on Legislation, with representatives from the Committee on Legality and Law and Order taking part, is a draft law on a Russian police or militia. Of course, it is impossible to discuss this question without paying attention to the order issued by the USSR minister of internal affairs and the USSR minister of defense, which is on everyone's lips at the moment, and of course, particular attention is being given to it in the Supreme Soviet. I therefore think that it would be interesting to hear the opinions of qualified specialists in this field about this order. I immediately raise the question—or the assumption, perhaps—as to whether or not this order is the extension of some foundation for what in my view is an impending dictatorship?

[Kotenkov] It is difficult for me to judge whether or not this is the continuation of some plan for the introduction of a dictatorship in our country, because I have not seen any such plan. But the fact that this order is anticonstitutional is beyond doubt. As a military man I find it very painful to hear the attacks on the Army, and the accusations—totally groundless and unfounded—that are now being made against the armed forces, particularly in connection with the latest events in the Baltic republics, to the effect that the Army is supposedly acting against the people, and so on. This order continues that line. It is intended that the Armed Forces will be used to impose public order in the country, effectively in violation of the Constitution. They will be given the functions of internal troops.

In support of this conclusion of mine I can present a number of documents—I have them here—in particular there is a conclusion by the directorate providing legal back-up for the activity of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs which recognizes that this order is unconstitutional. It refers directly to the USSR Constitution, in accordance with which the armed forces are established to defend the country against attack from outside. It quotes the decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies which, after the actions in Tbilisi, made a decision to ban the use of the Armed Forces within the country.

I would also like to mention the law on the state of emergency in the country. It is only under conditions of a state of emergency, which can be introduced either by a decree of the president with subsequent confirmation by the country's Supreme Soviet or by a decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet—it is only then that armed forces can be used to protect public order. Effectively the order by the two ministers, which has no legislative foundation beneath it, introduces the conditions of a state of emergency in the country. And of course, the comrades who signed this order, understanding the entire illegal nature of this order, subsequently requested the USSR Supreme Soviet to provide a legislative basis for this order.

[Nosovets] The appropriate document for this also exists.

[Kotenkov] Yes. I have in front of me the draft decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet proposing that the USSR minister of defense be given the right to dispatch servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy to participate in the protection of public order and to invest servicemen from the armed forces—when they are carrying out these tasks of assisting the internal affairs bodies—with the rights and obligations provided for the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs when they are protecting public order.

Comrades, even if this decision is adopted it still cannot have the force of law because it contradicts the USSR Constitution, and in order to make this order law, then either the USSR Constitution has to be changed, and it has to be stated that the armed forces have been formed in order to maintain public order in the country, or those units of the armed forces which will be taking part in the protection of public order must be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs by an appropriate document—which is what is now being done actively. Incidentally, whole formations are being transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the internal troops: In principle this action would then be legalized sufficiently.

Very often people accuse us—I mean the legislature of Russia—of encouraging or fanning the war of the laws. Let's be objective about this, comrades. Are we the ones who are now issuing illegal and anticonstitutional acts? Of course, we have to respond in some way to the fact that a state of emergency is effectively being introduced in our republic without our knowledge in violation of the Constitution, and in violation of the existing legislation. The law on the provisions of the state of emergency says that a state of emergency can be introduced—I have already mentioned this—either by a decree of the president or by a decision of the Supreme Soviet, but it must be with the agreement of the Supreme Soviet of the republic concerned. No one has informed us about this order. Of course, I cannot yet say how we will respond to this, but what concerns me most is the fact that this order, and the actions which are going to be implemented on the basis of this order, will undermine even more the authority of the Armed Forces: They will give rise to distrust of the Armed Forces by the people, and in fact this will inflict enormous moral damage upon servicemen who are going to be compelled to carry out unconstitional functions.

[Nosovets] I think that a similar situation awaits those working for the law-enforcement bodies. I would like to know your opinion as a specialist. What is the necessity for this? Is the crime situation so threatening here in Russia, for example, that militia detachments have to be backed up with military ones?

[Vitsin] I believe that the answer to that question is obvious. The fact is that there is talk the whole time about increasing crime. These days this is speculative to a certain extent. The fact is that the growth in crime is not so great as to justify resorting to these extreme measures now and I imagine that this order we have been talking about is simply one action in a series of actions aimed in a very specific direction. In this connection I would also like to stress that as Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has said repeatedly in the past everyone must engage in his own business and of course it is not the Army's business to resolve problems that are linked with ensuring law and order. In the main I do not think that the situation in our towns and capitals—in the main, I say—I do not think that the situation is such as to require the use of these extreme measures and I would like to think that such a situation will not make an appearance if it is not provoked. Furthermore, we must not forget the fact that the constitution determines directly the task of those troops which are under the Defense Ministry and those which are under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It should also be said that even the use of the internal troops is an action which goes beyond the bounds of the usual and in this sense there have to be certain legal limits and not simply the discretion of particular officials. If all the garrisons in our cities are going to be put into conditions of protecting public order this could have undesirable, I would even say provocative, consequences.

[Nosovets] Sergey Adamovich, the ideological grounds that have been given for these measures again state that all of this is being done in the name of and for the good of which person has this order been issued?

[Kovalev] Well, you see, it's not appropriate to talk about the good of the person here, if only because both the explanation given for the latest actions by the central power in the Baltic republics and this order are simply stepped in falsehood and hypocrisy. Just look: On that occasion they lied to us about no one from the central bodies, from the top representatives of power, having allegedly known about the actions of the armed forces which were taken in the Baltic republics. Well, not knowing means not knowing, but this is no excuse. It was their job to know. At the same time top leaders—two ministers and the president himself—nevertheless tried to justify these actions. Now we have this instruction. It says that its purpose is to protect our country's population against the dealers in the shadow economy. It supposedly has to protect them against hooligans. Well, begging you pardon, can you imagine armored transporters dealing with hooligans? I cannot do so. but when it comes to dealing with mass meetings and demonstrations they're an extremely effective weapon. That is why armored transporters have to patrol the streets and be positioned at the crossroads. It has nothing whatsoever to do with either hooligans or dealers from the shadow economy. That is what strikes one about it.

I would also like to support my colleague who has already spoken about a state of emergency effectively being introduced. Note that among the measures which are provided throughout the world by laws dealing with states of emergency, measures like putting the army into action and bringing in the armed forces are the most extreme and, furthermore, measures that are subject to special provisos. The legislator decides the question of the extent to which powers will be given to the executive power for this. How can these extraordinary measures be limited? In high-standard legislation dealing with states of emergency the whole state of emergency is constantly under the control of the legislator.

The Supreme Soviet session is not even dissolved. Here two ministers, just two ministers, are effectively introducing the toughest element of the state of emergency, not some kind of initial stage, but the last step. and this last step is not known to anyone, it is not known to the union legislator, it is not known to the legislators of the republics on the territories of which this measure will be applied. This is a flagrant contradiction of all international experience, and furthermore of the recommendations of the United Nations. Incidentally, the decree of the president which we heard on Saturday stands in the same line. We have not yet had the opportunity to read that one and to analyze it in a proper fashion. In effect, it is a decree on unsanctioned searches, searches that have not been sanctioned by the prosecutor or by anyone else who supervises the observance of legality.

I am not going to start talking about the economic consequences of this law, of this decree, but take the legal side of the matter. An unsanctioned search is in fact arbitrary rule, it is something that can be introduced for a very short time under the control of the legislator as an absolutely extraordinary measure. But here it is being introduced just like that, simply by a decree of the president, without any declaration of a state of emergency and without notification of partner-countries, which is an absolute requirement of the law on the state of emergency.

[Nosovets] A legitimate question arises: For what purpose does the president issue such decrees or sanction orders of that kind? What's the purpose of it?

[Kotenkov] I think that the purpose here is obvious. This is where we began our conversation. Although I stress once again that we do not know of any specific plans, the events of the past few weeks link together so logically into a single chain that I consider this is indeed the continuation of the same chain, the attack upon democracy: What is taking place is an elementary struggle for power, the structures of which feel that this power is moving out of their hands. They grasp at straws; they use the ultimate extreme measures in order to hold on to this power.

[Kotenkov] Yes, yes. It's no secret that all of these national salvation committees in the Baltic republics were based upon the central committees of the respective republics, and I don't think that the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow as unaware of the setting up of these committees and the actions being prepared there.

[Vitsin] But on the other hand I don't think it's logical for our leadership to carry out such actions in a few weeks before the referendum. They discredit our power, and place the whole authority of the future referendum in doubt.

[Nosovets] In my opinion the results of the referendum in this case are of little worry to the representatives of our central power.

[Vitsin] A referendum with tanks and armored transport at the crossroads is not, of course, a measure that enhances the authority of our power.

[Nosovets] So that our voters and viewers do not feel that we are not simply speaking as discussion consultants of some kind, let me remind them that we are legislators. What do you think should be the next steps of our Russian legislature to protect our sovereignty?

[Kovalev] I do not know exactly what will be done. I think the Russian legislature is right to make use of its own law on the priority of Russian laws on our territory, and to declare that this order does not operate on the territory of the RSFSR. In addition, of course, it should apply to the Constitutional Control Committee.

[Kotenkov] I will continue the thought expressed by Sergey Adamovich; I do not think there is any sense in fanning the war of the laws any more now. Before we adopt any legislative act we should first of all go to the Constitutional Supervision Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet so that they can give an explanation of whether they consider this particular order to be unconstitutional. As for the next measures, I think that a law on the procedure for introducing a state of emergency on the territory of the RSFSR, a law on the security of the RSFSR, and on other legislative acts which will make it possible to stabilize the situation in the republic on the one hand, and on the other to ensure in some way the security of the republic, will be adopted during the course of the current session.

[Kovalev] I would like to add that in our committee the draft law...

[Nosovets, interrupting] On human rights.

[Kovalev] On human rights, yes—a draft law on the state of emergency is virtually ready.

[Nosovets] Well, I thank, you, and would like to make a final point. Such will be the steps of our Supreme Soviet. But today we want to remind you once again that the order by the representatives of the central power of the USSR, like many preceding ones, alas, is against the law.

RSFSR Council of Ministers View Monetary Reform

914A0370A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
24 Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Edict Adopted for Execution"]

[Text] An expanded meeting of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, which took place on 23 January in Moscow and was chaired by I. Silayev, was dedicated to immediate measures for the further development of the economy of Russia.

The meeting's participants examined a pricing policy for the near future. In his report on this subject G.I. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, declared that without changes in prices it would be impossible to resolve a single economic problem. In addition he emphasized that "we must not jerk the public around with small increases in prices" in the event of a revision of prices. It is also dangerous, in his opinion, to toy with free prices. They should be replaced with strictly fixed prices and a preventive payment of compensation.

The assembled leaders of executive organs of government at all levels discussed questions of agrarian policy and the rebirth of the countryside. The food problem was at the center of attention, of course.

Changes were made to the agenda in conjunction with the appearance of the question of how to react to the USSR president's edict on halting acceptance for payment of bank notes worth 50 and 100 rubles of the USSR State Bank and to the corresponding decree of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Inasmuch as the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has adopted a law on the ratification of Union legislative acts, the final decision on a reaction to the edict on the territory of the republic will be adopted on 24 January at a joint meeting of both chambers of the parliament of Russia.

Because the Russian State Bank is an independent institute, the government of the republic has prepared and sent out appropriate recommendations on an emergency basis with the goal of averting misunderstandings at the local level.

A decree adopted on a system for implementing the edict says that it is to be adopted for execution. The document indicates the need to extend the operations of departments of the RSFSR State Bank for the exchange of bank notes. In the event of the absence of a sufficient quantity of the new notes, it recommends the distribution of checks, receipts, or other symbols of treasury obligations, which will be paid off as the new money comes in.

Resolution on Bank Note Exchange Published

PM3001091791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Resolution "On the Procedure for Implementing on Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Territory the USSR President's Decree of 22 January 1991 'On Ceasing Acceptance for Payment of USSR Gosbank 50- and 100-Ruble Bank Notes First Issued in 1961 and Limiting Cash Withdrawal From Citizens' Deposits'" issued by the RSFSR Council of Ministers in Moscow on 23 January]

[Text] In connection with inquiries from the localities and in accordance with Article 2 of the RSFSR Law "On the Operation of USSR Organs' Acts on RSFSR Territory" the RSFSR Council of Ministers resolves:

1. That the USSR president's decree of 22 January 1991 "On Ceasing Acceptance for Payment of USSR Gosbank [State Bank] 50- and 100-Ruble [R] Bank Notes First Issued in 1961 and Limiting Cash Withdrawals from Citizens' Deposits" be adopted for execution.

2. That USSR Cabinet of Ministers' resolution No. 2 of 22 January 1991 "On Ceasing Acceptance for Payment of USSR Gosbank R50 and R100 Bank Notes First Issued in 1961 and the Procedure for Exchanging Them and Limiting Cash Withdrawals from Citizens' Deposits" be adopted as a guideline with the following changes and addenda:

a) That the first sentence of Point 2 carry the words "in accordance with procedure determined by the RSFSR Central Bank" instead of the words "within the first three hours of the working day 23 January 1991";

b) That the fifth paragraph of Point 3 contain the words "within a limit of R500" instead of the words "within a limit of R200";

c) That Point 3 be supplemented by the following sentences:

"That the RSFSR Central Bank be authorized to clarify the dates for exchange of bank notes on the basis of the territorial features of individual regions of the Russian Federation, but no later than 1 February 1991.

"That, irrespective of the amount of bank notes for exchange, bank notes be accepted from citizens for exchange at bank institutions and enterprises, with citizens being issued, where necessary, with checks, receipts, and other bonds guaranteeing receipt of cash as it is received.

"That assent be given to the RSFSR Central Bank's suggestion for bank institutions to work around the clock throughout the bank note exchange period";

d) That after the words "USSR Gosbank" Point 9 be supplemented by the words "by agreement with the RSFSR Central Bank";

e) That Point 10 be supplemented by the following sentence:

"That the RSFSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] take the requisite steps to safeguard bank institutions and public order on the republic's territory."

3. That the RSFSR Finance Ministry, in conjunction with the RSFSR Central Bank, organize for the bank note exchange period an around-the-clock duty roster of qualified specialists to promptly resolve questions that arise and provide the appropriate explanations with regard to these questions.

4. That the councils of ministers of republics within the RSFSR and the ispolkoms [executive committees] of autonomous oblast and okrug soviets of people's deputies, and kray, oblast, Moscow and Leningrad City Soviets of People's Deputies take the requisite steps to organize the work of deputies' commissions.

I. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers

A. Tretyakov, RSFSR Council of Ministers administrator of affairs

Party Leadership Lauds Reception of Citizens

PM2901134191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat"]

[Text] The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat has examined the question and adopted a resolution "On Organizing Reception of Citizens by Members of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee." It stresses that reception of citizens is an effective channel for mutual relations between the Communist Party's elective organs and Communists and nonparty members and an important form of political work with people and of not only resolving their personal questions but also of studying and utilizing in the Central Committee's practical work working people's comments and suggestions on highly important areas of the republic's socioeconomic and political development. Well organized and—and this is the main thing—successful reception of citizens is seen as evidence of real democratization within the party.

It has been deemed advisable to considerably extend the practice of receiving citizens by Politburo members, Central Committee secretaries, and other members of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee resident both in Moscow and in oblasts, krays, and republics. A schedule for RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee members' reception of citizens has been approved. You can obtain information on all matters relating to reception from the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee's reception by telephoning 206-52-37.

Popov on Strengthening Executive Power in Moscow

91UN0773A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 2

[Open letter by Chairman of the Moscow Soviet G.Kh. Popov to people's deputies of the Moscow Soviet and rayon soviets, and to all Muscovites: "On Strengthening Democratically Elected Executive Authorities and a Democratic System in the City of Moscow"]

[Text] In my first open letter, I outlined my considerations regarding the issues of a consumer market in the city of Moscow (incidentally, this letter was sent to many Moscow newspapers, but only VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA saw fit to inform its readers about the position of the Moscow Soviet chairman).

In my second open letter, I would like to outline my point of view on the reinforcement of executive power in the city of Moscow.

By all signs, there is a lack of order and discipline in the country. However, this problem is particularly acute especially in large cities (similarly, at enterprises of various kinds disruptions affect main assembly lines first of all).

I would not reveal the details of the picture of lacking coordination in the system of power that every Muscovite knows quite well. It is important to discern the main, focal points behind all of these details.

First. Performing the function of the center—for the USSR, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Moscow Oblast—unavoidably makes Moscow a cluster of offices that do not produce goods but demand land, official premises, and employees (from Moscow or brought in from the outside), housing for them, transportation, foodstuffs, and so on from the city.

In turn, Moscow cannot have certain rights in order to interfere with the decisions of the USSR and RSFSR to create specific establishments, select cadres for them, issue residence permits to them, and so on.

Furthermore, Moscow is obligated to support the normal operation of hundreds of diplomatic embassies, international establishments, legations, and so on. Moscow is obligated to support the operation of political parties and other, most diverse USSR and RSFSR organizations registered as all-Union or republic organizations. In addition, hundreds of conferences, congresses, festivals, competitions, and so on need to be held in Moscow. This city "block" can only be "supported" by the nonrepayable subsidies and deliveries to the city by the USSR, the RSFSR, and Moscow Oblast that set up these institutions.

All of these tasks absolutely do not fit within the confines of the rights and functions of local soviets, and are usually divorced from the direct interests of Muscovites. This is why it is hard to count on the support of local soviets and their organs in the process of performing the functions of the USSR and RSFSR capital; resistance is encountered more frequently (at times, it is quite justified from the point of view of local interests). At the same time, there is no logic in some actions of the Moscow deputies and local organs: The Muscovites receive deliveries from Union and republic organs that differ considerably from average norms, but, for example, they do not want to allow the residence of the employees of these organs in Moscow.

If the capital-city functions of Moscow are to continue, the same thing should be done that has been done in all countries—a special decision on the capital city should be made. The essence of such laws on capital cities is the same throughout the world: To substantially reduce the role of organs elected by the citizens in solving the problems of the city, and to augment the role of organs that are capable of carrying out the instructions of Union and republic authorities. For example, for decades the residents of Washington did not even have the right to vote in presidential elections.

Second. The situation in the city is affected by a crisis of the entire system of soviets that amounts to a mighty "head" in the form of soviet sessions and quite a weak "body" in the form of executive organs. Power needs to be redistributed.

I have stated this point of view on many occasions, but they have continuously distorted it; this leads me to conclude that it is very advantageous for some people to maintain the current confusion.

They say that I am against the soviets. I am in favor of organs elected by the populace, but I am against parliaments in the city and the rayons. We need elected Municipal Soviets that are capable of discussing and resolving issues. What kind of a discussion may there be among several hundred people, when the author of a proposal cannot respond or give explanations but may at best speak once, whereas many of his opponents cannot speak even once? A representative organ is necessary, but one consisting of no more than several dozen deputies.

If these changes are not very realistic at present, the Moscow Soviet should be turned into a kind of congress that gathers once a year; the Permanent Committee (Municipal Soviet) elected by the Moscow Soviet for the current year, which would be about 10 times smaller than the Moscow Soviet, should operate during the year. As is known, there are congresses of deputies and there are supreme soviets in the USSR and the RSFSR. The Municipal Soviet, if elected at a Moscow Soviet session every year in keeping with the principle of representation, will reflect precisely the composition of deputy groups at the session.

They say that I am against the power of soviets. I am in favor of their power; however, not in general and everywhere, but rather only in the sphere of making rules, laws, and norms. I am categorically against direct actions by a representative organ in the executive sphere. So, the soviets want to correct the ispolkom [executive committee]? There are legal devices for that: revising financing, introducing norms, and reelecting the ispolkom chairman. However, if the soviet wants to decide itself who to put up in a new house this means administrative functions. Dual power in the executive sphere means the end of power.

I see a way out in strengthening executive power, primarily the apex of the entire pyramid—the introduction of mayors elected by the city. Second Russian Communist Party Secretary Comrade Ilyin falsely twists my point of view in the newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, carefully concealing its main part: Mayors should **be elected by the populace itself.** CPSU leaders who still have not risked being elected by direct vote of CPSU members may not like this proposal, but why ascribe to me the idea of mayors appointed from on high by the will of bosses? If there is a point on which I agree with Comrade Ilyin, it is that such a mayor elected by the people will be independent of the soviet. This independence is the ABC of democracy. A mayor cannot depend either on the organs or on the deputies. He needs to depend only on the people. The people elect the soviet and the mayor, and, naturally, they are not subordinated to each other. This does not amount to a "collapse" of any kind: In the United States, the people elect both the Congress and the President; within states, there are congresses, governors, and mayors elected by the people.

They say that a great number of people's deputies are capable of organizing trade, the distribution of housing, or militia operations better than some of the functionaries of the current executive organs. This is good—the mechanics of democratic elections are geared to finding precisely such people. However, why should we also entrust this deputy in the soviet with executive functions? It is simpler and more reasonable to nominate the deputy to any position in the executive mechanism.

Therefore, we need to sharply reinforce executive power and shelter it from the daily tutelage (which sometimes turns into daily terror) of local soviets. Both powers have their own spheres. Voters will decide in elections which one of them is right. Incidentally, terms for the reelection of local soviets should be set at one-half of what they are in the republic or the Union—two or three years. We may accept the idea of continuously changing the body of deputies: to reelect one-third of soviet members (by drawing lots) every year, so that in three years all deputies will be able to face the deputies, and the soviet will be able to preserve continuity. In any event, five years is too long a term for local life.

Third. The rayons of our city are yet another source of serious trouble. This is the middle echelon, i.e., a segment of the city mechanism. Meanwhile, at present this echelon is analogous to an independent rayon within an oblast.

For as long as the CPSU held power, the city rayons remained what they should be—subordinated to the whole, i.e., the city echelon—with their own interests, but without an opportunity to place these interests above those of the city.

Discord in the city could not but begin when rayons appeared that were subordinated to virtually themselves only.

Given the critical situation that has now emerged, and taking into account the position of Moscow as a capital city, I see no way out but to turn the middle echelon of executive power in the city, rayon ispolkoms, into the main organs at a level of city rayons formed by the city ispolkom and subordinated only to the city ispolkom. At the rayon level, there should be Municipal Soviets, however, with consultative functions as far as the rayon ispolkoms are concerned, and with the right to bring up their disagreements for a discussion in the Municipal Soviet of the city or in permanent commissions of the Moscow Soviet. The Municipal Soviets of rayons may consist of Moscow Soviet deputies who have not been elected to the Municipal Soviet of the city and whose districts belong to a given rayon.

They might say: After all, many active and competent deputies have been elected in the rayons. This is correct. They are the potential of democracy in our city. All the rayon deputies should keep their status. Some of them will transfer to rayon ispolkoms; others, the bulk of them, should become members of self-government microrayon soviets—that is, take part in forming the most important echelon of the city system that is emerging here but has not yet been created everywhere.

Given that a gap between the position of the deputies and that of the electorate may grow considerably even during three-year terms in office, representatives of sorts from all city organizations should be convened under the aegis of the mayor by setting up a political round table of sorts, a political consultative soviet that will complement ties between executive power and the citizens.

A draft of changes in the system of government of the city of Moscow as the USSR and RSFSR capital has been prepared proceeding from the considerations outlined.

I would like it to be discussed with the full measure of responsibility that is required at this critical moment. If the Moscow Soviet approves this draft we will be able to refer it to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. If the Moscow Soviet has doubts, a referendum of all inhabitants of Moscow should be held. However, it is clear that we cannot preserve the current system, the inner frictions of which set back even the best decisions; meanwhile, the decay of both our currency and economy proceeds.

I understand fully that the system proposed may affect me first of all if the Moscow Soviet does not nominate me a candidate mayor or if it does, but the Muscovites elect one of the alternative candidates. However, I am not the issue here. All of Moscow needs changes.

In my proposals, I strive to maintain in the course of changes the potential to which the deputies of the Moscow Soviet and rayon soviets amount. The work of Moscow deputies at annual Moscow Soviet sessions, quarterly sessions of the Municipal Soviet, in the permanent commissions of the Moscow Soviet, and in the Municipal Soviets of rayons, as well as the work of rayon deputies in the self-government soviets of microrayons, will give everyone adequate opportunities to meet obligations to his electorate.

I enclose a draft of restructuring with this letter.

Text of Restructuring Draft

91UN0773B Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 2

["Draft of restructuring" by Chairman of the Moscow Soviet G.Kh. Popov: "On the Government of the City of Moscow as the Capital of the USSR and RSFSR"]

[Text] 1. The following will be entrusted with solving the main issues of development of the city of Moscow:

—the mayor of Moscow, the Moscow Government Committee, and the Moscow City Ispolkom [executive committee];
—sessions of the Moscow Soviet;
—the Permanent Committee (Municipal Soviet) of the Moscow Soviet.

2. The positions of mayor and deputy mayor will be introduced. The mayor heads executive and administrative power and reports directly to the USSR president and chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet (RSFSR president). The deputy mayor acts for the mayor during the absence of the latter, and performs the functions the mayor entrusts him with.

Within the bounds of his powers, the mayor:

—manages state construction, economic, and sociocultural development of the city of Moscow and administers land in the city of Moscow and city property;
—determines a list and boundaries of administrative units within the limits of the city of Moscow, and determines the jurisdiction of the government organs of these units;
—confirms the personal composition of the Moscow Government Committee;
—nominates and, upon the endorsement of the candidacy offered by a Moscow Soviet session, confirms the Moscow City Ispolkom chairman;
—is responsible for full deliveries to the diplomatic corps located in Moscow. USSR and RSFSR central organs reimburse the city of Moscow for such expenditures;
—is responsible for providing premises and fully supporting Union and RSFSR organs, and representative offices of Union and autonomous republics. The USSR and RSFSR central organs reimburse the city of Moscow for such expenditures;
—ensures premises and operation in the city of Moscow of the leading organs of political parties and public organizations that have been officially registered in the USSR or the RSFSR at the expense of the funds of these parties or organizations.

3. The mayor and deputy mayor of Moscow are elected simultaneously by universal, direct, and secret vote of all residents of Moscow over 18 who have lived in the territory of the city for more than two years and have a permanent residence permit. Candidates for mayor and deputy mayor should be no younger than 35. A candidate deputy mayor is nominated by a candidate mayor.

A candidate mayor is considered nominated if no fewer than one percent of registered voters, each of which may state his support for only one candidate, support him.

A mayor is considered elected if more than 50 percent of those taking part in voting vote for him. If no candidate draws more than 50 percent of the votes in the first round of voting, a second round is held in which no more than the two candidates who have drawn the largest numbers of votes participate. A candidate getting a greater number of votes than his opponent is considered elected.

4. A Moscow Soviet session:

—gathers once a year in the first 10 days of December for no longer than one week;
—elects the chairman of every session and his deputy;
—elects the chairman of the Permanent Committee (Municipal Soviet);

—elects on an annual basis the Permanent Committee (Municipal Soviet);

—approves the candidacy of city ispolkom chairman nominated by the mayor;

—elects the chairmen of Moscow Soviet permanent commissions, and confirms the composition of commissions for one year;

—raises the issue of an early reelection of the mayor;

—adopts on an annual basis the budget of the city and a report on its implementation;

—an emergency session of the Moscow Soviet may be convened on the initiative of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, or that of the mayor of the city of Moscow, or at the request of two-thirds of the roster composition of the Moscow Soviet.

5. The Permanent Committee (Municipal Soviet) of the Moscow Soviet is elected by the Moscow Soviet one month after a mayoral election at the rate of one member of the Municipal Soviet (municipal councilman) per 10 deputies of the Moscow Soviet.

Regular proceedings of the Municipal Soviet lasting no longer than one week in each case are held once quarterly in the first 10 days after the beginning of a quarter. Extraordinary proceedings are convened on the initiative of the mayor.

The Municipal Soviet:

—reviews issues suggested by the mayor;

—reviews issues brought to the permanent commissions of the Moscow Soviet;

—reviews issues raised by the municipal soviets of rayons;

—the soviet may place issues on the agenda of its discussion on its own initiative by 50 percent of the votes of its roster composition.

Decisions of the Municipal Soviet are referred to the mayor and are considered adopted if the mayor does not reject them within two weeks. If the mayor rejects a decision the soviet may consider the issue again at its next meeting. If the soviet confirms its decision by a no less than two-thirds majority of roster composition after considering it again, the mayor either accepts this decision for execution, or transfers it to higher echelons for a final resolution.

6. In the event the mayor fails to comply with USSR and RSFSR laws, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (RSFSR president) may convene an extraordinary meeting of the Moscow Soviet in order to resolve the issue of reelecting the mayor. Early mayoral elections are held if no fewer than two-thirds of the roster composition of Moscow Soviet deputies vote in favor of this proposal.

The Moscow Soviet itself may raise the issue of early mayoral elections if no fewer than two-thirds of the roster composition of the soviet vote in favor of this. In this case, the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves the issue of early elections of either the mayor or the Moscow Soviet.

7. The Government Committee of the city of Moscow is an organ attached to the mayor. The following are members of the committee ex officio: chairman of the Moscow Ispolkom, commander of the Moscow Military District, heads of KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the city of Moscow, chairmen of the Committees for Long-Term Development, Architecture, and External Relations, as well as other persons selected by the mayor. The mayor confirms regulations on the Government Committee.

8. The Moscow City Ispolkom is headed by a chairman. The ispolkom chairman is nominated by the mayor and appointed by him after confirmation of the chairman by the Moscow Soviet. Regulations on the city ispolkom, its structure, and composition are submitted by the ispolkom chairman and adopted by the mayor of the city of Moscow.

9. The mayor of the city of Moscow appoints the chairmen of city rayon ispolkoms nominated by the chairman of the city ispolkom. The chairmen of rayon ispolkoms report to the chairman of the city ispolkom. The mayor adopts a list of city rayons and their boundaries.

Municipal soviets with consultative functions are formed at rayon ispolkoms. Regulations on the municipal soviets of rayons are adopted by the mayor of the city of Moscow. A rayon municipal soviet consists of Moscow Soviet deputies who have been elected in the territory of a given rayon and are not members of the city municipal soviet.

10. The self-government soviet of a microrayon elected by the populace is the basic level of government in Moscow. The soviets elect soviet chairmen. A list and boundaries of the microrayons of Moscow are confirmed by the mayor of the city of Moscow. By way of an exception, the first self-government soviets will consist of the deputies of rayon soviets elected in a given microrayon. Moscow Soviet deputies may also serve on the self-government soviets.

11. The first direct elections of the mayor by the citizens of Moscow will be held in February 1991. By way of an exception, candidates for mayor will be nominated at a Moscow Soviet session no later than 15 days before the elections. Every candidate getting no fewer than one-third of the votes of the roster composition of the Moscow Soviet is considered nominated. Contenders for mayoral candidates name candidate deputy mayors before a vote on their candidacies in the Moscow Soviet.

12. The Moscow Round Table—Political Consultative Council—is formed under the mayor of the city of Moscow. All organizations of Moscow, the documented numerical strength of which exceeds one percent of the number of voters on the rolls in Moscow, are given the

right to delegate their representatives to the council. Delegated representatives account for 50 percent of the council members. The mayor has the right to invite an equal number of council members from other political, scientific, creative, professional, etc. organizations of Moscow. Every organization invited by the mayor receives one seat on the council and designates its representative on its own. The composition of the council is adjusted on an annual basis. Regulations on the Political Consultative Council (Moscow Round Table) are adopted by the mayor of the city of Moscow.

Deputy Groups Issue Statement on Lithuania

PM3001104991 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 p 1

["Statement" adopted at meetings of the Moscow Soviet "Moscow" and "Independent" deputies' groups; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In view of the fact that when the Moscow Soviet session was adopting a resolution on the situation in Lithuania, the majority essentially tried once again to impose its political assessment of events on the minority, the "Moscow" and "Independent" deputies' groups were forced to abstain from voting and issue a joint statement on this question, having exhausted every possibility for reaching mutually acceptable decisions.

Statement

We, Moscow Soviet deputies, feel pain, bitterness, and compassion at the tragic events in Lithuania, which led to human casualties. We consider the main causes of these events to be the unconstitutional policies—aimed at the disintegration of the Soviet Union—of the republic's leadership headed by V. Landsbergis, and also the indecisive, inconsistent actions taken to normalize the situation in Lithuania by the country's central bodies of authority.

We continue to be concerned about how the situation will develop. We decisively and unconditionally condemn intolerance and extremism in the solution of political issues. We demand a public, impartial investigation not only into cases of fratricidal bloodshed but into all the factors that preceded the escalation of the conflict.

Feelings and emotions must not prevent us from establishing the measure of guilt of everyone whose irresponsible policies have brought the republic's population to the brink of despair and civil war.

We cannot regard as honest and objective those fighting for the freedom and national revival of the indigenous population but meanwhile encouraging systematic degradation of the human dignity and elementary civil rights of a considerable proportion of the population of Lithuania.

We cannot fail to see the desire of certain forces—which have arrogated the title "democratic"—to gain political dividends from the Lithuanian situation. They are intimidating people by saying there is a right-wing threat, whipping up anticommunist hysteria, fuelling nationalist sentiment, and provoking the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Essentially, they are transferring the explosive situation in Lithuania to Moscow and Russia.

We decisively protest against attempts to use the dramatic events in Lithuania to destroy the accord in international affairs that has been reached with such difficulty.

We consider intolerable any further display of indecision on the part of the country's government with regard to implementing adopted laws, and also any ill-considered, unfinished actions in the solution of critical problems that arise.

We demand that the situation be settled as soon as possible in strict accordance with Soviet laws and on the basis of the USSR Constitution, the Lithuanian Constitution, the decisions of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies, and the International Declaration of Human Rights.

Colonel Defends Yeltsin in Baltic Issue

91UM0298B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 2

["Stenographic account" of speech by Colonel A. Rutskoy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Invalids, War and Labor Veterans, and Soldier Internationalists, and the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, people's deputy of the RSFSR and hero of the Soviet Union, at Russian Supreme Soviet session on 21 January 1991, published under the rubric "They Are So Different-...These Generals and Colonels": "'May Russia Save Us!'"]

[Text] **We offer readers a stenographic account of the speech by Colonel A. Rutskoy, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Invalids, War and Labor Veterans, and Soldier Internationalists and the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families, people's deputy of the RSFSR and hero of the Soviet Union, at the Russian Supreme Soviet session on 21 January 1991 (with negligible abbreviations).**

I, like every military man, swore an oath to loyally serve the fatherland and my motherland and have honestly so served and continue to serve. But I did not swear an oath to serenely watch from the wings as lawlessness is perpetrated, as laws enacted by the Congress and Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation are not being ratified by the center, and as the Army and Russians are being called fascists. Today I saw a video shot in Lithuania. I feel very sorry for anyone who has not seen it. I came here to appeal to you, esteemed deputies, for a constructive and prudent approach. It is today, after what has happened in the country in the past two years, that it is we Russians who should put an end to the bloodshed once for all. There is no one to do this other than us. Of what the USSR Supreme Soviet is capable, of what our esteemed president is capable, we have all seen for ourselves.

I have asked myself and I wish to ask you a question. For how long will a hapless and unscrupulous political leadership, taking cover behind the protection of far from socialist gains and ideals, heap all misfortunes initially on the Army and then on the democratic forces?

The USSR Supreme Soviet, certain members of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, and the president are condemning the actions of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. Let us see whether it is Yeltsin who should be condemned in this situation, in today's situation.

Is Yeltsin to blame for the disintegration of the Union that is under way? Has Yeltsin called for bloodshed in the republics? Did Yeltsin give the order for the use of troops and the Armed Forces?

As of this time the Soviet people do not know the real truth about what happened in Lithuania. You watch the Vremya program, you watch the television news program: there is a brief mention: something, seemingly, happened unexpectedly. But these are people that are dying! This is evil, which must be terminated at once! Nagornyy Karabakh—was Gorbachev there or not? Tbilisi, Baku, Yerevan, and, finally, Vilnius....

The search for a culprit is once more being repeated, and today also, a search for a culpable "General Rodionov." There was a report on the news media that the garrison chief gave the command for the use of the Armed Forces and the transfer of airborne forces. Absurd! Anyone who has served in the Armed Forces knows full well that a garrison chief would never give such commands. And even the defense minister would never give such a command.

What I have just expounded is not strengthening the Union but tearing it down. I repeat, Russia and again Russia must adopt the decision to halt the collapse and the bloodshed. Where is the guarantee that a people driven to despair will not start to sort out national relations by blood in Russia also?

Esteemed members of the Supreme Soviet, I support the deputies who are demanding that the guilty parties be brought to account in accordance with the law. One may forgive the first time, one may forgive a second time, one may forgive a third time. But when this becomes part of the system, this cannot be forgiven.

We need to channel all efforts and all intellect into ending the confrontation both in the country and in the legislatures. Only then will we be able to put an end to the foolhardiness and disintegration of the fatherland.

Yeltsin, Union Heads View Income Indexation

LD2901181291 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1630 GMT 29 Jan 91

[From the "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Diary" program]

[Excerpts] Today the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet [Yeltsin] met the leaders of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. The discussion was private. Our correspondent had to wait outside the door. After the meeting the leaders of this organization—among them Igor Yevgeniyeich Klochkov, chairman of the Federation—informed the press about the subject and the results of the conversation.

[Begin Klochkov recording] [passage omitted] We are now holding talks with the government of Russia. We intend to conclude an economic agreement for 1991 between the Trade Union center and the government of Russia. However, the legal basis of the agreement should be provided by a law on indexation of incomes and a law on the employment of the population.

So, we said to Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, that these are the key laws, that they must be adopted in February as of primary importance. We reached a general agreement on this. That was the central part of our meeting today and we are satisfied that we reached mutual understanding; an understanding that it is inconceivable for there to be any further price rises. There are symptoms that the center intends to raise prices very soon. The date of 1 February is being spoken of, but this is not official—just back room talk. We believe that this cannot be done without indexation of incomes. People will not accept this. The trade unions will stand firm on this point. [end recording]

Sakhalin Seeks Suspension of Free Economic Zone

LD2801100191 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] The regional council of Sakhalin has sent a request to the president and prime minister to suspend the government's decision to lift the border zone regime on the island. The decision was adopted in disregard of the population's opinion.

About 50,000 islanders have voiced opposition to the planned measure. They fear that the free and unrestricted influx of people from the mainland will aggravate the housing and food problems to the limit and will frustrate the radical social and economic reforms underway on Sakhalin.

Cooperation Talks With Hokkaido Open in Tokyo

LD2801132591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0527 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kopnov]

[Text] Toyko, 28 Jan (TASS)—The present state and prospects for business ties between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the Japanese prefecture of Hokkaido are the subjects dominating the first session of the Russia-Hokkaido joint working group on economic cooperation, which opened today in Sapporo. The participants will spend three days exchanging proposals and discussing forms of cooperation in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. They will also study questions connected with the creation of a permanent mechanism for the development of bilateral relations.

The creation of the joint working group was the result of an agreement on the establishment of partnership ties between the RSFSR and Hokkaido, which was reached during the visit to Moscow in June last year by Takahiro Yokomichi, the governor of this Japanese prefecture. The working group is to draft a program for economic cooperation between the northern regions of Japan and the Soviet Far East. It is expected that a joint standing committee will subsequently be formed. Its task will be to implement the future program.

A delegation from the Russian Federation, made up of representatives from Maritime and Khabarovsk Krays and from Sakhalin Island, is taking part in the meeting of the working group.

Afghan Envoy to USSR Meets With Yeltsin

LD1901104191 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0420 GMT 19 Jan 91

[Text] Kabul, Jan. 18, BAKHTAR—Mohammad Daud Razmyar, ambassador of the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) in the Soviet Union met with B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the Soviet Federative Socialist Republics [as received] in Moscow recently.

During the meeting which took place in a complete friendly climate matters relating to the historical and traditional ties between the two countries were discussed.

The Afghan ambassador detailed B.N. Yeltsin in relation to the attempts of the RA for the realisation of peace and national reconciliation in the country.

Reciprocally, Yeltsin assured Razmyar of his assistance for the acceleration of the process of the political solution of the Afghan issue and ensurance of peace in the RA.

Yeltsin demanded Afghan envoy to convey his best gratitudes to Najibullah, president of the RA. He added that he will visit Afghanistan in an appropriate time in future.

RSFSR State Pension Law Issued

914F0074A

For the RSFSR State Pension Law published in the 7 December edition of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-91-004, pages 15-31.

Western Republics

Moldovan Communist Party Holds Conference

LD2601220191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1510 GMT 26 Jan 91

[By correspondent Fedor Angeliy]

[Text] Kishinev, 26 Jan (TASS)—A republican party conference began its work here today. Petr Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee, delivered a report "On the Central Committee's Political Activity and the Moldova Communist Party's Practical Tasks." The conference agenda also includes the question of the Moldova Communist Party rules. It is also due to discuss and adopt a number of other important documents: "Defending the Honor and Dignity of Communists," "Creation of a Social Support Fund for Communists," "The Party's Youth Policy," and "Concerning the Control and Auditing Commission of the Moldova Communist Party."

The speaker emphasized that the political struggle in the republic has intensified. It has entered a new phase. Its anticommunist direction has acquired fresh force. The Communist Party and its Central Committee are under attack from right and left. There has arisen the threat of a split in the party ranks. In his words, there are no small number of forces today who have earnestly set themselves the goal of weakening the Communist Party as much as possible and displacing it from the political arena.

All these trends, Petr Luchinskiy noted, have gathered force under the circumstances of a deepening crisis in the economy and the social sphere. The economic situation in the republic has sharply deteriorated, ties for integration between farms have been violated, the consumer market is in a critical state, the "shadow economy" is flourishing, and people's living standards are dropping. In 1990, the national income produced was 6.6 percent lower than for 1989.

The conference continues its work. Heated arguments have been raging over the role of the party and over the need for unity of party ranks at this time of difficulty for the republic and the country.

Party Statutes Approved

PM2901100091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent A. Pasechnik under the "Party Life: Events, Facts, Commentaries" rubric: "The Moldova Communist Party's Position"]

[Text] Kishinev, 27 Jan—A republic party conference took place here yesterday. P. Luchinskiy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Moldova Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the conference with a report on the Central Committee's political activities and the practical tasks facing the Moldova Communist Party. Delegates also heard a report by I. Gutsu, second secretary of the Central Committee, on the draft republic Communist Party charter.

A resolution "On the Moldova Communist Party's Political Position" was adopted, which stresses in particular the main objectives in the republic party organization's program—to ensure the national revival of the Moldavian people, to harmonize interethnic relations in the Moldova SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], to stop human rights violations on the grounds of nationality, world outlook, or any other factors, and to execute unconditionally the decree by the country's president "On Measures To Normalize the Situation in the Moldova SSR."

Delegates approved the Moldova Communist Party Statutes and the provision on the Moldova Communist Party Control and Auditing Commission.

Ukrainian Draftees Transferred Despite 'Promise'

LD2901105191 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] The MOLOD UKRAINY newspaper reports that the USSR Defense Ministry has broken its promise that the draftees from the Lvov region will serve in the Ukraine alone. Twenty-five draftees from Lvov and Sevastopol, the Crimea, have been transferred beyond the borders of Ukraine.

Ukrainian Politburo Discusses Draft Union Treaty

PM2901133191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Report by UKRINFORM and TASS correspondent A. Grigoryev under "Official" rubric: "Draft Union Treaty Under Discussion"]

[Text] Kiev, 25 Jan—The draft Union treaty and the decision to hold a referendum in respect of the USSR, which have been published in the all-Union press, are being discussed actively by communists and nonparty people, by all sections of the public in the Ukraine. Practically all political parties and associations in the republic, a number of which are working against the signing of the treaty in any version or form, have expressed their attitude toward it. This was stated at an enlarged session of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo. Its participants examined the question of the draft Union treaty and of the mass political work in connection with the holding of the nationwide referendum on the USSR.

It was pointed out that the delegates to the 28th congress of the republic Communist Party expressed the Ukrainian Communists' principled position in favor of preserving the renewed Union. At the same time a number of criticisms and amendments were voiced at the congress and also in speeches by Supreme Soviet Communist deputies and the public of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The chief thing in mass political work now, it was emphasized during the discussion, is to show and explain to people, first, why the Ukraine's communists advocate the Union and, second, what kind of Union they advocate and how they see its nature and functions.

Kravchuk Lauds Crimean Referendum on Autonomy

LD2801131791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1055 GMT 28 Jan 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Stanislav Volyanskiy]

[Text] Kiev, 28 Jan (UKRINFORM-TASS)—Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, called the referendum that took place in the Crimea on 20 January, on the status of this peninsula in the south of the republic, an example of good organization and of a responsible approach toward the resolution of this important issue by legal means. More than 80 percent of the adult population of the Crimea took part in the referendum. Of these, 93.3 percent came out in favor of the restoration of their own statehood, in the form of a Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic which is part of the Ukraine.

A session of the Crimean Oblast Soviet turned to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with a proposal that changes be made to the republic's Constitution consolidating the will of the population of the Crimea, and also with a request that a representation be made to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies about making appropriate amendments and addenda to the USSR Constitution.

"The question of the Crimea's autonomy is not new and, I think, its resolution in this way is just," Leonid Kravchuk stated, commenting on the results of the referendum. In his opinion, by their high level of activity during voting and their respect for the law the Crimeans had shown themselves to be equal to the situation. "They have set an example for everyone else who might wish to embark on this path."

New Concept Determined for Ukraine Constitution

LD2601184491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1825 GMT 25 Jan 91

[Text] Kiev. 25 Jan (UKRINFORM-TASS)—The concept of a new constitution for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has been worked out on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the republic by a group of experts in jurisprudence. The draft document has been prepared on the basis of the declaration of the state sovereignty of the Ukraine. It is aimed at creating a firm constitutional basis for the assertion of Ukrainian statehood and the democratic organization of society. Democracy must be based on the principles of legality and self-administration, on the clear demarcation of legislative, executive, and judiciary authority, on political pluralism, and on diversity of forms of property, it says. The basic law of the republic is aimed at consolidating the rights and freedoms of the citizens; their duties toward the state and society irrespective of their origin, nationality, religious belief, political convictions, or social and property status; guarantees of the rights of national minorities; and a recognition of the primacy of universal human values and the generally recognized norms of international law.

Taking into account the socialist nature of the social system, it proposes to maintain and enshrine in the new constitution the present name of the Ukrainian state—the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This is how it appears as both a founder and a member of the UN.

Protest Issued Over Fire in Dnepropetrovsk

LD2901163691 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] The information about setting in fire [as heard] of doors of Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party Committee and Dneptropetrovsk City Soviet has become a reason for a statement of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. The statement in particular reads the following: This was the consequence of actions of politized [as heard] organizations and groups on the platform of anticommunism. The Communist Party regional committee expresses its protest in connection with this incident and thinks that there appeared a real threat to stability and civil peace.

Ukraine, Poland Conclude Economic Trade Agreement

LD2601151191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1020 GMT 26 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Warsaw, 26 Jan (TASS)—Satisfaction with the results of the Ukrainian-Polish talks that ended here on Friday, and with the agreement that had been signed on economic cooperation and trade, was expressed in an interview given by Petr Serov, deputy chairman of the Ukraine's commission for economic cooperation with foreign countries, to the PAP News Agency. This is the first such agreement that the independent Ukrainian Republic has concluded with another state, he stressed.

Payment for goods and services covered by the agreement will be made in freshly convertible currency. According to the schedule for this year, Poland will supply its partner with light-industrial goods, machinery, and equipment, and will provide construction services. For its part, the Ukraine will sell its neighbor iron and manganese ore, metal, and vegetable oil. PAP reports that the Ukraine is also interested in buying 1 million tonnes of cement from the Poles, and intends to pay with gasoline, diesel fuel, and coal.

Ukrainian Student Hunger Striker's Case Closed

PM2801165191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel A. Polyakov: "Prosecutor's Office Rebuttal"]

[Text] Kiev, 24 Jan—Some days ago some sections of the central and republican mass media, including IZVESTIYA (16 January) reported that the public prosecutor's office in Kiev is prosecuting students who participared in a political hunger strike in October 1990. The fact that L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet guaranteed the personal safety of students in October, and now, it was said, this promise has been forgotten, was added to give a special caustic "relish" to the dish.

The Ukrainian SSR Public Prosecutor's Office has issued an official statement saying that criminal proceedings for participation in the hunger strike were not being instituted against any of the students. A. Doniy, a fifth course student at Kiev State University, was arrested for organizing the blockade of buildings and installations of the university, as a result of which the courses of more than 5,000 students were disrupted over three days in October. However, in view of A. Doniy's youth, out of humanitarian considerations, the republic's Public Prosecutor M. Potebenko had released him from custody, and the decision to close the criminal case had been taken. True, according to Doniy himself, he does not intend to repent of anything.

The republic prosecutor's office pointed out that the distortion of the real facts in the press and the publication of false information, was unacceptable.

Ukrainian Law on Prices, Price Formation

914A0225A

For the Ukrainian law on prices and price formation published in the 11 December issue of SILSKI VISTI, see the JPRS Report Soviet Union: Economic Affairs, JPRS-UEA-91-004, pages 38-41.

Caucasus

Georgia To Establish Army, Abolish Joint Patrols

AU3001091891 Paris AFP in English 0900 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Text] Moscow, Jan 30 (AFP)—The Georgian parliament has voted to set up an army in the southern republic under the auspices of the local interior ministry, a Georgian parliamentary spokesman said Wednesday, contacted in Tbilisi by telephone.

The spokesman said that Georgia became the first Soviet republic to take such a decision on Tuesday. So far there had been no reaction from Moscow, he said.

The time-frame and details of the move were to be worked out by the interior ministry, the spokesman added, saying that the number of soldiers to be trained was not known.

No other details were available.

In a further challenge to the Kremlin, the parliament also voted to suspend an order from the Soviet defence minister and interior minister providing for the Army to patrol alongside police from Friday, February 1.

The Georgian Supreme Soviet said Moscow's decision was "anti-constitutional" and "leads to dictatorship", the spokesman said.

The Georgian constitution was amended following last October's elections in Georgia which gave a parliamentary majority to pro-independence parties.

Police Withdrawal From South Ossetia Proposed

LD2901152791 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] Tbilisi January 29 TASS—Despite some time of relative stability in South Ossetia, tension has not fully abated there. TASS has learned from unofficial sources that militants belonging to unlawful armed groups such as Legion Gruzinskikh Sokolov, Mkhedrioni and Bely Georgy are reported to be amassing in Georgian villages located around Tskhinvali. Cases of their looting are reported, victimising the local population both of Georgian and Ossetian nationalities.

The leaders of the Ilya Pravedny Society appealed to members of their organisation to help the Georgian Supreme Soviet settle the conflict in South Ossetia. They think that the situation in the region remains serious.

At a press conference in Tbilisi on Monday [28 January], Mkhedrioni leader Dzhaba Ioseliani made a proposal that the Georgian Police be fully withdrawn from the conflict zone and Soviet Interior Ministry troops in South Ossetia be simultaneously moved to barracks.

Ioseliani thinks that his illegal armed groups should be vested with law enforcement powers because "they enjoy high authority among the Ossetian population and can settle the conflict without bloodshed".

Although Georgian Interior Ministry staff were withdrawn from South Ossetia, the drive to collect money, food and weapons for the Georgian Police in that region continues.

Situation in S. Ossetian Capital 'Contradictory'

PM2901135791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Semenyaka report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Who is To Instill Public Order"]

[Text] Tskhinvali—There seems to be progress in overcoming the deadlock situation here, in the region with a state of emergency. As a result of talks between representatives of the republic and the autonomous oblast, an accord has been reached on the withdrawal of internal affairs staffers of Georgian nationality from the city. Servicemen of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops have begun serving at checkpoints jointly with State Automobile Inspectorate staffers. They are preventing firearms and ammunition from being brought illegally into the city and extremists from entering it. On Sunday servicemen also began patrolling the streets of the oblast center.

But, despite the measures being taken, the situation in the city remains contradictory. On Saturday there were instances of armed clashes between persons of Georgian and Ossetian nationality. Then, too, cases of gross violations of public order were noted.

On the outskirts of the city persons of Georgian nationality stopped an ambulance. The medical personnel were beaten up. The patient was killed. Persons unknown set fire to several houses. The firemen who arrived on the scene were unable to extinguish them—the crews came under fire.

No shooting was observed Sunday. A patrol arrested four citizens of Ossetian nationality with weapons. The mass media appealed to residents to keep the peace and observe the requirements of the curfew.

Militia staffers of Ossetian nationality did not report for service. In the form of an ultimatum they declared that they will do so when their lives are not threatened with danger and proper public order is established in the city.

It is appropriate to ask: But who will instill and maintain it?

Georgian Railroad Protest Ends; Trains Operating

LD2901152891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Text] I spoke at the beginning of our panorama about the blockade of the railroad station at Samtredia in

Georgia. We have just been informed that after a few hours holdup, the trains have started moving. The action was organized by representatives of the Georgian National Congress, opposed to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. During the blockade of the station, political demands were put forward aimed against decisions of both the Union and the republican leadership.

Local Administration Bodies Created in Georgia

LD2901225791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1521 GMT 29 Jan 91

[By SAKINFORM-TASS correspondent Eduard Ediberidze and Tengiz Grigalashvili]

[Text] Tbilisi, 29 Jan (TASS)—In Georgia, beginning today, in rayons and towns subordinate to the republic, the prefecture [prefektura] becomes the body of local administration, while in villages and settlements it is the local authority office [uprava]. This decision is embodied in a law of this Transcaucasian republic on local administration during the transition period. It was adopted here today at a sitting of the first session of the Georgian Supreme Council.

The prefect [prefekt], being the highest official in rayons and towns, ensures the protection of overall republican interests and the implementation of the decisions of higher bodies of state power. According to the law, he is appointed by agreement with the Council of Ministers on the basis of a submission from the chairman of the Georgian legislature, and is released from the post by its Presidium.

The prefect is accountable to the legislature, its Presidium, and the republic's Council of Ministers, and the local authority and its administrator [upravitel] are accountable to the relevant assembly [sobraniye] or prefect. The prefect's term of office is four years. The same person may be appointed to this position for no more than two terms consecutively. It is noteworthy that the prefects of rayons and towns in an autonomous republic are appointed, by agreement with the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers, by the Presidium of the Georgian legislature on the basis of a submission by the chairman of the autonomous republic's Supreme Soviet.

The republic's Supreme Soviet adopted the law on the election of local bodies of power—the assemblies [sobraniya]. Their elections are scheduled for 31 March 1991. A law on referendums was also adopted at the session.

Armenians Attack Vehicles, Town in Azerbaijan

NC2901163291 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Armenians fired on and stoned a six-truck convoy traveling from Agdam to Shusha on 26 January. The Armenian bandits overturned one truck, which bore license plate number AB 9827, and set fire to it. The other trucks were also seriously damaged. Drivers Akhmedov, Abbasov, and Gasanov were wounded and hospitalized.

(?Badzhikardash) town in Mir-Bashirskiy Rayon came under automatic weapons fire from (?Saare) town in Mardakertskiy Rayon on 27 January. The bandits then attacked the town and stole 350 head of cattle from the Akhundov collective farm.

Another very serious crime was committed on the same day. Armed Armenians wearing military uniforms fired on two vehicles, which bore license plates numbers O 2510 AB and 5947 ABY and were being driven by Namazov and Gasanov near the town of Dozular in Khanlarskiy Rayon. Three people were killed and three more seriously wounded in the attack. The victims were from the towns of Chanaklar and Yeni Ali-Bayramly in Khanlarskiy Rayon.

Three deaths in a single day. God knows what will happen next.

Azerbaijan Communist Party Plenum Opens 28 Jan

LD2901110691 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0202 GMT 29 Jan 91

[Excerpts] On 28 January the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee held a meeting. First secretaries of town and rayon party committees who are not members of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, chairmen of town and rayon executive committees, leading officials of ministries, state committees, and main departments, senior officials of the Central Committee, the presidential apparatus, the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, and representatives of the mass media were invited to the plenum.

The plenum was opened by Ayaz Mutalibov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, and president of the republic.

Those who died in Nagorno-Karabakh and border region rayons during the period between the two plenums were remembered.

Ayaz Mutalibov read a report on the first item on the agenda—the duties of the party organization of the republic concerning the social and political situation and transition to the market economy.

A report by Viktor Polyanichko, second secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee, on finalising the structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee commissions and party committees was heard. [passage omitted]

The plenum adopted decisions on both questions.

Later the plenum examined an organizational matter. In connection with Veli Mamedov being elected deputy chairman of the commission for supervision and control, and in connection with Takhir Abasov being elected member of the Presidium of the commission for supervision and control, both were relieved of membership of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee.

With this the plenum of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee concluded its work.

Azerbaijan Officials Examine Refugee Situation

NC2801084891 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] The enlarged meeting held by the collegium of the republic's procurator office together with the leading officials of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, the State Committee for Refugee Affairs, the Association of Azerbaijani Refugees, the Baku City and Rayon Soviet Executive Committees, and the popular courts examined the measures put into effect to consolidate the housing legislation and strengthen control on the work carried out to meet the needs of the citizens, who have been forced to leave their places of permanent residence, in accordance with their legal rights and interests.

It was noted that a few hundred thousand refugees have arrived in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic as a result of the incidents which have occurred in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO]. More than 85,000 refugees are living in Baku alone at the present time. Meanwhile, refugees continue to immigrate to Baku. This is indicative of the fact that the required attention has not been given to the question of providing employment for the refugees and to the question of meeting their social needs. In view of this, the people, who have seriously suffered from the dreadful wave of Armenian extremism, have been moving from various places in the republic because of the failure of leading officials to treat them with concern and attention.

Benefitting from the recent situation and using false documents, citizens posing as refugees have occupied a number of houses. Many houses have been occupied in this way. Actually, 11,425 houses have been arbitrarily occupied. Meanwhile, more than 80,000 families were registered for housing facilities in Baku on 1 January 1990.

The office of the republic's procurator and the other law enforcement organs have put a number of measures into effect to [words indistinct] and evacuate the occupants of the said houses. However, the housing organs in Baku and in the other regions have not been taking the measures required to protect the vacant houses, prevent the collapse of the housing fund, and secure a fair distribution from the fund's resources. No measure has been taken to empty the illegally occupied houses in Stepanakert, where 12,000 Azerbaijanis lived in the past. The [word indistinct] organs have not made an effort to secure compliance with the decision to vacate the illegally occupied houses. Nor have they cooperated with the workers of the militia [word indistinct] and housing (?organs).

The state committee and the refugee association have failed to focus attention on the question of accomodating the refugees in the republic's rayons, creating the conditions required for [words indistinct], and preventing the refugees from immigrating to Baku.

The collegium drew the attention of the local soviet executive committees to the fact that the collapse of the housing fund cannot be allowed. Meanwhile, the office of the procurator of the NKAO was instructed to resolve the question of vacating all illegally occupied houses in the NKAO. The collegium assigned the city and rayon procurators with the task of strengthening their control on the work carried out to effectively implement the housing legislation, maintain the housing fund, and safeguard the interests of the refugees.

Armenian Leader Briefs Legislature on Lithuania

NC2901124691 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Excerpts] The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet continued its deliberations today. [passage omitted] Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, informed the session about his visits to Lithuania and Italy:

[Begin Ter-Petrosyan recording] Our mission to Lithuania took place at our own initiative with the consent of the Council of the Federation and with the prior agreement of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman Landsbergis. We visited Vilnius at his request. This was the first thing. Second, the aim of the visit was not to solve the political problems or make political evaluations. The sole aim of the visit was to avert bloodshed and halt the illegal operations carried out by the Army. Our delegation fully achieved its objective with the help of the Lithuanian authorities: The further tragic spread of the incidents was checked.

There have been various assessments of the situation both in the Soviet Union and abroad and one could either agree or disagree with them. The most correct one is that an attempted coup d'etat took place. That is obvious enough. An unconstitutional organization was set up called the National Salvation Committee, which so far remains obscure no matter who represents it. and it was under the pressure of this committee that the troops undertook the operation that resulted in bloodshed. The military command did not hide the fact that the troops acted on the decision of the National Salvation Committee. They showed us the written decision of that committee.

The fact that an unconstitutional (?committee) could force the troops to launch an operation is alarming. This could be an extremely dangerous precedent, because had that coup d'etat succeeded in Lithuania it could have spread to the other republics, such as Latvia, Estonia, and even Russia, where similar national salvation committees were set up. This was one of the objectives of this military operation. The second and more important aim was to create a situation in Lithuania and in other Baltic republics which would have presented a pretext to introduce presidential rule in these republics. This was the ultimate aim, for during all our contacts the military and especially the Russian-speaking population, as though by previous agreement, insisted on a single demand: to introduce presidential rule in Lithuania. It is obvious that such a move would have been a deplorable precedent because once such a rule were introduced in any republic the center would try to do the same in all the insubordinate republics. Thanks in part to the mission of our delegation this was averted. We succeeded in convincing both the military officials and the center that the introduction of presidential rule would be extremely dangerous in particular in view of the fact that at present no one knows what presidential rule means.

Even considering that Gorbachev could introduce such a system in any republic, the problem for him would be how to enforce his authority. He could only do this with the assistance of the troops considering that the introduction of such a rule would immediately be followed by widespread civil disobedience and therefore Gorbachev could run such a republic through the use of military force, just the thing now taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh; he has no other means to implement this rule. For the time being this dangerous counterstrike by the reactionary forces was checked and I think that this could be considered an important victory for the democratic forces at this stage, since I do not exclude the possibility that in the future similar situations will arise, attempts will be made to organize coup d'etats and introduce presidential rule. We have to act more flexibly in order not to create such opportunities.

However, I want to note, and this was recognized by many Lithuanian politicians, that their leaders do not always pursue a flexible policy. They could have achieved the same results with more refined steps and not through such confrontations which engendered this tense situation. It already appears that the Baltic authorities will act more flexibly and negotiate with the opposition forces, the center and the military command to solve the current problems. This was even recognized by the politicians of the Baltic republics. It should be realized that there are grave problems in the Baltic republics, both on the domestic front—with this I mean the existence of the national minorities and their genuine problems—and in foreign relations. It is not possible to give an unequivocal assessment to the movements in the Baltic republics which must make a great deal of effort to ensure domestic stability and forge inner harmony, for the internal antagonisms could always be used by the center as a pretext for intervention. Therefore, they face very serious problems, but which could have been solved by political means and there was no need at all for the military intervention. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Armenian Official Rules Out Price Increases

NC2501122591 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 2130 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Text] The whole world knows that prices are soaring in the USSR. Why and how? Levon Barkhutaryan, deputy chairman of the republic's State Committee for Economy, addressed this question in an interview in HAYASTANI HANRAPETUTYUN.

He said: There are several reasons for the price increases. First of all, the transition to market relations require a free pricing policy based on the correlation of supply and demand in the market. Taking into account the great shortages of goods and services in the USSR, it can definitely be stated that in the initial stages of the transition to market relations, the price of goods and services will go up.

This is not, however, the only reason, Levon Barkhutaryan noted. While leaving the retail prices of foodstuffs and mass consumption goods unchanged, the central government has increased the prices of the raw materials, fuel, and power, well aware that faced with this situation the republics which have taken to the road of independence will be forced to increase retail prices themselves. This will result in popular discontent with local governments.

Levon Barkhutaryan stressed: The Armenian Government declares unequivocally that the prices of primary consumer goods will remain unchanged in the republic until the means are found to compensate the population for the losses sustained from retail price markups.

Armenian Government Appoints Representatives

NC2201181091 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0700 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Text] The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium met soon after the morning session of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet on 21 January. Babken Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, chaired the Presidium meeting.

Ktrich Sardaryan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Republic Council of Ministers, presented the government's proposal to appoint plenipotentiary representatives in Charentsavan and Goris cities in line with the law on the local elections.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium examined the candidates proposed and then endorsed the government's proposal to appoint Zori Ishkhanyan as the government's plenipotentiary representative in Charentsavan and Hamlet Mkrtichyan in Goris.

The Presidium also examined other current problems pertaining to the political situation in the republic.

Further on Appointments

NC2901141891 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 28 Jan 91

[Text] Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium met on 28 January chaired by Babken Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

Ktrich Sardaryan, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, presented the government's proposal to appoint a plenipotentiary representative of the government in Sisyanskiy rayon.

The Supreme Soviet Presidium examined the nomination and concurred with the government to appoint Mayis Kristaporovich Pogosyan as the plenipotentiary representative in Sisyanskiy Rayon.

Central Asia

Kazakhstan's Abdildin Views Union Treaty

PM2301112591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Serikbolsyn Abdildin, deputy chairman of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, by Colonel A. Ladin; place and date of interview not given: "Union Treaty: View From the Republics. There Is No Substitute for Cooperation"]

[Text] [Ladin] The opinion exists that Kazakhstan is being forced to sign the Union treaty since it cannot do without constant external assistance. Is this the case?

[Abdildin] No, of course not. If these rumors are arising because Kazakhstan really does receive subsidies from the Union budget, then at least we should understand the point of these financial operations. It is as follows: Even to to this day, as a result of the failure to regulate prices, the republics that supply raw materials are in a disadvantageous position with respect to their partners who have a well developed processing industry. Subsidies are a kind of instrument for a fairer redistribution of revenue. I can easily prove this. Kazakhstan cannot be a destitute republic as it possesses much that is valued in the current domestic and world economy. Judge for yourselves: The republic, having only six percent of the union's overall population, provides the country with eight percent of the gold mined, nine percent of petroleum extracted, 12 percent of the coal, 20 percent of the phosphates, and 30 percent of the copper.

A total of 1.8 tonnes of grain per capita of the population is produced in Kazakhstan.

In order to be understood correctly, however, I would like to stress that as a result of the complex structure of the distribution of labor between the republics that has taken shape during the years of Soviet power, it is difficult for Kazakhstan today to break up the familiar vitally important ties. We import approximately 40 percent of consumer goods, including food, from other regions in the country. I recently spoke to the director of one of the enterprises in Chimkent. I found out that the plant workers receive 4,800 large and small subassemblies from various areas of the Soviet Union, and only 128 types come from the territory of Kazakhstan itself. I think it is clear how much we value cooperation with our traditional partners.

[Ladin] So does that mean that the main idea behind Kazakhstan's adamant determination to sign the new Union treaty is its desire to live and work hand in hand with the peoples of the other sovereign republics.

[Abdildin] It stands to reason. Discussing the draft treaty, the members of our legislature have advocated the idea that the Soviet Union should always remain a powerful and authoritative state capable of exerting a positive influence on the processes taking place in the world. This can only be achieved if we are closely united on the basis of the sovereignty of each republic. I would also like to cite other reasons why Kazakhstan is aiming for the preservation and strengthening of the Union. First of all, because our republic is multinational. Up to 120 nations and ethnic groups live in it. People are linked to their relatives and friends throughout the whole country by a large number of living ties.

Second, isolation will not give us anything apart from new losses. Some people are blindly expressing confidence that we can survive even without the Soviet Union, by striking up a friendship with Western businessmen. They say that these are the people who will support us, and drag us out of the mire of economic disorder with lavish investments. This is a dangerous delusion. No capitalist invests his resources anywhere without a definite purpose. Very soon those who have a penchant for foreign handouts would find themselves hopelessly fettered without even noticing it.

Don't get me wrong, I am not opposed to foreign investments in general. But we must use them in a reasonable way. To be more exact, in an enterprising way. For what purpose? Perhaps in order to enrich ourselves with new technologies, and renew our production facilities by using world achievements.

[Ladin] You spoke of the importance of cooperation between republics and mutual assistance between them. But people are saying that Kazakhstan is now holding on to the rich grain harvest in its granaries. Allegedly because of this, a shortage is developing in certain areas in the country.

[Abdildin] The question is not altogether tactful. What do you mean "holding on to"? We have stopped dispatching it around the country automatically. Admittedly, grain is supplied to Moscow and Leningrad as before without any additional contracts, according to existing delivery norms. In other cases, in answer to the government decisions of a number of Union republics, we are adhering to a different policy than before: Those who are guaranteeing equivalent supplies in return and those who are not violating earlier economic ties are the ones who receive the grain. Unfortunately Kazakhstan is going through great difficulties today as a result of existing ties being broken. But now we are trying to put the situation right as quickly as possible. In particular, horizontal contracts have been concluded with Central Asian republics, Belorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine. Naturally the structure of our economic ties with these republics is changing. We need reliable partners.

[Ladin] Will the Union treaty be signed soon in your opinion?

[Abdildin] It could have been signed a long time ago. Then the many misfortunes assailing us would have been avoided. In my opinion, the Union leadership became needlessly involved in the fruitless discussion with those who do not like the actual political essence of the future Union treaty and who would like to turn aside from the path of socialism. This desire by certain politicians is quite obvious. And there is no point in saying that the treaty is imperfect. To my mind, the document takes into account quite fully the interests of both the republics and the Union as a whole. Surely all that needs to be done is to stress more thoroughly the sovereign rights of each component of the federation.

Kazakhstan's legislature supports the idea that no one should be dragged into the new Union by force. To begin with, let those who have long been expressing approval for the preservation of the Union sign the treaty. And after that we can see who has won and who has lost. It seems to me that there is no substitute for cooperation. This has long been clear to the whole world. Those who adhere to this principle do not suffer.

We need the treaty as quickly as possible. After all, look what is happening with the formation of the Union budget for the current year. Because of the confusion many sectors of the national economy are suffering. It might take us years to eliminate the consequences. We must not allow our defense to be weakened. Kazakhstan has unequivocally advocated a situation whereby the Armed Forces are united and we do not recognize any republic armies. This means that there should not be any delays in the financing of our defense program on the scale determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

We need to to take particular pains lest the scientific-technical standard of the military industry decline. Why do I mention this? Because we cannot count on the reduction of the Armed Forces in terms of numerical strength if we do not strive to secure an improvement of weapons, combat equipment, and of their quality and effectiveness, and an enhancement of the personnel's skill through training.

Alma-Ata Workers' Movement To Help Communists

LD2601115191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 26 Jan 91

[From the POSTFAKTUM news agency]

[Text] With the support of the Alma-Ata City Communist Party, a workers' movement is being set up. On 9 February its constituent assembly will take place. According to the deputy chairman of the (?KZMV) [expansion unknown] organizing committee, the workers' movement will help the Communist Party recover its authority from below.